A HISTORICAL VIEW OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS BIG POWERS
Humayoun Khan *
China has risen from a weak, economically backward country to a rising great power in the international system. It has become an important player in the future multipolar world as the nation’s international status and prestige have risen steadily, which in fact, reflects a recognition of China’s great power status in the post-Cold War era. To understand how China will function as a great power in the world arena, one needs to understand the evolution of China’s foreign relations since 1949. Two leaders were instrumental in formulating China’s foreign policies: Mao Zedong as the founder of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Deng Xiaoping, as the general designer of the reform and “open door” policy. Each had an impact on the evolution of China’s foreign policy.
China, as an active player in the international arena in the post-Cold War years, has begun to take a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and at times, more constructive approach towards regional and global affairs as compared to Cold War era, when China was in constant confrontation with the US during the Vietnam War in 1950s and the Korean War of 1950-1953. During that period, China had a huge ideological difference with the US in terms of Communism vs. Capitalism, which has now been reduced to some extent and China is now playing a very active role in the Six Party Talks along with the US for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. With Russia also, China’s relations were strained during 1970s and 1980s, over border disputes, and as both the countries wanted to head the communist block. However, relations between the two countries started to normalise during the Gorbachev era, continued under Boris Yeltsin’s government, and in 2001, China and Russia signed the “Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation.” This is a milestone in the relations of the two big powers, who share 4,300-km border between them and considering the tortuous history of border delimitation talks that have dragged on for the past several decades, this treaty will enable the two countries to settle their border disputes, which includes the two small islands in Amur River i.e. Damansky Islands (Jenbao), and also covers others areas of cooperation as well, including arms sales and technology transfers, energy and raw materials supply, and the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.
China’s economy has been continuously growing since 1979. Presently, China has a booming market, with rich human resources and a stable political and social situation. The country is now one of the world’s safest and most lucrative destinations for investment. The economic growth aggregate climbed to a new level with the figures rising from one digit to two digits. In 2002, the nation’s economic aggregate reached 10.2 trillion RMB Yuan, with the per capita GDP touching US $ 1,000 and in 2005 it was nearing US $1,200,1 indicating a new period of economic take-off. Judging from the speed of its economic development, China has clearly entered a rising stage of the economic growth chart. The nation’s GDP growth registered at 7.5 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, around 9 percent during 20032 and, according to the current official statistics of China it was 9.1 percent in 2005.3
In contrast to Cold War era, when its stance towards multilateralism was hardly effective and known, China now largely works within the international system embracing much of the current constellation of international institutions, rules, and norms as a means to promote its national interests. It is not only an important member of the UN body, it is also party to several international agreements, such as, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (March 1992), the Nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (October 1998). Today, China’s role towards multilateralism has been internationally recognised, for example, its role in the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, its leadership role in Asian Pacific Economic Forum (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN), the Australian New Zealand Free Trade Area (ANZEFTA), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). China has also made itself available to multilateral dialogues on security issues through a number of regional forums e.g, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). According to Ewing Stevenson II, “We can chart our future clearly and wisely only when we know the path which has led to the present”.4 So, one can better understand how China will behave as a great power in the future by looking back and examining how China had done in the past; and the best approach, is to examine the evolution of China’s foreign policy since 1949.
This paper divides the PRC foreign relations into two periods: the era of Mao Zedong [1949-1976] and the era of Deng Xiaoping [1978-1997] because apart from other leaders these two leaders had played a very important role in the formulation of China’s foreign policy. In the past half-century, China’s foreign relations evolved in a way that it kept shifting from USA to Russia. Undeniably, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made significant impact on the evolution of China’s foreign policy, and established their own models in their respective eras. This paper aims to explore some major Chinese foreign policy decisions in Mao and Deng’s rule, and then briefly discusses the situation under the current leadership. The period of Mao’s rule (1949-1976) was important in China’s foreign policy because it gave China the initial stability and strength it required as a new state and Deng’s rule (1978-1997) gave China the economic boost and set the foundation for an emerging economic power.
Mao Zedong’s Foreign Policies: (1949-1976)
The aim of Chinese foreign policy under Mao was to safeguard national security, to guarantee China’s hard-won state sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enhance China’s international status. In this sense, the foreign policy objectives under Mao were basically survival and security oriented. Since the founding of China in 1949, China’s international strategies, like all other states, consisted of using national power to enhance its national interests in the world. During this period Chinese policies, shifted between the Soviet Union and the US: “the leaning to one side strategy” in the 1950s,5 “the Double Anti” in the 1960s,6 and after that “the one united front strategy.”7 As explained in the following paragraphs, China first tilted towards the Soviet Union in 1950s; then went against both the US and Soviet Union in 1960s; and then in view of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, especially after the armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, the Chinese leadership realised that their biggest threat came from the north and China’s very survival was at stake. Therefore, it had to change “the Double Anti” strategy to escape from its strategically disadvantageous position. Consequently, China adopted a one united front strategy, under which it normalised its relations with US and went against the Soviet Union.
As the PRC emerged, there ensued a sharp confrontation between the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the imperialist camp headed by the US. China had to decide where it stood in this struggle and determine a foreign strategy in a bipolar world where its sphere of international activities would be limited as it was facing a hostile posture from the US which did not want to see another communist country on the map of the world. The US government’s hostile policy toward China in the 1950s and its huge ideological difference with China played an important role in allying China with the USSR with whom it shared a common ideology. In the beginning, Mao Zedong wished to establish a good relationship with the US, but was declined by the Truman Administration.8 The Truman Administration thought that the regime in China would not last long and consequently adopted the policy of “waiting for the dust to settle”,9 which involved political isolation, military threats, and an economic blockade.
On June 30, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the “leaning to one side strategy”. He said, “You are leaning to one side. The forty years experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road.”10
To strengthen China’s new regime and to protect their hard-earned national independence, the Chinese naturally adhered to the USSR’s anti-US and anti-imperialist front. After experiencing war, chaos, and tragedy, China urgently needed economic aid, including capital and technology, and experience in nation-building and economic development. Such aid could only be obtained from the Soviet Union at that time. The US government assumed that China was incapable of handling its own economy and awaited its failure.11 This stance helped China to cooperate and maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
The strategy of leaning to one side was practiced for about ten years. During this period, China accomplished three goals: First, it completely ended Nationalist rule on the mainland and drove out the foreign forces that had been entranced in China over one-hundred years12, China’s Communist party got full control over mainland China and the Nationalist Kuomintang party retreated to Taiwan and established their government there. Second, it resisted the US aggression in the Korean War of 1950-53 by aiding Korea, frustrating the threat posed by the US to Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina during the early 1950s.13 Third, it launched a smooth recovery of the domestic economy, which had been destroyed by years of war, and established the base for China’s industrialisation with 156 construction projects received from the Soviet Union. The annual volume of trade between China and USSR rose from 1.4 billion in 1950 to 5.4 billion in 1957, which accounted for more than 50 percent of China’s total foreign trade volume.14 Achievements like these depended mainly on being self-reliant, but without aid from the USSR and other friendly countries it would have been more difficult to achieve them. In spirit, allying itself with the USSR allowed China to realise its national sovereignty in the face of US policy of isolation and threats. Over a period of time “leaning to one side” strengthened the new regime, secured the nation’s interests, and enhanced China’s world position.
In the 1950s, China guided by a large number of Soviet advisors, followed the Soviet model of development, with its emphasis on heavy industry funded by surpluses extracted from the peasantry, while making consumer goods a secondary priority. However, by the late 1950s, Mao had begun to develop new ideas about how China was supposed to advance directly to Communism through a mobilisation of China’s massive labour force; these ideas led to the “Great Leap Forward”.15 Between the late 1950s and the end of the 1960s, important changes took place in China’s domestic politics and also in international diplomacy.
On the domestic front, with the advent of the “Cultural Revolution”,16 Mao began an offensive to purify the Chinese Communist party (CCP), having grown increasingly uneasy about what he believed were the creeping “capitalist” and antisocialist tendencies in the country. Mao believed that the material incentives that had been restored to the peasants and others were corrupting the masses and were counter-revolutionary. To arrest the so-called capitalist trend, Mao launched the “Socialist Education Movement” (1962-65), in which the primary emphasis was on restoring ideological purity, reinfusing revolutionary fervour into the party and government bureaucracies, and intensifying the class struggle. In connection with the “Socialist Education Movement”, a thorough reform of the school system, which had been planned earlier to coincide with the “Great Leap Forward”, went into effect. The reform was intended as a work-study programme namely, “New Xiafang Movement” in which schooling was slated to accommodate the work schedule of communes and factories. It had the dual purpose of providing mass education more cheaply than previously, and of re-educating intellectuals and scholars to accept the need for their own participation in manual labour. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao felt that he could no longer depend on the formal party organisation, since he was convinced that it had been permeated with the “capitalist” and bourgeois obstructionists. He turned to Lin Biao, Minister of Defence and Commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to counteract the influence of those who were allegedly ‘left’ in form but ‘right’ in essence. Chairman Mao believed that people in his party were antisocialist and have liking for capitalism. So Mao wanted PLA to reinitiate the fervour of communism in the masses as the PLA was widely extolled as a “great school” for the training of a new generation of revolutionary fighters and leaders. Maoists also turned to middle-school students for political demonstrations on their behalf. These students, joined by some university students, came to be known as the “Red Guards”. Red Guards activities were promoted as a reflection of Mao’s policy of rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm and destroying “outdated”, “counter-revolutionary” symbols and values. The result of the unfettered criticism of established organs of control by China’s exuberant youth was massive civil disorder, punctuated also by clashes among rival Red Guard gangs and between the gangs and local security authorities. The party organisation was shattered from top to bottom. Mao was busy in extending his powers inside China and crushing his opposition, and he succeeded in his efforts. So, during this period scant emphasis was given to foreign policy due to internal instability, and political problems.
The biggest event at the international front was the Sino-Soviet split. This occurred because China could not tolerate the Soviet Union’s prejudice,17 which attempted to bring China under its control as part of its global strategy. The Soviets reneged on their earlier commitment to help China develop nuclear weapons. They also refused to support the PRC in its border dispute with India, a country friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviets openly supported India in its war with China in 1962. These events greatly offended Mao and the other Chinese leaders. Mao saw Khrushchev18 as too conciliatory to the West. During 1962, international events caused a final rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Mao criticised Khrushchev for backing down in the Cuban Missile Crisis to which Khrushchev responded that Mao’s policies would lead to nuclear war. These events were followed by formal statements projecting each side’s ideological positions: the Chinese published The Chinese Communist Party’s Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement19 in February 29, 1964, in which China criticised Russia for not properly handling the Communist movement, the Sino-Soviet boundary issue, the question of aid to China and trade between Soviet Union and China; and the question of Soviet experts whom Soviet Union had called back from China. The Soviet Union responded with Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union20 in March 7, 1964, in which it openly blamed China for everything. This was the last formal communication between the two parties. During this period, the US continued to pursue a hostile policy towards China. Thus, China found itself caught in a two-way squeeze from the USSR and the US.
During 1968, the Soviets increased their troop deployments along the Chinese border, particularly the border with Xingjian where a Turkic separatist movement was going on and had the potential of destabilising the region. In 1961, the Soviet Union had around twelve half-strength divisions and 200 aircraft on the border; by the end of 1968 there were 25 divisions, 1,200 aircraft and 120 medium-range missiles.21 Although China had detonated its first nuclear device in 1964 at Lop Nor, its military power could not be compared to that of the Soviet Union. Tensions along the border escalated until March 1969, when armed clashes broke out along the Ussuri River on the Damansky Island, followed by more clashes in August.22 Many observers predicted war, and veteran American journalist, Harrison Salisbury, published a book entitled The Coming War between Russia and China. In August 1969, Soviet sources hinted at a strike on Lop Nor with nuclear weapons23. It was only when the Soviet Premier, Aleksey Kosygin, visited Bejing on his way home from the funeral of Hi Chi Minh in Hanoi that a political solution cooled the situation. The border dispute was suspended, but not actually resolved, and both sides continued their military build-up along the border.
The main themes of Chinese foreign policy under Mao were war and revolution. His early experience and almost thirty years of struggle for the victory of communism in China made Mao to consider China a revolutionary country, which should support revolutions. Mao’s ideal was fully reflected in an editorial of The People’s Daily on January 5, 1965, which openly presented slogan of “world revolution” as a guide for Chinese foreign policy. These themes had a significant impact on Mao Zedong’s perceptions of the world, e.g., those of a world war. Mao always believed that world war was inevitable and China must be prepared for it as soon as possible, and it should also be prepared for a nuclear war. To protect the Chinese nation, Mao Zedong in 1960s replaced the strategy of leaning to one side with the strategy of the Double Anti24, that is, the simultaneous pursuit of the anti-imperialism struggle against the US and the anti- revisionist struggle against the Soviet Union. Double Anti led to the development and strengthening of relations between China and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It also led to the development of relations between China and Japan and China and the West European countries because China could not live in isolation and fight with two big powers. When the European Economic Community (EEC), forerunner of the EU, was established in January 1958, China adopted a positive approach towards them, and by the 1970s managed to develop close ties with the EEC. The concept of Double Anti however, was based on an overestimated danger of world war. It was also influenced by the “ultra-leftist” trend in domestic political thinking evident during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, China for a time made too many enemies and based the intimacy of its foreign relations on ideological considerations.
By 1970, Mao had realised that he could not simultaneously confront both, the Soviet Union and the US, and also suppress internal disorder. During that decade, despite the fact that the Vietnam War was at its height and China’s anti-American rhetoric was at its peak, Mao decided that since the Soviet Union was a greater threat because of its geographical proximity to China, he should seek an accommodation with the US to confront the USSR. In the early 1970s, Chairman Mao and other Chinese leaders seized the opportunity which was offered by the US government to push forward the normalisation of Sino-US relations. China’s leaders wanted to ally with the US and contain the Soviet Union. On the common ground of tackling the main threat posed by the Soviet Union, China and the US established strategic cooperation. Similarly, the US was also interested in normalising relations with China as the Cold War between the US and USSR was intensifying and the US was deeply involved in Vietnam. So, consequently a secret back channel of communication was opened through Pakistan and Romania, which sent signals to the Chinese that the US was interested in ending its policy of attempting to isolate China.25 In July 1971, the then US National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, had secretly visited Beijing and reached an agreement whereby Nixon visited China. The movement toward reconciliation, which signalled the end of the US containment policy toward China, provided momentum for China’s admission to the UN. In 1971, Beijing finally gained China’s seat at the UN. Despite the fact that the US did not want Taiwan to be expelled from the UN, while at the same time favouring China’s entry, the world body overwhelmingly voted to oust Taiwan in favour of Beijing’s Communist government.26
In February 1972, during the visit of US President Nixon to China, the US and China issued the “Joint Communique” between the People’s Republic of China and the US, better known as the “Shanghai Communique”.27 The Communique noted that “there are essential differences between China and the US in their social systems and foreign policies”, but that both were prepared for their mutual relations to be guided by the principles of “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”.28 In addition, the Communique stated that the two nations had reviewed the “long-standing serious disputes” between them. It also noted that for the Chinese side, “The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations and the Chinese belief that the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair,” and “all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan”.29 The US agreed that Taiwan was part of China, and stated that it had the ultimate objective of complete withdrawal of its forces and installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it would progressively reduce its forces there as “tension in the area diminishes”.30 The communique also reaffirmed US interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. This communique was also a credit to Mao’s foreign policy.
With the end of the Cultural Revolution, and from then until Mao’s death in 1976, there was a gradual return to Communist “normality” in China. The Chinese stopped their direct support for revolutionary groups in other countries. China wanted at that time to normalise its relations with its neighbours, because it was exhausted by its domestic disturbance in the form of “Cultural Revolution”, and the situation in its neighbourhood especially in countries like Vietnam and Laos. These developments led to an end of the state of armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, but not to any thawing in political relations. However, China continued to denounce “Soviet social imperialism” and accused the Soviets of being the enemies of world revolution.
With the death of Mao in 1976, and the removal from power of the radical “Gang of Four”,31 the era of sweeping economic reforms began under Deng Xiaoping. He reversed Mao’s policies and began a transition to a market economy for China. By that time, China had largely lost interest in communist polemics, and condemnations of Soviet revisionism took on a fading ritualist tone.
Deng Xiaoping Foreign Policies: (1978-1997)
Deng Xiaoping was in power by the end of 1978, and the economy became the nation’s main priority. Changes were soon forthcoming in both, the domestic and foreign policy sectors. China had a broad agenda, including opening up to the outside world, national reunification, securing global and regional security, and the establishment of a new international political and economic order. Despite dramatic international developments during Deng’s era, such as, the major changes in Eastern Europe, the break up of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the bipolar system and the termination of the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy maintained considerable continuity.
Deng initiated China’s first major diplomatic transformation by launching the “reform and opening” movement in the late 1970s. Prior to Deng, Mao had rejected the rules of the international system, pursuing change through revolution instead. Mao’s foreign policy was noted for its aggressive language, strong opposition to the superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union), close association with developing countries, relative isolation from international organisations, and economic autarky. Deng took China in the opposite direction. To facilitate economic modernisation at home, he promoted engagement with the international community. China expanded its international profile by significantly increasing its participation in inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, especially financial ones, and gradually began to emerge from its Mao-era isolation. In the opening address at the “Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China” in 1982, Deng Xiaoping put forward the idea of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. The intent was,
“to unite the people of all ethnic groups in working hard and self-reliantly to achieve, step by step, the modernisation of industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology and to make China a culturally and ideologically advanced and highly democratic socialist country. To strive for China’s unification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland and to oppose hegemonism and work to safeguard world peace-these are the major tasks of our people in the 1980s. Economic construction is at the core of these tasks; it is the basis for the solution of our external and internal problems.”32
Though economic prosperity was the core of Deng’s reforms, yet he approached the opening up or the economy capitalist agenda, gradually. Deng initially opened some coastal cities to the outside world for overseas investment, such as Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai.33 China planned to expand its economic cooperation with foreign countries, absorb their capital and introduce their advanced technologies and managerial skills, so as to accelerate the development of its own economy. The private sector was developed to a large extent as a supplement to the socialist sector, which continued to remain dominant in China’s economy. In the beginning of 1985, Deng decided to expand the open coastal areas, extending the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou triangle in south Fujian, Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei and Guangxi into an open coastal belt.34 In 1990, the government decided to open the Pudong New Zone in Shanghai to overseas investment, and opened more cities in the Yangtze River valley. In this way, a chain of open cities extending up the Yangtze River valley, with Shanghai’s Pudong as the “dragon head”, had been formed. From 1992 onwards, the State Council opened a number of border cities, and in addition, opened all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions.35 In addition, 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new and high-tech industrial development zones were established in large and medium-sized cities.36 Deng also urged that some regions and some people be allowed to become prosperous first, through hard work, so that others would follow their example. As a result, a multi-level, multi-channel, omni-directional and diversified pattern of opening, integrating coastal areas with rivers, border and inland areas were formed in China. As these open areas adopted different preferential policies, they played the dual roles of “Windows” in developing the foreign-oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through exporting products and importing advanced technologies, and of “radiators” in accelerating domestic economic development. With such policies the Chinese economy began to make rapid progress.
In the diplomatic field, Deng resolved issues related to basic diplomatic strategy (such as normalising relations with Soviet Union), a massive troop reduction (1 million soldiers) based on the judgment that a world war was not imminent in the near future, and acceptance of the Hong Kong model of “one state, two systems”.37 Deng energetically negotiated with Margaret Thatcher over a solution to the Hong Kong problem, as well as with Mikhail Gorbachev on normalising Sino-Soviet relations. 38 Deng invited Gorbachev to China in October 9, 1985 through Romanian leader Ceausescu, and Gorbachev paid an official visit to China from May 15-18, 1989, during which both leaders discussed putting an end to the past and open new prospects for the future. They particularly focussed on settlement of historical accounts and focus their energies for the future. Unlike the relations of confrontation and stalemate in the 1960s and 1970s, Sino-Soviet ties after the visit evolved into a relationship of good neighbourliness, friendship, mutual benefit and cooperation.
After becoming a member of the UN, China also joined most of the UN affiliated agencies, including, by the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. China’s willingness, under Deng’s policy of opening up to the outside world, to receive economic and technical assistance from agencies such as the UNDP, was a significant departure from its previous stress on self-reliance. In 1986, China renewed its application to regain its seat as one of the founding members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In Deng’s era, there were many dramatic changes in the foreign-policy decision making. For example, unlike Mao’s dependence on an autocratic system which ignored support organisations, Deng enlarged meetings of the Politburo in order to decide policies. As a result, even though Deng’s opinions continued to have a major influence, policy was not valid unless approved by the Politburo.39 Under Deng’s guidance, “Politburo’s Foreign Affairs Guidance Group” was established, and as a result, the opinions of the State Council’s executive members were emphasised increasingly in foreign policy decisions. The role of research institutes in providing foreign policy inputs was also improved a great deal.
Deng Xiaoping articulated a series of principles in handling China’s difficult international environment in the wake of the Tiananman incident in 1989, in which a series of student-led demonstrations were held in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, between April 15, 1989, and June 4, 1989. The students’ protest started in middle of April 1989, triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang, who had been forced to resign as Party General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Hu, was widely seen as a liberal-minded person and his forced resignation from his position by Deng was viewed as unfair treatment by many, especially among intellectuals. The protests began on a relatively small scale, in the form of mourning for the late Hu Yaobang, and demands that the party revise their official view of him. The protests grew wider after news of confrontation between students and police spread; the belief by students that the Chinese media was distorting the nature of their activities also led to increased support for the protest. At Hu’s funeral, a large group of students gathered at Tiananmen Square and requested, but failed, to meet Premier Li Peng, widely regarded to be Hu’s political rival. The students called for a strike in the universities of Beijing. On April 26, 1986, an editorial in People’s Daily, following an internal speech made by Deng, accused the students of plotting turmoil. The statement enraged the students, and on April 27 about 50,000 students went onto the streets of Beijing, ignoring the warning of a crackdown made by authorities and insisted that the government withdraw the statement.40
On May 4, 1989, approximately 100,000 students and workers marched in Beijing making demands for free media reform and a formal dialogue between the authorities and student-elected representatives. The government rejected the proposed dialogue, only agreeing to talk to members of appointed student organisations. On May 13, large groups of students occupied Tiananmen Square and started a hunger strike, demanding that the government should withdraw the accusation made in the Peoples Daily editorial and begin talks with the student representatives. Hundreds of students, supported by thousands of protesting students and residents of Beijing went on hunger strike, which lasted for a week.
Although the government declared Martial Law on May 20, 1989, the demonstrations continued. After deliberating among Communist party leaders, the use of military force to resolve the crisis was ordered. The General Secretary of China’s Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, was ousted from political leadership as a result of his failure to prevent military action. Soldiers and tanks from the People’s Liberation Army were sent to take control of the city. These forces were attacked by Chinese workers and students in the streets of Beijing and the ensuing violence resulted in both civilian and military deaths. Student protesters claim that over 7,000 were killed. Following the violence, the government conducted widespread arrests to suppress the remaining supporters of the movement. The suppression of the Tiananmen Square protest caused widespread condemnation, of the Chinese government by the US and other Western Powers and consequently, China suffered from economic sanctions imposed by the West. It also had to deal with the implications of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as well as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Although, Deng’s legacy will always be dogged by the Tiananmen Square tragedy, he managed to survive through the ideological tug of war in the country, and finally preserved the political stability within China.
The objectives of Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy was to make sure that China’s economic modernisation would not be disturbed and that China would continue to seize every opportunity to develop the economy. China adopted a low profile in the comity of the world after the1989 Tiananmen Square incident. As Deng Xiaoping explained after the Tiananmen Square incident:
“There are many unpredictable factors affecting the international situation, and the contradictions are becoming increasingly evident. The current situation is more complex and chaotic than in the past, when the two hegemonist powers were contending for world domination. No one knows how to clear up the mess. Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that - this is one of our basic state policies. We can’t afford to do it and besides, we aren’t strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative. China will always side with the Third World countries, but we shall never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader. Nevertheless, we cannot simply do nothing in international affairs; we have to make our contribution. In what respect? I think we should help promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order. We do not fear anyone, but we should not give offence to anyone either. We should act in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence41 and never deviate from them.” 42
All during this time, China kept on improving its economy, but on the political front it kept a very low profile. However, the mid 1990s, especially after the Taiwan Strait crises in 1995-1996, China has accelerated the pace of its efforts for the establishment of a new international political and economic order through establishing strategic partnerships with the major powers of the world.
In comparison, while the foreign relations’ strategies under Mao were basically for survival and were security oriented, in Deng Xiaoping’s era, the priorities of Chinese foreign relations’ strategies were different, and can be described as modernisation-oriented strategies.
Comparison at a Glance
Mao’s Era Deng’s Era
To safeguard national security. To promote economic prosperity.
To guarantee China’s hard- To promote the establishment
won state sovereignty and of the new international order.
territorial integrity.
To enhance China’s To maintain a peaceful
international status. international environment.
Contemporary Situation
Today, China’s approach to bilateral relations, multilateral organisations, and security issues reflects a new flexibility and sophistication. The more recent transformation began in the early 1990s, with Beijing’s drive to expand its bilateral links. Between 1988 and 1994, China normalised or established diplomatic relations with 18 countries, as well as with the Soviet successor states. In the 1990s, it began to build on these new relationships, establishing various levels of “partnership” to facilitate economic and security coordination and to offset the US system of regional alliances. Beijing has abandoned its previous aversion to multilateral institutions, Chinese leaders began to recognise that such organisations could allow their country to promote its trade and security interests and limit US influence. So, in fact one has seen a greater emphasis on multilateralism and regional cooperation.
Starting in the second half of the 1990s, China began to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 1995, Beijing began holding annual meetings with senior ASEAN officials. Two years later, China helped initiate the “ASEAN + 3” mechanism, a series of yearly meetings among the ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea. Next came the “ASEAN + 1” mechanism, that is, annual meetings between ASEAN and China, usually headed by China’s Premier. China also deepened its participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and hosted the ninth leaders meeting in Shanghai in 2001. In the wake of the vacuum created with the demise of the Soviet Union in Central Asia, China moved quickly to institute a multilateral confidence building mechanism, the Shanghai Five in 1996, which also included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This enabled China to enter into multifaceted cooperation with its western neighbours. The Shanghai Five, which was further consolidated into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001, was further enlarged in 2005, with Pakistan, Iran and India becoming observer members in the organisation. 43
With regards to the UN, the year 2004 marked the 25th anniversary of the UN-China partnership. China has become an active member of the UN and other international organisations. China also provides manpower for UN peacekeeping operations and, at a time when the US is becoming more assertive about its pre-emptive doctrine, China has continued to reassert the primacy of the UN in dealing with international security issues and threats.44 China’s positions on the UN and its reforms as well as related issues have been put out in a Position Paper issued by the Chinese government on June 7, 2005. In this, the United Nations is seen as playing “an indispensable role in international affairs. As the most universal, representative, authoritative inter-governmental international organisation, the UN is the best venue to practice multilateralism, and an effective platform for collective actions to cope with various threats and challenges.” 45
Conclusion
When Mao was alive, China made most foreign policy decisions through a highly centralised system with Mao calling the shots. The process opened up somewhat under Deng, as China’s ties with the international community expanded, however, the ultimate decision-making remained centralised. Chinese foreign policies have also been influenced and determined by the structure and process of the international system. The Cold War system restrained China’s shifting between the two poles, the US and the Soviet Union, as China was a developing state and it had to ally itself with either of the two super powers. China has experienced three phases of development: survival, development and re-emergence in the era of Mao, in the era of Deng, and the post-Deng era, respectively. In the era of Mao, the unfavourable international environment was an obstacle to China’s development, and Mao's radical development approach was in line with a more ideological and dogmatic foreign policy. Since China’s economic reform and opening to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation oriented foreign policy served his emphasis on economic development.
Today, however, the process of making foreign policy in China has become much more institutionalised and decentralised, and is now far less dependent on any individual leader.46 China today is politically stable and prospering economically. The confirmation of Deng’s reform policy at the Communist Party’s 14th National Congress in October 1992,47 was a signal that Beijing would continue its reform and open-door policy in the post-Deng era and it has done so successfully. The future strengthening of China, domestically and internationally, is likely to enhance its sphere of influence in the region as well as in the world. With the implementation of Deng’s reform policies and in the post-Deng era, China started to enlarge the degree and range of its participation in international activities. The pursuit of economic modernisation and regional stability would incline China towards greater cooperation on security matters and increasing economic and cultural exchanges.
The role of the two leaders discussed above proved vital in developing a roadmap of China’s development. Mao gave the initial stability and security which was needed and Deng gave the economic boost which was the need of that time. China’s present international significance rests heavily on its rapidly growing economy and its increasing integration with the world economy. China is interested in concentrating on trade and economic development and therefore wants an international environment conducive to continued economic growth. A clear example of this is reflected in the Bush Administration’s perception of China as an important partner in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, with the US and China sharing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The Bush Administration also sees China as a strategic partner in the global war on terror. For example, China has recently joined the US Container Security Initiative, and, in year 2005, China and the US began periodic senior-level dialogues on global issues of mutual concern. The Pentagon has even expanded its programme of military-to-military contacts and exchanges between Chinese and US military academies in a sharp reversal of its policy of pre 9/11 era. Economic relations have expanded greatly after China joined the World Trade Organisation on December 11, 2001, and despite occasional trade tensions, many US economists and businesspeople regard economic ties as mutually beneficial and rewarding. China’s military power has grown substantially. The country has been modernising its military for two decades, and its armed forces are now smaller but much better trained and equipped. China continues to buy advanced weapons systems from Russia, including the SU-30MK2 maritime strike aircraft, S-300 SAMs, Kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class destroyers. It is also developing new weapons systems of its own, including tanks, submarines, and a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Since China behaves as a status quo power focused on better economic and political cooperation, it is difficult to envision a credible scenario in which the country’s improved military capacity poses a threat to anyone but Taiwan. Beijing regards Taiwan as Chinese territory and has always reserved the right to use force against Taiwan, if necessary. That possible use of force is now codified in the Anti-Secession Law of March 2005. So, China’s political role and influence in Asia and the world has and will grow substantially in years to come, reflecting a more adroit Chinese approach to its foreign policy.
* Mr. Humayoun Khan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.