RESURGENCE OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF UZBEKISTAN

 Mehwish Hassan Sara *

Introduction 

Islam resurfaced in Central Asia in the 1990s after being in hibernation for eighty years during the Soviet rule. The Soviet disintegration gave way to the stifled ethno-religious sentiments of the Central Asian people. Independence from Soviet Union brought forth economic and political tribulations for the unprepared Central Asian States that were further intensified by accompanying social and cultural transition. Collapse of the authoritarian Soviet rule came as both, a blessing and affliction for the Central Asian people. The Soviet disintegration left a religious, cultural and political vacuum which needed to be filled by some alternative substantive system. Islam and democracy were evidently viewed by the governments and people of these states as the only available options for survival as the governments of these states declared Islam as their official religion.

The renaissance of Islamic traditions and culture in Central Asia in the 1990s is attributed to the recurrence of the phenomenon that existed in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s when the activities of low key Islamists became noticeably evident. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remained the nucleus of clandestine ventures of the Sufis who strived for the restoration of Islam during that period. Despite the fact that these activities were crushed by the tough Soviet policies, religious elements remained active in the social sub-strata of former Soviet republics. 

Perestroika and Glasnost, the policies of social and economic openness, enunciated in the Gorbachev era (1985-1990), let low key religious elements to establish their organisational framework. This was the era when Islamic revivalism became a vital religious movement for the people of Central Asian States to follow.1 This trend intensified further after the collapse of the Soviet Union and resulted in the rapid growth of madrassahs across Central Asia. The madrassahas were an outcome of the Afghan-Soviet war and initially operated in the areas of Central Asia adjacent to the Afghan territory. Religious Scholars who operated these madrassahs belonged to States of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Jordan, Egypt, Chechnya and Pakistan. They were trained in Islamic schools in Pakistan’s North-western territory.2 

Initially, the strengthening of the madrassah network was not taken seriously into consideration by the autocratic regimes of Central Asian States, but subsequently the increasing power and influence of the Islamic orthodox factions posed a serious threat to these regimes. Long borders with war-ravaged Afghanistan also proved to be a constant source of cross-border infiltration of militants that further bolstered the operational capability of these groups. The Central Asian states became more aware of the Islamic groups presence in this region after the US and Russia perceived threat from these militant groups. 

The main focus of this research paper is to review the historical status of Islam, origin of resurgent movements and the vital role played by the Islamic fundamentalist factions in the politically volatile region of Central Asia. An attempt will also be made to analyse the threat posed by religious groups to the stability of the Central Asian States regimes. The paper will also examine the measures taken up by the state regimes, especially the Uzbek government, to curb militancy in the areas under its authority. New political and religious challenges faced by the Uzbek government will also be discussed. 

Historical Perspective of Islam in Central Asia 

Genesis of Islam 

The arrival of Islam in Central Asia is attributed largely to the wars fought between the Arab raiders and the native tribesmen in the third quarter of the seventh century. The year 644 AD. marked the beginning of Arab conquests and by the end of the seventh century, most of the Central Asian region had been conquered by the Arabs.3 

Although Islam was not the first monotheist religion to be introduced in Central Asia, it has remained alive in the Central Asian culture since the seventh century AD.4  

Samanids adopted Islam as the official religion in the Samanid state for the first time in the Central Asian region (875-999 A.D). Samanids abolished small city states and fiefdoms and created politically centralised state with  Bukhara as its capital and Khiva, Kokand and Samarkand as federating units. Bukhara later stood out to be the educational and religious hub of Muslims. It was independent of Baghdad caliphate and was ruled by the local dynasty of the provincial governors.5

By the end of the tenth century, Islam occupied an important status in the Samanid state’s politics since the Samanid Muslim preachers sought to Islamise nomadic people.6 Samanids regulated and expanded the Silk Route, which made Bukhara, the Samanid capital, as centre of religious, cultural and trade activities. Samanids incorporated religion into politics and set a new trend of using religion and language as instruments for exerting and spreading political influence. As the local people of this region were familiar with Persia, the Samanid rulers found it easier to administer the dynasty through use of Persian language.7 

The Samanid Empire came to an end by the year 999 AD. With the arrival of the catalyst Turkic tribes (Ghaznavids-Qarakhanids). Subsequently, the Seljuks defeated them and established their dominance all over the Central Asian region. Islam neither dilapidated nor flourished under these rulers. 

With the lessening of the significance of the land route that linked Central Asia to the outer world as a result of the regulation of sea routes to India, Europe and Africa, the advent of the seventeenth century brought the decline of Silk Route trade dramatically.8 The decline of trade led to the decrease in income of these states and meant that Central Asian rulers lost the capability of keeping large standing armies to keep their influence and expand their kingdoms. Islamic clergy who had tremendous influence over the life of a common man impeded innovations in education and social life, as they thought innovations and modernisation as anti-Islamic traditions. In mosques, preaching of these clerics through prayer sermons depicted this trend evidently, as the common people spent their lives according to teachings of these clerics. This trend further marginalised and isolated Central Asia from the rest of the developing world. 

Subsequent years marked the rise of Shaybani dynasty (1451-1510 AD). As a result of the events that marked the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, the Shabayni dynasty which upheld Islam as their supreme religion, gradually degenerated into city-based fiefdoms. In the eighteenth century, three Khanates (fiefdoms) known as Khiva, Kokand, Bukhara ruled by the patriarchs called Khans emerged.9 Islam as depicted by Islamic clergy survived in those days and the common man relied on clergy for religious guidance more than on Quran.10 

In the mid of 1860s, the Russian considerations to take Central Asia into the fold of Russian empire were made imperative by the fact that the cutting off of the US cotton supplies for the Russian factories had brought the Russian industrial cycle to a halt. Central Asia in this situation provided the best cotton raw material. On the other hand, the Russian empire did not want to loose this region in the critical era of the Great Game, when Great Britain and Russian empires wanted to outmanoeuvre each other. Russia felt consistently threatened from the expansion of British Empire towards Afghanistan that could lead to Central Asia.11  

Islam During the Period of the Tsars  

During the period between 1865 and 1876, the Russian Tsars captured Tashkent and rest of the Uzbek areas. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were also subjugated by the Tsarist army, however, the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan were kept open. The bandits and the tribal chiefs often took refuge in each other’s territories.12

Islam in Central Asia became less diverse and dynamic not because of the reason that new Russian rulers imposed restrictions on Islam, but due to the fact that Russians gave the Muslim ultra-conservative clerics  incentives of modernised life, health, education and industrial benefits to enhance coherence between the new masters and the ruled ones.13

The new Russian rulers got only partly successful as the incorporation of the modern way of life and Western ideas gave way to modern interpretation of Islam known as Usul-e-Jadida or Jadidism (new educational principles). Jadidism was one of the intellectual Islamic movements which swept over the colonised Muslim world in the late nineteenth century.14

Jadidism remained an intellectual rather than a popular movement. Cleavages in the movement, due to ideological and political differences, hindered the way of progress of this movement. The Jadids also joined the communist party after 1917, and helped in building indigenous communist parties, but it did not benefit them as expected. When Stalin came to power, he termed the Jadids as the Bourgeois reformers who in thousands were later brutally eliminated in the purge of 1937.15

Islam under the Bolshevik rule

The Bolshevik Revolution engulfed Central Asia in 1917, by establishing Bolshevik rule over the entire region. The Bolsheviks found Central Asia as deeply fragmented and highly politicised region with anti-Russian feelings put ablaze by the Islamic clerics. In 1917, the Bolsheviks awarded the right of self-determination to the local ethnic national groups.16 

Sacred Islamic monuments, books and things pillaged by the Tsars were returned to the mosques. The days of Muslim celebrations were declared to be the legal holidays throughout Central Asia. An equivalent court system was formed in 1921, with Islamic courts rendering justice in harmony with Sharia laws. A special Sharia Commission was established in the Soviet Commissariat of Justice. Some Sharia sentences that contravened Soviet law, such as stoning or the cuttingoff of hands, were forbidden. Decisions of the Sharia courts that concerned these matters had to be confirmed by higher organs of justice.  

A corresponding education system was also established. In 1922, rights to certain “waqf” 17 (religious bequest) properties were restored to Muslim administration, with the condition that they would be used for education only. As a result, the system of madrassahs (religious schools) was established. In 1925, there were 1,500 madrassahs with 45,000 students in the Caucasus state of Dagestan, as opposed to just 183 state schools. In contrast, by November 1921 over 1,000 Soviet schools had some 85,000 pupils in Central Asia. The Muslim Commissariat in Moscow oversaw Russia's policy towards Islam. Muslims with few communist qualifications were given leading positions in the Commissariat. The result was the division of the Islamic movement. Majority of Muslim leaders aided the Soviets, persuaded by the fact that Soviet power meant religious liberty. There was serious discussion generated among Muslim population about the similarity of Islamic values to the socialist principles. Popular slogans of the time included: “Long live Soviet power, long live the sharia, religion, freedom and national independence!”18. It quickly became apparent to the Muslims in Central Asia that the right of self-determination given by Bolsheviks was only used as an instrument to win support from millions of non-Russians particularly Muslims. The Bolsheviks made alliances with the Kazakh pan-Islamic group, the Ush-Zhuz which joined the Communist Party in 1920.19 The Basmachi revolts (Islamic movement) 20 which started during the years of the Bolshevik resistance to the Russian Tsarist rule never died and remained alive in the social undercurrents of Central Asian republics against all Bolshevik efforts. 

The Stalinist Repression 

Stalin became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 1922.21 Whilst the Basmachi revolts still stayed alive across the Central Asian region, Stalin decided to disband the “bandits” (Islamic revolutionists) to suppress unrest in the region. The last of the Basmachi revolts was finally crushed in 1929, in Tajikistan. Many Basmachi leaders with their thousands of followers fled to Afghanistan. Stalin consequently re-drew the map of Turkistan and divided the region into five socialist republics with well-defined demarcated borders. Demarcation was not done according to the geographical or ethnic considerations; main purpose was the consolidation of the Russian rule and suppression of opposition in the region.22

Socialist bearings were imposed with full thrust on all spheres of life in Central Asia in 1929. The Stalinist regime embarked on oppressive methods for the introduction of Atheism in Central Asia.23 Having consolidated the power, the Soviets launched castigatory campaigns against all religious forces present in the new Communist Russia. Islam was particularly beleaguered because it was thought to be the most conservative and reactionary of all religions. They depicted Islam as “mullah” (Islamic cleric) led force which was suspected to be supported and financed by the British imperialists trying to impede the way of Socialism.24 

In this era of Socialist repression, mosques were locked or converted into workshops. Women were forbidden to dress up according to Islamic traditions and Islamic teachings were banned. In Soviet empire only four thousand mosques were operative in 1929. Despite harsh crushing and even physical annihilation of a great part of the religious institutions, Islam, clan and local traditions were preserved in Central Asia through Makallahs (part of village-indigenous community).25This remained the basic units of social structure of Central Asia and still retains its influence today. Makallahs had mosques which were operated as centres of Islamic education. However, these mosques had been operating covertly since the 1920s.26 Makallahas remained the centres of Islamic education through out Central Asia even during the Stalinist rule. 

Paradoxically, the situation improved for Muslims in Central Asia as Hitler invaded Soviet Union in 1941. Stalin appeased the Muslims of Central Asia as he needed people to fight the war for Soviet Union and set up four directorates to mobilise and control the Muslims of Central Asian states simultaneously. Central Asian region also benefited from the industrial development as the industrial infrastructure was shifted from Soviet main land to the Central Asian land.27

Khrushev’s Liberalisation of Religion 

The brief period during (1955-1958) marked the slight relaxation of astringent Soviet policies. Khrushev adopted this policy to liberalise Stalin’s harsh political structure, seeking to gain support for the Soviet policies in the Muslim world by showing tolerance towards Islam within its own territory. Islamic schools were established in Tashkent and Bukhara, where Islamic clerics were trained to synthesise Islam and Socialism. Muslim high-ranking clerics were brought from Islamic countries as Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Morocco to Tashkent to certify the compatibility of Islam with socialism.28 

Gorbachev’s Policy Towards Islam  

President Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-1980s promulgated the policy of restructuring, called “Perestroika.” Perestroika comprised of a set of strategies aimed at liberalisation of political and social policies. This set of policies did not include the lifting of constraints from religious practices but the people of Central Asia interpreted this slight lift of ban as an opportunity to revitalize their religious practices.29 As a result, Central Asian citizens showed deep interest in Islam. Thousands of mosques were built and Islamic literature was brought in from all over the Islamic world. The Islamic reading material was distributed among the population by the itinerant clerics30 who became public orators and prayer leaders in these Makhallas.31 The main reason for this instant bent of the population towards Islam was that Islam never relinquished its appeal even during the era of the severest Soviet oppression. The survival of Islam in Central Asia is attributed to the strong ethnic Islamic traditions and the external support of the Muslim and the Western hemisphere to keep Islam alive during the Soviet rule. The itinerant Islamic clerics and the Sufi societies which operated in a covert manner contributed enormously to the survival of Islam in this period. The well-organised Sufi societies published and distributed Islamic literature.  

Even within the local Communist parties in Central Asia, some native Muslim Communist leaders hired mullahs and the Sufis to perform the Islamic rituals. Women also played a leading role in keeping the Islamic traditions alive at home. Moreover, they maintained the prayer places. Women also facilitated to keep the shrine praying regulated.32   

Roots of Islamic Resurgence in Central Asia 

The Afghan war and the Soviet disintegration in the year 1990 had a long lasting impact over the Central Asian states, politics and religion. In 1980s, thousands of Central Asians were recruited in the Red Army to fight the Afghan Islamist warriors. Consequently, the Central Asians got introduced to the wider Muslim concepts and Muslim brethren. Despite the fact that Central Asian Muslim soldiers were brought to fight for their Communist masters against their co-religionists they got deeply impressed by the devotion of the Afghan Mujahideen towards Islam. A large number of Central Asian soldiers who were taken as prisoners of war were indoctrinated and joined Mujahideen.33 

Thousands of these Islamists studied in Islamic madarsahs spread on Pakistan’s territory. The Muslims began to envisage a fight beyond the Afghan borders as Islamists running madrasahs started planning to reserve places for Central Asian Islamists, who received education and living allowances. These Islamists entered Pakistan in droves without any visas and passports.34

The strengthening of Islamism in Central Asia is mainly attributed towards the Islamists infiltration from Afghanistan into Tajik and Uzbek territories. This became particularly evident in 1985 as movements for recognition of right of selfdetermination triggered up in Soviet republics.  This was further accelerated by an over all worsening of the Soviet economic system.35 After the Soviet disintegration, in the absence of political control and weak social infrastructure, Islam proved to be a unifying force for the Central Asian societies. 

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Impact on Central Asian States 

The end of the Soviet rule caught the Central Asians by surprise. The Central Asian leaders reluctantly viewed the independence from Soviet rule as un wanted blessing. Central Asia stood connected to Moscow by strong communication, transport and administrative network. Therefore, its centuries old ties with Russia could not be broken instantly due to demarcation of new borders.

The presidents of five newly incepted Central Asian States met in Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, on the eve of December 12, 1991, to formulate a strategy to cope with the new transition that their nations were faced with. The Minsk Treaty which disbanded Soviet Union had not even been presented to the Central Asian leaders for consultation.36 Central Asian leaders faced the fears of running independent states; problems of inflation, security and foreign policy among others. 

The leaders embarked on policies of political suppression and media censorship as the only solution to counter the growing domestic problems of these states.37 Few democrats in Central Asia looked up to Russia for political inspiration and Central Asian youth drew inspiration from Muslim states for new ideological guidance. The reinforcement of Islam in Central Asia got enhanced by absence of any religious and political system. This gave way to the strengthening of ethnic ties and anti-Russian sentiments. Among the politically and economically dissatisfied youth, teachings in madarssahs ingrained the spirit of conservatism and aggressiveness towards un-Islamic political system. Natural antagonism towards modernisation and democratic ideals was also developed. Popular support winning slogans such as “building the caliphate”, or “justice and equal opportunities for all” were raised by the students of these madarssahs; these slogans praised the importance of Islamic economic system as a remedy to all poverty-related problems. 

Some external factors also contributed in adding Islamism to the political scenario in the Central Asian States. One of the factors is the long border with the war-ravaged Afghanistan, which has been a constant source of cross-border infiltration by Islamic militants. The other reason was the presence of opposition within the state or in exile, which wanted to win popular support by using Islam as a campaign-winning slogan. Neighbouring states  such as Iran and Turkey also wanted to expand their area of influence by using religion in regional politics. 

The participation of Islamists in the process of transmitting Islam to the Central Asian States has been a very important factor.  The total number of foreign Mujahideen in Afghanistan is estimated to have been approximately thirty thousand, prior to September 11, 2001.38 Their movement remained unhindered due to absence  of strict border control in Afghanistan and the adjoining border areas of Central Asian states. These Mujahideen constantly shifted from one conflict to other conflict centre (from Afghanistan, to Bosnia, Tajikistan, Palestine, and Chechnya). 

Central Asian States adopted the policy of Secular-neutrality and the stance of steering their policies without any religious or ethnic influences. Orthodox Islam in Central Asia got incorporated with politics in early 1990s and at first this phenomenon showed itself in Tajikistan. There are three basic reasons for this, the first being the collapse of official communist ideology and its associated security system. Second is the growth of national self-consciousness in which historical and cultural roots are often linked to religion. Third are the socio-economic setbacks that have accompanied the transition from centrally-controlled economic system to free-market economic system. Moreover, Islam has been used by various factions of Central Asian societies to determine their influence in their states and gain benefits.’39  

Islam as Dealt by Central Asian Leaders 

Turkmen populace comprises of 89 percent of Muslim population and 9 percent of Eastern Orthodox people. Turkmen President, Suparmurat Niyazov, has often stressed on the official stance of Turkmen government which is based on “secularist isolationism.” The country has seen a steady growth of Islamic trends among the masses despite strict government regulations and policies, aimed at restricting the Islamic groups operations in the country.40 President Niyazov, said in a statement, “We have firmly proclaimed the principle that Turkmenistan is a secular state. We have no grounds to think that someone intends to change this principle.”41 Another government statement asserted the, “inadmissibility of interference of religion in organisational and state affairs.”42 

The Kazakh population is an ethnic mix of Russians and Muslims in equal proportions. The ruling elite led by Nursultan Nazarbayev is dominantly inclined towards Western ideologies and socio-political trends.43 Unlike the rest of the Central Asian States, Nazarbayev created a separate “muftiate” (council of religious clerics) for Kazakhstan. The 1993 constitution clearly identifies Kazakhstan as a secular state, forbidding religious parties in any form in the state territory.44 

The Kyrgyz population comprises of Sunni Muslims who practice Islam according to their tribal traditions. The Soviet rule only had trivial effect over the Islamic traditions and way of life.45Islam has not been a vital factor of Kyrgyz politics and the state constitution preamble clearly describes Kyrgyzstan as secular state and restraints the incursion of any religion and ideology into state constitution.46 In Kyrgyzstan, primarily in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad as well as in Batken, a number of Islamist groups named were trying to secure official registration with the Justice Ministry.47 

Tajik population has 85 percent Sunni Muslims and 10 percent belong to Shiite faction. Islam had played a vital role in Tajik politics in 1990's.  The incursion of mass political Islamic groups in political main stream urged the Communist party of Tajikistan to take into consideration the Islamic heritage of Central Asian States. The Tajik opposition wanted to depict Islam as a destabilising factor for the existent regime, but the Imam Ali Rahmonov regime has shown inclination towards the Iranian version of Islam and has refuted the Tajik opposition allegations.48 1992–97 civil war made Islam an important force in Tajik society and strengthened it within the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Today the (UTO), which is considered to be a moderate Islamist force, is cooperating with the Tajik government in accordance with the peace agreement of June 1997.49 

Uzbekistan remained hub of economic activity and political power during the Soviet rule. The Soviets made Uzbekistan the biggest cotton producing region of the Soviet empire. Bukhara and Samarkand remained centres of cultural heritage and Islamic education for centuries. Islamic schools remained operative in these areas and anti-communist movements also originated at these schools. The incumbent Uzbek President Islam Karimov has pursued the policy of crushing opposition groups right from the time of inception of Uzbekistan in 1990.Uzbekistan has seen steady growth of political cum religious  groups. Erk ,Birlik Haq Parasti, Hizb-u-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are prominent political parties.  

Political Islam in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan comprises of Samarkand, Bukhara and the Ferghana Valley. These have been the nucleus of Islamic education and culture for centuries. In the Soviet rule religious activities became embedded in Socialist bearings but  never relinquished in these areas. 

Uzbekistan stands as the second economically stable state of Central Asian region after Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan borders the Aral Sea to the north, Kazakhstan to the north-west, Turkmenistan to the southwest, Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to the east.50 

The first decade since Uzbekistan’s independence has been a period of restoring and developing the main spiritual values of the Uzbek nation. With the achievement of the country’s independence in the year 1991, religion as the spiritual core of national consciousness has found its true place in the system of social institutions and values. The nation in Uzbekistan has always followed titular Islam, and predominantly in its Khanifite form due to indelible effect of Soviet traditions on Uzbek people. After enduring many deprivations and trials during 70 years of communist dictatorship, since the first days of gaining independence the Islam has regained its primeval right to exist and, at the same time, has embarked along the path of new trials. During the Soviet period there were 84 mosques in total, now there are 1854 functioning mosques. Young people may study Islam in depth: in the Tashkent Islamic University, Islamic Institute and approximately 10 medrese [Muslim colleges], etc. The state has created conditions, and provides assistance for, the annual pilgrimage (haj, umra) to Mecca by approximately 5,000- 6,000 believers. At the same time, the following non-Islamic religious confessions are officially operating on the territory of Uzbekistan: Russian Orthodox Church, Church of Christians of the Complete Gospel, Church of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Church of Christian Seventh Day Adventists, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Roman Catholic Church, Armenian Gregorian Church, Korean Protestant Churches, Bahai Societies, Jewish Religious Societies, Society of Krishna Consciousness, Church of Jehovah’s Witnesses, New Apostolic Church, and the Biblical Society of Uzbekistan. 

Uzbekistan is predominantly a “Muslim country.”  According to the US Library of Congress 88 percent Sunni population dominates the ethnic mix. The religion in Uzbekistan is separate from the state and the activities of religious confessions are governed by legislation. Article 31 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan: “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all. Everyone has the right to profess any religion or none. The compulsory imposition of religious views is not permissible”. At the same time, the government of Uzbekistan is making every effort to combat extremism of every kind. Article 31 of the Constitution also states: “It is prohibited for political parties and other similar social organisations to be set up or to operate which have as their objective a forcible change of the constitutional regime; which oppose the sovereignty, integrity and security of the republic and the constitutional rights and freedoms of its inhabitants; which advocate war, social, national, racial and religious enmity; which infringe on the health and morality of the people; and also militarised associations and political parties organised along national and religious lines. It is prohibited to establish secret societies and associations.” It is on the basis of this article of the constitution that extremist parties were prohibited and their leaders arrested during the Soviet rule in late 1989. The new authorities and new regime have granted Muslim preachers the possibility of conversing with the faithful openly and with dignity; however, as well as the old religious authorities, those missionaries who were forbidden to enter the country during the communist period have also gained this right. The traditional local preachers, having gained the freedom to preach, have discovered that now they are not the only authorities in the Muslim mosques. At the same time missionaries from other Islamic countries arriving in Uzbekistan have come into conflict with the religious principles of local believers which differ significantly from those found in Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan or Turkey. The newly arrived preachers have not always met with understanding from the Uzbek Muslims.

Afghanistan Factor in Uzbek Politics 

Uzbeks are spread all over Central Asian region in ethnic minorities. Their presence in Central Asian States influence the ethnic stability of their home countries. Afghanistan proved to be a constant source of cross border infiltration of militants for Uzbekistan as ethnic Uzbek tribes are situated on both sides of Uzbek-Afghan border. These tribesmen harbour their relatives in hide outs located on the border strip. Uzbeks also make up a significant part of the Afghan population. Two million ethnic Afghan-Uzbeks residing in Afghanistan exert tremendous political influence on governments in Afghanistan. The Uzbek President Islam Karimov, supported the Afghan warlord Rashid Dostum, in year 1995 and onwards, who demanded an autonomous Uzbek state comprising Afghan province Mazare-Sharif. Islam Karimov’s stance towards Islamists became explicit at this very stage. Karimov hoped that if Abdur Rashid Dostum, a former communist and Afghan war lord assumed power, it would have served as a secular buffer between Uzbekistan and the Talibans regime in Kabul, as Dostum intended to establish Uzbek autonomous state within Afghanistan. Uzbekistan financed Rasheed Dostum to contain the Islamic movement and Taliban government to take hold of areas where Uzbek population resided in majority.51 Diplomatic relations between two countries were established in 1992. Afghan General Consulate operating from 1982 became the Embassy of Afghanistan. Consulate of the Republic of Uzbekistan began functioning in 1992 in Mazari Sharif. Military actions in Afghanistan prevented from continuing the work of the consulate and on January 15, 2002, it was reopened. Uzbek Embassy began its work in Kabul in August, 2002. Mr. Karzai visited Uzbekistan at the beginning of March, 2002, by the invitation of Mr. Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan. The Two leaders signed a joint declaration, which envisages that Uzbekistan will assist Afghanistan to reconstruct its economy supplying water resources, energy, construction materials and others. Currently, relations between the two neighboring states are heading towards normalisation.52 

Personality Cult of Uzbek President and Islam 

President Islam Karimov is an ethnic Uzbek. He came to power as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989, and was named President of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990. He was re-elected in January 2000 but the international community raised serious concerns about the poll's fairness. The OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) refused to send observers after deciding that there was no possibility of a fair contest. US officials who did go said the poll was “neither free nor fair and offered Uzbekistan's voters no true choice.”53 The situation was no better in parliamentary elections in December 2004, in which Mr.Karimov banned opposition parties from taking part.54 

The rule of Uzbek President got extended again in the year 2004 up till 2007 after the President got elected for another 4 years term, and although he has been in power for more than fifteen years, he still remains intent on curbing any political opposition that might challenge his rule. His most cruel attacks are for those whom he views as Islamists. Most significant of these events occurred on May 12, 2005, at Andijan when Prison break demonstrators, demanding democracy and removal of harsh media policies, were termed as members of Islamic group by the government. The government used the military for crushing the demonstrations. 178 civilians demonstrators were killed. Islam Karimov has been highly criticised within his country and internationally for this cruel inhibition of demonstrations. 

Islamic Activist Groups in Uzbekistan 

Militant Islamic groups, such as, Hizb-u-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have been active in Uzbekistan since early 1990s and they have tried to topple the Karimov government through staging anti government demonstrations. The political parties which grew out of the political struggle for independence were “Birlik Haqparasti.”55 The Erk (Freedom) Democratic Party grew out of the Birlik (Unity) Popular Front of Uzbekistan which was founded by Muhammad Salih, who was an active member of the republic's Writers Union and served as its Secretary between 1988 and 1991. Erk was officially founded in 1990. Muhammad Salih was elected the party leader. The party's platform articulated the goals of independence for Uzbekistan, a multi-party democratic system, a market economy, private enterprise and land reform.56 Birlik was not allowed to have a candidate to the general elections in 1991, Muhammad Salih ran as the Erk party's candidate for president of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan in 1991 and enjoyed a great deal of popular support. He was appointed as Karimov's official challenger. In 1992, Erk became too radical in Karimov's eyes, and a new "opposition" party called “Vatan Taraqqiyoti” (Fatherland Progress) was founded by Ahtam Tursunov. In 1995, two new parties called “Adolat” (Justice) and “Miliy Tiklanish” (National Rebirth) were founded on Karimov's direct "advice" by Dilorom Toshmohumadova, and many parliament members were "asked" by the government to join these parties. Karimov's party, the successor of the local branch of Communist Party in Soviet era, was renamed in 1991 as “People's Democratic Party.”57 

In addition to the gamut of extremist-fundamentalist organisations in the strict sense who are conducting anti-constitutional activities in Uzbekistan, there are also groupings of nationalist-separatist movements which are appearing under the slogans of radical Islam. An example of such an organisation is the Nurchilar58 community, founded by Said Nursi. As the foundation of his teaching he established the principles of social justice, equality, protection of the rights of members of society. Nurchilar’s ideas enjoy considerable support among the Kurdish population in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Saudi Arabia. The community has a television channel and several radio stations. During the course of several investigations information was received that the Turkish secret service and various politicised and extremist religious Turkish entities were undertaking practical steps to attract the Uzbek youth into their sphere of influence.59 In particular, there is no letup in the attempts by members of Nurchilar and Uzbek émigrés to attract students into their ranks who are studying in Turkey. Emissaries of the Nurchilar society are searching for more conspiratorial methods of carrying out their religious and propagandist activities. In June 1999 the Turkish press stated that the Turkish secret services had submitted a report to the Council of National Security which exposes the essence of Nurchilar; whose ultimate objective in Turkey was to overthrow the secular constitutional order and establish a Shariy’ah form of government. At the same time, the legal organs have started to investigate the activities of the current leader of Nurchilar, F.Gyulen, who is hiding from the Turkish secret services in the US. Information continues to be received by Uzbek Counter-Intelligence concerning the attempts by activists of the Turkish Nurchilar tendency to restore their positions in Uzbekistan after the closure of a network of Uzbek-Turkish high schools which they initially used as a cover for their activities.60 

Having crushed the democratic opposition and consolidation of his rule in early 1990s, Islam Karimov focused on eliminating the threat of Islamic militant groups. Uzbek president viewed these Islamic groups as a counter power to his autocratic prolonged regime. He cracked down on Muslims in Ferghana valley whom he found suspected of having links with Islamic “fundamentalist” groups. However the result of repressive policies has been the continuous growth of Islamic extremists groups in addition to democratic opposition against Karimov’s regime.61 

In Uzbekistan, the strengthening of Islam was further triggered by a growing national-ethnic self-recognition and identity claimed by religious groups and political parties mentioned above. Islam projected internal homogeneity and religious harmony of the Muslim populace. After more than 130 years of forced Socialist rule, Islam showed itself as a strong, independent political force in February 1989. The most intense demonstrations began in June 1989 and continued up till August of same year. Birlik remained vital in the demonstration and demanded language laws formulation, reduction of cotton production, Uzbek sovereignty, health care, social welfare, and personal freedoms. Two main factors which sparked the riots in the summer of 1989 were the population explosion and the deformed economic structure of Uzbekistan.62 This rioting accentuated the Islamists views also as, streets of Tashkent echoed with the sound of demonstration of more than two thousand Muslims who demanded and achieved the resignation of the pro-Soviet Mufti Shamsuddin Babakhan, the head of the joint religious Muslim Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. As a continuation of this process, many new mosques and madrassahs were opened. In 1989, there were only eighty seven mosques in Uzbekistan. Only eight years later, in 1997, that number had increased to more than three thousand official and unofficial mosques.  

Formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) also has its roots in this era. The IRP was officially set up in 1991. It grew out of an aspiration to protect the Islamic identity of the Soviet Union’s Muslims during the 1980s. As such, the party gained popularity among the masses. It was widely taken into account both within the Soviet Union, amongst policy makers and academics in the West. Primarily, the party had some significant ideas, such as bringing the Islamic awareness and understanding among the Muslims of the Soviet Union, as well as representing them and co-ordinating a unified posture towards the Communist regime. The IRP was also labelled as the main proponent of the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) by the Uzbek government. 

The IRP began as an Islamic educational group (madrassah network) in mid 1980s, not as a political party, therefore it made its aims and objectives limited initially but modified itself afterwards as political group. The IRP leaders often repeatedly stated that IRP was not looking for the establishment of an Islamic polity, but a Islamic democracy.63 

Uzbekistan has been the focal point of attention of regional states and super powers. Its importance was highlighted particularly after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. US signed strategic partnership agreement with Uzbekistan on March 12, 2002.64 US and coalition forces acquired military bases in Central Asian region. Uzbekistan had a significant position due to its geo-strategic location in the region. US found Uzbek bases most suitable for conducting of air strikes in Afghanistan. This made Central Asia a basing ground for US and coalition forces. Islam Karimov’s treatment with the Islamists has been shaped by domestic and external political pressures. Islam Karimov viewed the strategic partnership with US as a mode or instrument for consolidating his rule on one hand and eliminating Islamists on the other. Islamists posed serious threat to both Uzbekistan and US,strategic partners in the Central Asian region. This partnership remained sound and continued till May 2005, when it was impeded by US government and human right groups criticism over Islam Karimov regime. The events at Andijan date back to the summer of year 2004 when 23 Andijan businessmen were arrested on charges of propagating Orthodox Islamist views. The May 13, 2005, violence began early in the morning as an undetermined number of attackers in fifteen cars invaded the jail, killed several guards and released hundreds of prisoners, including the 23 businessmen. In coordinated moves, armed men also attacked the police station and army garrison, killing unarmed men and taking hostages. Attacks on the local offices of the National Security Service and the Ministry of Interior failed. As they took control, they called friends and relatives, so that by the end of the morning Babur Square was filled by the protestors. The rebellious crowd set up a public address system, over which they made speeches calling for jobs and justice. 

After the government, represented by Minister of the Interior, Zakir Almatov and then President Islam Karimov, pursued several hours of negotiations, government troops moved in with armoured personnel vehicles. The rebels positioned themselves behind the crowd and their remaining hostages. It is not clear that who fired first, but soon the troops were firing with machine guns indiscriminately on the crowd and killing citizens as they fled towards the nearby border with Kyrgyzstan for refuge.65 

The uprising at Andijan (Southern Uzbekistan) in May 2005 was suppressed by violent means as Karimov’s government termed the militants as Islamic extremists who were suspected of staging a coup for toppling the Karimov government. This bloody oppression of the Islamic radicals was criticised by the US human right groups. Uzbek President viewed this criticism as intervention of superpowers into Uzbek internal affairs. Moreover, he viewed this criticism as an instrument of the West and US to destabilise the Karimov government. This finally led to evacuation of US forces from base at Karshi-Khanabad Uzbekistan. This deteriorated the US-Uzbek relations and slowed down the pace of joint anti-terrorism efforts. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Central Asia in October 2005. Uzbekistan stood omitted from the list of states which US Secretary of State visited, as a resultant of deteriorated relations. At this stage no further agreements have been drafted so far bilaterally either on terrorism or for economic cooperation. 

Uzbek President’s pro-US and Westernized modernization in Uzbekistan flamed the antagonism of Islamic groups and political parties.   The Islamic Movement of Uzbekisan (IMU) supporting violence, and non-violent Hizb-u-Tahrir movements are the most well-known radical Islamists in Central Asia. The IMU is on the US State Department's formalised list of thirty three Foreign Terrorist Groups, while Hizb-u-Tahrir is operating freely from its London headquarters, but is legally banned in all Central Asian states. Hizb-u-Tahrir's ideology envisages a strict Islamic state and the re-establishment of the medieval Arab caliphate in the region. The IMU is believed to have been responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999. IMU militants also took foreigners hostage, including four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyz soldiers in August 1999 in Kyrgyzstan; and four US citizens who were mountain climbing in August 2000 in Tashkent out skirts. In Operation Enduring Freedom launched in late 2001, the US-led counter terrorism coalition  captured, killed, and dispersed many of the IMU's militants who fought with the Talibans in Afghanistan. This severely effected the movement's ability to influence Uzbek or Coalition interests in other parts of Central Asia. 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-u-Tahrir have been working for the same cause that is the establishment of religious system of government world over; however, IMU resided on violent means to achieve its motives. Hizb-u-Tahrir adopted non-violent means to achieve its goals. 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), also known as Islamic Party of Turkestan, is a radical Islamic group and has separatist manifesto. The group originally focused on toppling the government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, which it viewed as pro-Western and anti Islamic, and putting forward idea of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. While changing its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan in June 2001, the group expanded its original goal of establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan to the creation of an Islamic state in all of Central Asia, which would include the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China's Xingjian province. The IMU comprises of “militants” mostly from Uzbekistan, but includes other Central Asian nationalities and former ethnic groups, for example, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Karakalpak, and Tatars as well. IMU is lead by Tahir Yuldosh and Juma Namangani. Juma Namangani fought with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997). Yuldosh was elected the leader of Uzbekistan's Adolat (Justice) party and was named by the Uzbek government as one of the conspirators behind the attempted assassination of Uzbekistan's President, Karimov, in February 1999. In May 1999, Yuldosh obtained the Taliban's permission to establish a military training camp for the IMU in northern Afghanistan. The post-9/11 developments in this region witnessed the dislocation of Yuldosh from his bases in Afghanistan to some unknown whereabouts on the Pak-Afghan border. 66 

Militant Activities 

In August 1999, Juma Namangani led a group of 800 militants into southern Kyrgyzstan, where they captured villages, took hostages and threatened to attack Uzbekistan. In August 2000, IMU rebels led by Namangani made incursions into southern Uzbekistan’s mountainous areas just outside of Tashkent and several areas in southern Kyrgyzstan.67 

Organisational Structure 

The IMU is part of a militant organisations’ network and receives support from other fundamentalist Islamist groups throughout Central and South Asia. Russia, China, and the US believe that the Taliban aided the group, at least by harbouring the militants and providing training camps. They use leaflets and pamphlets to propagate their views among masses. No certain detail of their organizational frame work is available. 

Areas of Operation 

The IMU is operative throughout central and southern Central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge. The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan simultaneously.68 

Hizb-u-Tahrir Origin and Activities in Central Asia

Hizb-u-Tahrir, also termed as ‘Freedom Party’, was formed in the Middle East in 1950s. Its original members were mainly Palestinians from Jordan and Syria. The movement rapidly found followers in Egypt and North Africa. It surfaced in Uzbek politics in late 1980’s. It is a conservative movement in nature, and aims to return the religion to its original state of mystical purity. Hizb-u-Tahrir has adopted non violent means to achieve its goals and passive attitude is core of its policies.

Among its goals are the abolition of modern forms of government and imposing Sharia Islamic law throughout the Islamic world. But distinctly from other movements, like the Taliban and Wahhabism which similarly sponsor a strict version of Islam Hizb-u-Tahrir does not oppose modern technology and spreads its message through Internet.

The movement first surfaced in Central Asia in the early 1990s. Its members are present in unidentified numbers in the region, and its organisation is based on networks comprising three-person "trios" with only limited contact among one other. This makes it difficult to evaluate its size. Hizb-u-Tahrir claims to have more than 100,000 supporters in the area apart from its members, the group's impact is irrefutable.

The Uzbek government has always linked Hizb-u-Tahrir with IMU in Central Asia. Hizb-u-Tahrir has never divulged on violent means to achieve its motives of creating an Islamic caliphate. Hizb-u-Tahrir has not been listed so far by the US Defence department, as a terrorist group. There is no evidence to believe that Hizb-u-Tahrir poses a threat, at least in any direct way, to the democratic governments of the region because of its passive ideology.69

Tajik officials on January 16, 2006, stated that it is hard to give an estimate as to how many members Hizb-u-Tahrir has in Central Asia. Some experts say there are thousands who share the group’s major objective, creating a caliphate or an Islamic state. Hizb-u-Tahrir’s members say they are in thousands.70 In Tajikistan, ninety nine alleged Hizb-u-Tahrir members, including sixteen women, were arrested in 2005 alone. As the country’s authorities announced on January 16, 2005, thirty eight of them have already been sentenced to lengthy jail terms for “extremist activities”.71 Security Ministry official, Abdulqader Mohamadiev, alleged that two of those arrested were Hizb-u-Tahrir leaders. “It has been established by the investigation that one of them is the deputy leader of this party's cell in Tajikistan and the prosecutor's office of the Soghd region in northern Tajikistan is investigating this case now," Mohamadiev said. "The other person, whose investigation is coming to an end, is a cell leader in the Soghd region. Both of them have been in detention and their cases are in the final stages.”72 

Conclusion 

Radical Islamic groups in Central Asia have blended among the population. They can unite at any time and start creating problems for the state governments. If these states do not pay heed to these groups, this danger can prove to be politically and socially lethal for these states. Religious fundamentalism around the world can not be curbed by repressive crackdowns. Rather, institutionalisation and legislation is needed on behalf of the state governments. Countering terrorism and curbing militancy in Central Asian region is a challenge for the existing Central Asian governments. Elimination of the root causes of fundamentalism can be one of the solutions. The incident at Andijan signified that presence of militant elements in the social sub-strata of Uzbek community can further ablaze extremist activities. The lack of economic reforms and development and the absence of freedom of expression combined with the autocratic rule make fundamentalism flourish. Facts depict that despite harsh crack downs on the fundamentalist groups these have not been rooted out.

Central Asian youth is intolerant towards these repressive acts and long for true democracy and religion as sole ways for salvation in the political status-quo. The danger is that extensive harassment of non-violent groups, including Hizb-u-Tahrir, would motivate these groups to radicalise and marginalise themselves as specific group aimed at radicalisation of social setup. The repressive policies of the current regimes can lead to the formation of a new crop of frustrated youth, willing to take up arms not just for countering state-sponsored crackdowns but also for acquiring even the basic necessities of life. If this process happens on a wider scale, it would negate any gains meant to be sought from the Central Asian government’s efforts to curb militancy.

 

*   Ms. Mehwish Hassan Sara is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

  1. Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.78.

  2. www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2004-daily/19-09-2004/main/main7.htm

  3. Ibid.p.5

  4. Ludmila Polonskaya-Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, Lebanon, Garnet Publications, 1994, p.4.

  5. Ibid. p.10.

  6. Ibid. p.11.

  7. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, The rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Lahore, Vanguard Books, 2002, p.21.

  8. Ibid.p.23.

  9. Ibid. p.23.

  10. Ibid. p.24.

  11. “The Great Game”, http://homepage.ntlworld.com

  12. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.p.24.

  13. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.p.24-25

  14. “Central Asia: Jadidism-Old Tradition Of Renewal”, www.rferl.org/ featuresarticle.html

  15. Ahmed Rashid,op.cit.p.31

  16. Ibid. p.32.

  17. Waqf: term used for property devoted to Islamic teaching, mosques and Muslim orphanages.

  18. Dave Crouch, “Socialists can learn from how the Bolsheviks approached the Muslims of the Russian empire”, www.lpi.org.uk

  19. Ibid.

  20. Basmachi: A Turkic term that means bandit used by Soviets for revolts and Islamic mujahideen who opposed the communist system in central Asia after 1917.

  21. Joseph Stalin, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin

  22. Ahmad Rashid, op.cit. p.36

  23. Ludmila Polonskaya-Alexei Malashenko, op.cit. p.92.

  24. Ahmad Rashid,op.cit. p.38

  25. Makallah: Tajik word meaning part of home town, village-essential part of social network.

  26. Ludmila Polonskaya-Alexei Malashenko,op.cit. p.96

  27. Ahmed Rashid , op.cit.p.38.

  28. Ibid.p.39.

  29. Ibid.p.42.

  30. Mullah:Islamic cleric

  31. Ahmad Rashid, op.cit. p.43.

  32. Ibid.p.41.

  33. Ibid.p.32.

  34. Mujahideen,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen#Afghan_Mujahedeen.

  35. Ludmila Polonskaya-Alexei Malashenko, op.cit. p.121.

  36. Ahmad Rashid, op.cit, p.47.

  37. Ibid. p.53.

  38. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen

  39. Shukhrat Yovkochev -Rich Hawkins, “The Politization of Islam in Uzbekistan: Before and After Independence”, http/birliknet/page-18.uk.

  40. Library of Congress, “Turkmen religion and culture,” http://countrystudies.us/ turkmenistan

  41. Eurasia Daily Digest

  42. “Turkmenskaya Iskra (Ashgabat),” May 3, 1994.

  43. Aleksei Malashenko, op.cit

  44. “Islam and state-Kazakhstan”, http://countrystudies.us/kazakstan

  45. “Kyrgyz religion”, http://countrystudies.us/kyrgyzstan

  46. Ibid

  47. Aleksei Malashenko,op.cit

  48. “U.S. Library of Congress-Religion”, http://countrystudies.us/tajikistan

  49. Saodat Olimova, “Political Islam and Conflict  in Tajikistan”, www.ca-c.org

  50. www.britannica.com/eb/article-query-uzbekistan&ct

  51. Shabir Ahmad, “Pakistan-Uzbekistan Relations: Hopes and Hurdles”, www.turkishweekly.net/comments

  52. www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/383c3d03-2526-446e-943d-f81dfddbdc68.html

  53. Uzbek President, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4554997.stm

  54. Ibid

  55. Birklik Haqparasti:Popular political movement,Uzbekistan.

  56. “Alternative Political Voices In Uzbekistan”, www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/ 2003/0301uzbek.html

  57. “Freedom Democratic Party (Uzbekistan)”, www.fotw.net/flags/uz}erk.html

  58. http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/09.muminov.shtml

  59. www.tanlovuzbekistan.org/index.php?cat

  60. Ibid.

  61. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.p.81.

  62. www.uzbekistanerk.org/books21/BERIKAN_3en.htm

  63. “A History of Islam in Central Asia (Part 111)” ,http://archive. muslimuzbekistan.com

  64. http://goliath.ecnext.com/comsite5/bin/pdinventory.pl?pdlanding=1 &referid=2750&item_id=0199-1564953&words=Us_Uzbekistan_Sign

  65. www.fpri.org/enotes/20050601.centralasia.seiple.uzbekistan.html

  66. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan

  67. http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/terrorism.htm

  68. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,”  http://survivalx.com/wilderness_survival

  69. “Central Asia,’How big a threat is Hizb-ut-Tahrir”, www.religioscope.com

  70. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizb_ut-Tahrir

  71. RFE/RL.org

  72. “Central Asia: Hizb Ut-Tahrir’s Calls For Islamic State Find Support”, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006.