Situational Paper


The unfortunate incident of the burning of the bogies of Sabarmati Express on February 27, 2002, in the Indian State of Gujarat, has sparked a wave of Hindu-Muslim riots in the State. The Sabarmati Express was coming from Ayodhya carrying Hindu activists when it was attacked by a mob in Gujarat. Some 58 Hindu activists were burned alive. The Hindu activists were returning from Ayodhya after participating in religious rituals which were meant to seek divine blessings before the construction of the Ram temple. The hard-line Hindu organisations, such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal have accused Muslims for the attack. VHP regarded the train incident as a ‘manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism.’ (‘He Ram’ The Week, March 10, 2002). Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee termed the incident as ‘unfortunate.’ However, he did not condemn the Muslims for the attack. On February 28, the VHP called for a statewide strike to condemn the attack. The Hindu protestors became violent resulting in the targeted killing of Muslims and destruction of Muslim property in Gujarat. As violence spread in the State, 26 cities, including Ahmedabad, Baroda, Rajkot and Surat have been placed under curfew. So far, more than 1000 people, mainly Muslims, have been killed in the State. There are reports that the Hindu-Muslim riots have also spread to some parts of Uttar Pradesh.

The ineffective response by the Gujarat police and other law enforcing departments during this turmoil was quite obvious. The State government gave ‘shoot-at-sight’ orders after two days’ of violence. The Gujarat police remained silent spectators even when a building opposite the Commissioner’s office was burned. Another example is that of the Congress I’s former member of parliament, Eshan Jaffri, a Muslim, who was burned alive along with his family. Reportedly, police sources admitted that he made various calls to the police informing them about the danger and asked for help, but the police turned a blind eye. (‘200+ on the Human Richter’ Outlook, March 11, 2002).

The irresponsible attitude of the police and State government has been criticised by Indian Opposition parties and human rights organisations. On March 1, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in India considered the matter at a full Commission meeting in New Delhi. The NHRC report states: ‘the news items report a communal flare-up in Gujarat and what is more disturbing, they suggest inaction by the police force and the highest functionaries in the State to deal with this situation. In view of the urgency of the matter, it would not be appropriate for this commission to stay its hand till the veracity of these reports has been established and it is necessary to proceed immediately assuming them to be prima facie correct.’ (The Times of India, March 1, 2002). The Commission issued notices to the State government and Director General police to submit their reports before the Commission.

Why would the State government show such irresponsibility in containing the communal violence? It may be noted that after the recent State Assembly elections in four States, BJP is only in power in three States and Gujarat is one of them. The rational response of the State government to the communal violence should have been to ensure that it remains limited and not create a grave law and order situation in the State. Why then the State government did not act immediately to contain the violence? One important reason could be that the Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, belongs to Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS). Furthermore, Gujrat is a stronghold of VHP. Therefore, no matter what the declaratory stance is, the Chief Minister’s support to VHP is quite obvious. ‘This is perhaps a reason why the police failed to act against the rioters. In fact, the lower police cadres obliquely hinted at being told not to act. ‘We’re caught between the devil and the deep sea. If we do not act we may be in trouble. But if we do we’ll be in worse trouble with people in the government,’ said a senior police officer on condition of anonymity.’(‘200+ on the Human Richter,’ Outlook, March 11, 2002.)

In this context, the BJP government at the centre, especially Mr. Vajpayee, is also facing a serious dilemma. During the State Assembly elections in February 2002, the policy of communal polarisation adopted by BJP did not yield the desired results. The BJP’s tacit support to VHP’s campaign for building the Ram temple in Ayodhya after March 12, this year, failed to unite Hindu voters in favour of BJP. As part of NDA the BJP could not openly support VHP in its campaign. However, the BJP government only gave declaratory statements of not letting VHP construct the Ram temple. It took no concrete measures to stop the VHP activities in Ayodhya for the construction of the Ram temple. VHP activists have been categorically saying that they will not give up their campaign. Also, Mr. Vajpayee’s remarks regarding winning of elections without Muslim support backfired. This not only united the Muslims against the BJP, but also widened the Hindu-Muslim divide. The election results in the four States show that BJP has suffered a heavy defeat. This will certainly have a negative impact on BJP’s position in NDA. Therefore, the dilemma is that if Mr. Vajpayee ‘attempts to pander to the VHP, the NDA allies will pull the rug from under his government. If he cracks down on the VHP, he could well face a mini-revolt from his own MPs and alienate the Sangh Parivar.’ (‘The Arson Within,’ Outlook, March 11, 2002). It has to be seen whether the BJP government at the centre is able to stop or limit the activities of VHP. Since the VHP, in its campaign of Ram temple, has tacit support of the BJP, the latter has for the time being persuaded them to limit the activities for lowering down the heightened tensions and the political pressures being faced by BJP.

Mr. Vajpayee is also confronted with the division within BJP over the support to VHP activities for the construction of the Ram temple. Some BJP Members of Parliament are of the view, that for them ‘Ram came before rajniti (statecraft)’ and they would participate in kar sevak even if it amounts to violation of any party directive.

The Muslim community in India is the second largest religious community and forms almost two-third of all the religious minorities taken together. According to the census report 2001, published by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, the provisional Muslim population in thirteen Indian States exceeds one million and is nearly 97% of the national Muslim population in India. For details see Appendix. However, the unfortunate fact is that the Muslim community in India is facing economic stagnation, social backwardness and threat of communal violence.

Since independence, some 6,000 incidents of Hindu-Muslim riots have taken place in India in which Muslims have been the major victims. The major ones include those in Jabalpur, Ahmedabad, Moradabad, and Meerut. Some important Hindu-Muslim riots in the last two decades are listed below:

  • In the 1983 Assam massacre, some 7,000 Muslims were killed.
  • In 1987, 320 people were killed in Hindu-Muslim riots in different parts of India.
  • In the October riots in Orissa in 1989, some 1,500 Muslims were killed.
  • In 1989, major Hindu-Muslim riots took place in Guajrat, Bihar, Indian-held Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bengal, where 611 people were killed.
  • In 1990, there were major Hindu-Muslim riots in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Some 630 people died.
  • In 1992, in Aligarh 92 persons were killed in Hindu-Muslim riots out of which 60 were Muslims.
  • In 1992, in Jaipur riots 43 out of 47 killed were Muslims.
  • In 1992, in Ayodhya, due to the destruction of the Babri mosque, in widespread Hindu-Muslim riots more than 2,000 people were killed, mostly Muslims. Kanpur, Surat and Bombay were the worst hit cities.
  • In January 1993, 600 Muslins died and 2,000 were injured following riots in Bombay.
  • In Surat riots, in 1993, after the Babri mosque incident, Muslims suffered 90-95 percent of human and property losses.

(Source: ‘Hindu Extremism, Indian Muslims & The Issue of Human Rights’, Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Vol. XX, No.1, January 2001, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad).

A careful analysis of the Hindu-Muslim riots shows that Hindus were primarily instrumental in instigating them. Muslims were not only the planned targets for killing but were also accused of starting the riots as well. As reported in HRW World Report 1999, ‘several senior officials of the BJP, including Home Minister Lal Kishan Advani, have been implicated in instigating anti-Muslim violence in riots that took place after groups aligned with the BJP destroyed the Babri Masjid, a sixteenth-century mosque, in 1992. In 1998, these groups threatened to go ahead with plans to build a temple on the site of the destroyed mosque despite the prospect of further violence.’ The report also mentions the incident of Hindu-Muslim riots in Maharashtra, and states: ‘the state government led by the BJP and Shiv Sena, another Hindu nationalist group, launched a campaign to deport Bengali-speaking Muslims, claiming that they were illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. The new government did little to address other longstanding human rights concerns, including child labor and caste violence.’

Another important example is of the report submitted by Bombay High Court Justice B.N. Srikrishna, who conducted the one-man commission of inquiry into the 1992-93 Bombay riots. The report ‘determined that the riots were the result of a deliberate and systematic effort to incite violence against Muslims, some of whom had carried out spontaneous and sometimes violent protests following the destruction of the Babri Masjid. More than 700 people died in the riots, a vast majority of them were Muslims. The report singled out Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray, and Chief Minister Manohar Joshi, as being responsible for inciting violence and recommended that they be prosecuted.’

Assessment

  1. The rise of BJP has gravely threatened the Muslims as well as the secular image of India. The formation of coalition governments at the centre was seen as a development which could marginalise the Hindutva policy of BJP. However, it has now become obvious that despite pressures from its coalition partners, BJP has been trying to use the Hindu communal card to strengthen its political base. The State Assembly elections in February 2002 and the Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat indicate that religion has become a permanent factor in Indian politics.
  2. Since the policy of using the Hindu communal card for strengthening the political base has backfired and placed BJP government in a difficult situation, it will try to convince the VHP to suspend its activities for the time being. As has become obvious, regarding its decision to start building the Ram temple after March 15, the VHP after talks with the government has accepted to wait for the Supreme Court decision. However, this does not mean that BJP government will adopt any tough measures against VHP, as BJP itself supports the idea of building the Ram temple. It is only because of political reasons – to prevent rift within NDA – that BJP is not vocal about its support.
  3. On the contrary, the possibility of using VHP for instigating communal violence in order to build pressure on non-BJP regional governments - especially Congress I governments - cannot be ruled out. If the BJP government at the centre feels that non-BJP regional governments are becoming too powerful or trying to influence the government at the centre, it may use VHP to create law and order situation in that State.
  4. In order to counter internal pressures regarding BJP government’s inefficiency in controlling the violence the BJP government will, as usual, repeat the argument of suspected Pakistani involvement in Gujarat violence.

---Fahmida Ashraf            
Senior Research Fellow

Appendix

Table - I

     

Total Population Rate of Decadal Growth

 

Total

As % of Total

Muslim Population Rate of Decadal Growth

S. No.

India/States

2001

1991-2001

1991

(1991)

1981-91

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

  India

1027.02

21.34

105.55

12.93

31.19

1.

UP

174.53

25.56

24.11

17.33

36.54

2.

W. Bengal

80.22

17.84

16.08

23.61

36.89

3.

Bihar

109.79

27.16

12.79

14.81

29.50

4.

Maharashtra

96.70

22.57

7.63

9.67

31.40

5.

Kerala

29.10

9.42

6.79

23.33

25.49

6.

Assam

26.64

18.85

6.37

28.43

41.62

7.

AP

75.73

13.86

5.92

8.91

30.66

8.

Kanataka

52.73

17.25

5.23

11.64

25.71

9.

J&K

10.07

29.04

3.96

64.18

30.00

10.

Gujarat

50.60

22.48

3.61

8.73

24.05

11.

Rajasthan

56.47

28.33

3.53

8.01

41.46

12.

MP

81.19

22.68

3.28

4.96

31.21

13.

Tamil Nadu

62.11

11.19

3.05

5.47

21.14

14.

Delhi

13.78

46.3

10.89

9.44

51.45

Note: The Provisional Totals figures, has been utilized, in conjunction with the data of the Census of India, 1991, to make an approximation of Muslim population, in the country and State-wise, as on January 1, 2001.

Source: Approximate Muslim Population in India (2001),’ The Milli Gazette, March 5, 2002.


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