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HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA Amina Afzal* Since their emergence as sovereign entities in 1991, the five Central Asian states have been subjected to severe criticism by the international community for the human rights violations in each state. The constitution of each state affirms the individuals’ rights as recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a common standard of achievement for all nations and is a yardstick by which to measure the degree of respect for, and compliance with, international human rights standards. It forms the basis for all the subsequent work conducted in the field of human rights and provides a basic framework for numerous international instruments created for the protection of rights and freedoms that it proclaims. All five Central Asian countries are a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966.1 Additionally, the Central Asian countries are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act, which inscribes basic human rights for the citizens of each participating state.2 The end of the Cold War saw the modification and transformation of the Helsinki Final Act into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The concept of security is the basis of OSCE activity and amongst its three basic elements is the human dimension focusing specifically on human rights, democratic principles of government and the rule of law.3 The OSCE documents detail human rights commitments that are benchmarks against which the behaviour of each government can be judged. The criticism of the Central Asian states emanates from the fact that authoritarian regimes have been in power in each of the five states and all the respective heads of state of these countries earlier belonged to the high rungs of the Soviet establishment. In the post-1991 period, following the demise of the Soviet Union, the leadership in each country has sustained its political clout through the systematic suppression of the right to freedom of speech, free election and participatory governance. The collapse of the Soviet Union was surrounded by euphoria in the West that the newly-emergent states would reject the Soviet system in favour of Western style democracies and economic institutions. Ironically, the transition across the former Soviet satellites has not been consistent with these expectations. The Presidents of each of the Central Asian states have ruled by diktat. Their holding of elections and referendums failed to meet international standards. The striking similarities in the processes that led to the democratic reforms in the countries were not merely coincidental but rather a proof of the enduring strength of the Soviet system. As a consequence of the ‘democratic impulse’ that swept through Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, three of the countries i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan witnessed the establishment of multiparty electoral systems. Eventually, the systems that evolved in each country were reflective of the level of commitment of the respective leaders of each country towards a process of democratisation.4 In comparative terms Kyrgyzstan carries a better image because it adopted an inclusive political system and instituted democratic political reforms. The creation of parties in Kyrgyzstan had begun even before independence supporting democracy and civil reform. The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan created in May 1990, for example, supported both economic reform and the liberalisation of Kyrgyzstan. February 1991 saw the emergence of Erkin Kyrgyzstan (Free Kyrgyzstan), which disintegrated in November 1992, on account of a difference in ideologies and their respective stances towards the government. The second faction set up Ata Meken (Motherland Party).5 Other parties include Asaba (Banner), Osh Aymagy (named after the Osh riots) and Adolat (Justice) Party. In Kazakhstan also there were a number of opposition parties. Examples include the Zheltoksan (December) Party, the Alash (named after the legendary Kazakh hero) Party, and Azat (Freedom).6 All these Kazakh political parties existed before independence. Two legal parties exist in Uzbekistan, the Peoples’ Democratic Party and the Vatan Taraqiati (National Progress Party) both of which are considered to be officially sponsored organisations, set up by the President in order to give some semblance of pluralism. Opposition parties that were formed existed at the time of December 1991 elections. The leader of Erk (Freedom) Party, Muhammad Salih, took part in the election but the party was later banned. Birlik (Unity) Party, suffered a similar fate and was not allowed to register. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was created in 1991 but was banned soon after its inception.7 This can be attributed to the fact that the leaders of Central Asia wanted to accommodate Islam within the society only to a certain extent and wanted to ensure that religion did not threaten the secular ideologies of the states. Officials have, therefore, generally been opposed to the formation of Islamic rebirth parties.8 Similarly, in Tajikistan also four main opposition parties emerged. These include the IRP, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Rastakhiz (Rebirth) Party and the Lali Badakhshan (Ruby of Badakhshan) Party. These parties formed a coalition named Islamic Renaissance Party for the November 1991 elections against the communist-dominated government.9 In Turkmenistan the Communist party of the former USSR has been renamed Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, with President Niyazov as its Chairman. The opposition groups that emerged, including the Agyz Birlik (Unity Party) and the Democratic Party were never registered. Niyazov encouraged the creation of the Peasant Justice Party to give some semblance of democracy.10 In January 2002, Kyrgyz legislator, Azimbek Beknazarov, was arrested on charges of misuse of power. The allegations referred to his tenure as an investigator in the Toktogul regional prosecutor’s office seven years ago. Beknazarov had been a very vocal critic of the Akaev government’s negotiations with China, in which Kyrgyzstan conceded over a hundred thousand hectares of previously disputed territory to China, and had called for the President’s impeachment. Beknezarov’s trial led to peaceful demonstrations in Aksy in March 2002, which were broken up by the police, leaving seven dead. A month later, one of the demonstrators died of a stroke during a hunger strike. In May 2002, the Beknazarov trial led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and his government. The continued imprisonment of former vice president Feliks Kulov, now head of the Ar Narmys (Dignity) Party, remains another political sore point. A similar situation exists in Kazakhstan as well. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, has continued to provide strong rhetorical support for the need for democratisation in the country, governmental policy provides little evidence that the country’s leaders are seriously committed to democratic reform. A group of key reformers left the Kazakh government in November 2001, following a joint statement asserting that, ‘democratic reforms in Kazakhstan have stopped.’ They formed a political movement called the Democratic Choice. The Democratic Choice movement itself proved relatively short-lived, as two of its organisers, Mukhtar Ablyazov and Gaklimzhan Shakiyenov, were arrested on charges of corruption. Ablyazov was sentenced to six years in prison. These developments and similar patterns in other Central Asian states suggest that the civil society and democratic institutions have been dealt a serious blow at the hands of the respective Central Asian regimes. The Central Asian countries have been condemned by several multilateral organisations including the EU and the UN on account of the human rights violations in each country. Accordingly, on November 24, 2003, the UN Third Committee (Social, Cultural and Humanitarian) approved a resolution on the situation of Human rights in Turkmenistan by a vote of 72 in favour to 37 against, at the 58th session of the UN General Assembly.11 The resolution expressed grave concern about the serious and continuing human rights violations occurring in Turkmenistan and called upon the government of Turkmenistan to implement the recommendations as outlined by the March 2003 report of the Rapporteur of the Moscow Mechanism of the OSCE. The Moscow Mechanism was invoked in response to charges that suspects in the November 2002 attack on the Turkmen President were tortured and did not receive fair trials. Turkmenistan refused to allow the designated rapporteur, French law professor Emmanuel DeCaux, to visit Turkmenistan. Similarly, at an OSCE permanent council meeting in July 2002, the EU expressed concerns about the new law on political parties in Kazakhstan saying that it ‘posed a threat to political pluralism and would impede the full development of political parties in all sectors of the Kazakh society.’12 The law imposed stringent conditions for re-registration of political parties and as a result, the country’s opposition groups were barred from contesting future elections.13 Other institutions involved in the Central Asian region include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the OSCE, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and also the World Bank. With reference to human rights, for example, the EBRD on May 4, 2003, called for an improvement in the human rights situation in Uzbekistan. The EBRD is the largest investment bank in Central Europe and Central Asia and supporting 27 countries to help build market economies. It, however, stipulates that it provides financing for only those countries that are committed to democratic reforms and had given the Uzbek government one year to improve its human rights’ record and to introduce political reform.14 The issue of the status of Russian citizens within the Central Asian countries surfaced when these countries became independent states. The Russian citizens faced numerous problems vis-à-vis the local regimes that assumed power. The Russian Duma adopted a resolution on the rights of Russian citizens in Turkmenistan on June 20, 2003, following the Turkmen Governments decision to rescind the 1993 dual citizenship agreement between the two countries.15 The authoritarian regime of President, Islam Karimov, failed to make progress toward international human rights standards and the US State Department issued a statement in this regard on January 9, 2004. The statement declared that the authoritarian government of President, Islam Karimov, had failed to make progress toward international standards. Uzbekistan is the recipient of US military aid to destroy Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction programmes under the Nunn-Lugar Programme, which requires an annual human rights certification to ensure the flow of aid. In Uzbekistan’s case, however, President Bush, waived the human rights certification requirement on the grounds that the US national interest would be served by continuing to work with Uzbekistan, as it was the primary provider of uranium to the Soviet government.16 In the ensuing discussion this paper will analyse the human rights situation prevalent in each of the Central Asian countries in the light of their respective constitutions and the international treaties that they are signatories to. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan was the last of the Commonwealth of Independent States to sign the international bill of human rights in November 2003. The Kazakh government attributed the delay to the major legislative reforms needed to fulfill the standards set forth in the international Covenants that it is signatory to.17 According to its constitution, Kazakhstan is a democratic and secular state assuring rights and freedom to its population in that: ‘The basic underlying principles of the operations of the Republic of Kazakhstan are social harmony, political stability, economic development for the well being of the entire population, Kazakhstan patriotism, and the democratic resolution of the most important issues of national life through means including republican referenda and votes in Parliament.’18 Although, the constitution assures democratic norms and values, the situation on ground is very different. The constitution has in fact greatly increased the power of the president and has marginalised the importance of the legislature.19 The Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President heads a Council of Ministers. In practice, President Nursultan Nazarbaev exercises complete control over the government. Parliamentary parties are government-sponsored and the President personally established several of the parties. In 1991, Nazarbaev gave his blessings to the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (PCK), which was followed by the creation of the People’s Unity Party of Kazakhstan (PUPK) in 1993. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the President backed four parties: the PCK, the Party of National Unity, the Democratic Party and the Popular Cooperative Party. During the 1999 elections, however, only the Popular Cooperative Party won representation, with the others replaced by three new pro-presidential parties: Otan (Fatherland), the Civic Party and the Agrarian Party.20 In April 2003, the Kazakh government’s Ministry of Justice accepted the re-registration of seven parties. Before the re-registration law came into force in January of the same year the number of political parties in Kazakhstan was nineteen. Defending the law, a Justice Ministry spokesman claimed that some parties had been refused registration as they violated the civil code and the laws on political parties. The law on political parties that was adopted in 2001 required that parties must prove a membership of at least 50,000 members to be registered.21 The result of the legislation was that some registered opposition parties did not re-register, as they were no longer legally eligible to function as legal entities on account of a lack of members. The Commission for Cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan met in Brussels on July 22, 2003, to discuss Kazakhstan’s progress on democratisation, the rule of law and the implementation of human rights standards as a response to the appeal made by Human Rights Watch, a New York based independent non-governmental organisation which is working across the globe and has acquired international status as being amongst the foremost human rights organisation in the world. HRW 22 had appealed to the EU insisting that the country be pressured to accelerate its progress in these areas. Human Rights Watch had urged the EU to use its regular EU-Kazakhstan cooperation council meetings to insist on the release of Kazakh political opposition leader, Galimzhan Zhakianov, Kazakh journalist, Sergei Duvanov, and other political prisoners. It further requested an independent and impartial review of all criminal cases brought against members of the political opposition and called on Kazakhstan to rescind criminal defamation laws, including those that currently allow government officials to bring claims of insult to ‘honour and dignity’, when they are called to account for corruption and abuse of office. Furthermore, it asked Kazakhstan to sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which the country finally signed in November 2003, and was the last of the Central Asian states to do so. The Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbaev’s family owns most of the country’s newspapers and televisions stations, directly or indirectly. On May 3, 2003, President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, approved restraining revisions to Kazakhstan’s Mass Media Law. Under the law, organisations designated as members of ‘the mass media’ would be subject to certain harsh provisions. The amendment widened the range of the official legal net by designating websites as mass media as well. This change affected independent journalists and politicians who published on the Internet. In a tightening of criminal libel laws, it is now even easier for the government to prosecute editors and media owners in a country where criticism of the government brings harsh officially authorised punishment.23 The state controls all of Kazakhstan’s printing houses, as well as the country’s two main Internet service providers. Officials often block access to politically sensitive material, including the website of the Moscow-based Information Analytical Center Eurasia (www.eurasia.org.ru), which is funded by exiled members of Kazakhstan’s opposition party, the Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan.24 Articles in the www.eurasianet.org are more often than not published under pseudonyms out of the journalists’ fear of government reprisal.25 The start of legal investigations by the US government into the alleged Swiss bank accounts of President Nursultan Nazarbaev, led to new assaults on press freedom in the country. A US citizen, James Giffen was alleged to have channeled millions of dollars to Swiss bank accounts of top Kazakh government officials including President Nazarbaev, and was tried by a New York court on charges of bribing foreign state officials, which is considered a criminal offence under US laws. Since the President was also implicated in the trial the authorities used different pretexts to shut down a large number of privately owned newspapers that gave coverage to these investigations. Under growing political pressure, and facing a corruption scandal involving secret Swiss bank accounts, Nazarbaev responded with a severe crackdown on both the media and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK). Two prominent DCK leaders and a journalist were arrested and jailed, by the authorities on dubious charges.26 Mukhtar Ablyazov, a DCK leader, was arrested in March 2002, and in July of that year the Supreme Court sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. International and local observers at Ablyazov’s trial told Human Rights Watch that the case was clearly politically motivated, riddled with procedural violations, and lacking in evidence. Ablyazov himself called the indictment ‘absurd’ and said the charges had been brought against him for having founded the DCK. In August 2002, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, the DCK’s other co-founder, a former governor of Pavlodar region, was jailed for seven years on similar charges of abuse of office and financial mismanagement. In January 2003, independent journalist, Sergey Duvanov, received a three-and-a-half year prison sentence on dubious rape charges. He had written extensively on the oil corruption scandal known as ‘Kazakhgate’.27 The Kazakh Police also resorted to violence against prisoners allegedly belonging to unregistered political parties. Members of the group Hizb-ut-Tahrir 28 were perhaps subjected to the worst kind of torture by the government authorities.29 The intensification of crackdown against the Hizb-ut-Tahrir can be attributed to the 9-11 attacks on the US territory and the consequent US led war against terrorism. As a result of the US campaign in Afghanistan the scrutiny of Islamist movements by the native regimes across Central Asia has intensified. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Hizb members, on account of a fear of crackdown, went underground. With the passage of time, however, Hizb members became more active. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir has followers across Central Asia, although the organisation advocates a non-violent approach, its Central Asian-based followers at times speak in ways that suggest that the organization, or at least some of its members, do not preclude resorting to violence, if the party continues to suffer severe repression at the hands of the Kazakh Government. Kyrgyzstan The international community has often referred to Kyrgyzstan as the bastion of democracy in Central Asia. The situation in Kyrgyzstan might appear better as compared to the rest of the Central Asian countries but the Aksy riots of March 2002 suggest otherwise. The Aksy riots had begun as a result of public protests against the government’s trial of Azimbek Bekanazarov, who had called for an impeachment of the Kyrgyz President, following the government’s decision to sign a controversial land agreement with China. The turmoil can be attributed to the people’s accumulated discontent with the continued negligence of social problems by the authorities.30 Observers believe that the stationing of US troops and other anti-terrorism coalition forces in Central Asian states has encouraged regional leaders, including President Akayev, to act forcefully to strengthen their individual authority. Authoritarianism coupled with corrupt practices has pushed the masses toward radical organisations.31 Analysts believe that Kyrgyz authorities are pushing the political opposition into drastic actions. The 1993 constitution defines Kyrgyzstan as ‘a sovereign unitary democratic republic created on the basis of a legal secular state.’32 However, President, Aksar Akaev, continues to dominate the government. Despite constitutional limitations the parliament and civil society have managed to become more assertive and have occasionally been able to modify and even block Presidential initiatives. The presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2000, were seriously marred by irregularities. On the judicial front also the judiciary remained subservient to the executive branch of the government. There were numerous incidents where the government used the judiciary against political rivals and media figures.33 Incidents such as the trials of a Kyrgyz Member Parliament, Beknazarov, and former Kyrgyz Prime Minister, Feliks Kulov, in 2002, only serve to strengthen the claims of critics that human rights are being extensively abused by the authorities in Kyrgyzstan. Independent media outlets have also suffered considerably at the hands of the Kyrgyz government.34 Human rights monitors, including the HRW and Amnesty International in Kyrgyzstan, believe that Beknazarov’s detention was a proof of an intensification of political crackdown carried out by President, Aksar Akayev’s administration that has long sought to limit the political influence of his opponents. Other human rights advocates point to the continuing persecution of Feliks Kulov, who is widely viewed as President, Askar Akayev’s strongest political rival, to support their claim.35 President Akayev’s administration has stifled any domestic criticism of its policies and as a result even the human rights monitors are not being spared. In late 2001, Ravshan Gapirov, a local human rights activist, was sentenced, to a multi-year jail term on fraud charges. Gapirov’s human rights organisation, Pravosudie, was providing legal representation to members of banned religious groups, including Hizb-ut-Tahrir. In addition to Gapirov’s arrest, authorities detained dozens of young Kyrgyz suspected of having ties to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, according to local media reports. Officials insist that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s activity represent a security threat to Kyrgyzstan.36 The intensification of the onslaught against members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir is linked with the US-led anti-terrorism campaign. President Akayev, appears to be taking advantage of the United States’ preoccupation with containing terrorism by portraying his domestic political adversaries and religious activists as potential security threats. A political observer Satybaldi Kurmanov commented, ‘It is the collaboration with the Western anti-terrorist forces that is giving confidence to local governments. Authorities believe that there will be no harsh consequences from donor countries for human rights abuse. … Our president (Akayev) will use it to crush domestic opposition.’37 Tajikistan Although Tajikistan’s civil war ended in 1997, its devastating effects endure. Journalists work in dire, impoverished conditions, exacerbated by the stifling restrictions imposed by President, Emomali Rakhmonov. Investigative reporting is uncommon, especially on issues such as trafficking in weapons and drugs, border tensions, and power struggles among the political and military elite considered sensitive by the government. Tajikistan’s sole publishing house is controlled by the state, which freely blocks publication of critical stories. Journalists who persist in speaking their minds are threatened with police intimidation, tax harassment, and legal challenges under insult laws that carry prison sentences of up to two years.38 A dictatorial government that has established some nominally democratic institutions rules Tajikistan. President, Emomali Rakhmonov, dominates the government following his re-election in 1999, for a five-year term. The elections were seriously flawed and in order to pacify any antagonism the opposition figures held seats in both the parliament and the government. Several parties were allowed to participate in the 2000 and 2001 parliamentary elections but the elections were considered flawed and not free by international standards. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice. The judiciary has been subjected to military and paramilitary pressures and often there were long delays before trials. For example, it was reported by the Asia plus blitz on January 2001, that the Supreme Court at the request of the Ministry of Justice had suspended the activities of the Adolatkhoh (Justice) Party for a period of six months. Justice Party officials claim that the suspension was ‘an act of revenge’ for the party’s opposition to Rakhmonov during the 1999 elections. Following the six month ban, on August 7, 2001, the Supreme Court ultimately banned the Justice Party altogether.39 Articles 19 and 20 of the Tajik Constitution state that every citizen is guaranteed judicial protection and that no one may be subjected to detainment, arrest or deportation without lawful grounds. It further affirms that that a person may not be considered guilty of commission of a crime until the verdict of a court enters into legal force. In a violation of these constitutional articles, the authorities arrested Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov, the deputy chairman of the Tajikistan’s opposition Islamic Renaissance Party, in June 2003. Later, on June 4, 2003, the country’s military prosecutor, Major General Sharif Qurbonov, told the ITAR-TASS news agency that Shamsiddinov had been arrested by security services on a warrant issued by his own office. No other information was given about the suspect except that he had committed ‘serious crimes’.40 According to the 2003 annual report of ‘Reporters Without Frontiers’,41 the Tajik authorities continue to exercise great pressure on independent journalists and printing presses are under strict governmental control. The state control of the broadcasting commission enables the authorities to censor newspaper articles and refuse licenses to independent media. An independent radio, Asia+, which began broadcasting in September 2003, had to wait nearly four years for authorisation from the authorities. The authorities often use pressure tactics such as seizures, threats or conscripting critical young journalists into the army. Press offences are still considered crimes and defamation is punishable by two years in prison and five years if it concerns the president himself.42 Turkmenistan Section II, articles 28 through 30 of the Turkmen Constitution deal with the basic rights and freedoms of its citizens concerning their right to democracy.43 However, President Saparmurat Niyazov, head of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 and President of the country since its independence in 1991, is the country’s President for life, although he has announced his intention to hold elections between 2008 and 2010. Niyazov continues to hold his monopoly on political power and on the Democratic Party, which is the sole political party in the country. The President had complete control over the parliament and the judiciary, emphasising stability and gradual reform, official nation-building efforts continued to focus on fostering Turkmen nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov.44 Turkmen authorities continued to violate basic rights of the ethnic minorities particularly the Russians. In its effort to purge the nation of any remnants of Soviet rule, the government began a unique campaign promoting the Rukhnama (Book of the Soul), authored by Niyazov. Study of the Rukhnama is compulsory in all state institutions and schools. The personality of the President has become a cult and now even the names of the months of the Turkmen Calendar year are named after the president and members of his family.45 Ironically, the Turkmen State under Niyazov has opted for the Soviet-style authoritarianism as opposed to the rest of the regimes in Central Asia. The authorities have particularly targetted the Russian citizens of Turkmenistan. The President annulled the dual Turkmen-Russian citizenship in April 2003, due to which many Russian citizens were forced to leave Turkmenistan. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and Niyazov had earlier signed the agreement on dual citizenship in 1993. At the end of April 2003, Turkmen security officials had begun removing Russian citizens with dual citizenship lacking a valid Turkmen visa from aboard airplanes in Turkmenistan. The Russian official news agency RIA (Russian Information Agency Novosti) commented that the April 22 decree had deprived nearly 100,000 Turkmen citizens from the opportunity of travelling to Russia.46 Turkmenistan’s government stresses its secular nature and its support of freedom of religious belief, as embodied in the 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organisations in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and institutionalised in the 1992 constitution. The law guarantees the separation of church and state; it also removes any legal basis for Islam to play a role in political life by prohibiting proselytising, the dissemination of ‘unofficial’ religious literature, discrimination based on religion, and bans the formation of religious political parties. In addition, the government reserves the right to appoint and dismiss anyone teaching religion or who is appointed as a member of the clergy. Since independence, the Islamic leadership in Turkmenistan has been more assertive, but has to respond within the parameters of government control. The official governing body of religious judges gave its official support to President Niyazov in the June 1992 elections. In August 1999, the Hare Krishna leader, Aleksandr Prinkur, was expelled to Uzbekistan, while in December of that year, Ramil Galimov, a member of a Jehovah’s Witness group in Kyzyl-arbat who held dual Russian-Turkmen citizenship, was summarily deported. Six Baptist missionary families were deported between December 1999 and May 2000, mostly to Russia.47 In January 2002, Mukhamed Aimuradov, who was imprisoned in 1995, and Baptist pastor Shageldy Atakov, jailed in 1999, were not included in an amnesty, which freed many prisoners a fact which shows the government’s strict policy toward religious freedom. Numerous institutions, including Amnesty International and other UK and Moscow-based organisations have documented the human rights abuses in Turkmenistan. According to these reports, Turkmenistan has the worst record on religious freedom in the entire 55-nation OSCE. Uzbekistan RFE/Rl Newsline in Prague on May 11, 2001 reported that it had received a fax from a dissident Uzbek citizen, Bahram Muminkhunav, currently residing in Moscow, accusing President Islam Karimov, of plotting the assassination of Muhammad Salikh, the exiled leader of the banned Erk (Freedom) Party. Muminkhunav claimed that he had evidence to prove that two officials of the interior ministry and the President had offered him bribes amounting to two million dollars in autumn 1999, to arrange the assassination through his Chechen contacts.48 The government accused Salikh of being responsible for the February 16, 1999, terrorist attack in Tashkent and he has been in exile since then. Salikh is incumbent President Islam Karimov’s political opponent and competed against him in the 1991 elections following which the party was banned in the country. Independent observers raised doubts over the validity of the January 27, 2002, national referendum in Uzbekistan on presidential and parliamentary reforms on charges of rigging. According to the Central Electoral Commission, CEC, almost 92% of the electorate turned out for the poll, with 91% opting for an extension of Islam Karimov’s presidential term from five to seven years and 93% backing the creation of a bicameral parliament. In May 2002 press censorship was eliminated in Uzbekistan. However, the Uzbek Government cautioned editors that they would be responsible for the content of their publications. Additionally, new amendments to the media law in effect encouraged self-censorship. The government frequently banned public meetings and demonstrations, citing the threat of unrest. Freedom of religion was restricted and officials harassed. Hundreds of Muslims it suspected of extremism have been arrested. The Uzbek Ministry of Justice registered Independent Human Rights Organisation of Uzbekistan (IHROU) in March 2002, and this became the first time since the independence of Uzbekistan, it had ever registered an independent, non-governmental, domestic human rights organisation. On March 19, 2003, after a year of sustained international pressure, the authorities registered a second group, Ezgulik (Good Deed), after rejecting the group’s applications three times.49 In its March 2000 report on Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch documented a crackdown on human rights defenders unleashed by the government following the February 1999 bombings of several government buildings in the capital, Tashkent. The report focused its specific concerns over Makhbuba Kasymova and Ismail Adylov, leading activists of the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), who were in prison at that time as a result of the crackdown. In November 2002, the Uzbek Government invited the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit the country. According to the report released by the UN following the envoy’s visit to Uzbekistan, the prison conditions were poor, and pre-trial confinement often lasted several months. Police routinely and arbitrarily detained citizens to extort bribes. Muslims suspected of extremist sympathies were more often than not the prime targets of security forces. Those responsible for documented abuses were rarely punished. In response the Uzbek government denied allegations of torture but acknowledged incidents of human rights in its prisons.50 Role of International Community In the post-Cold War era nearly all countries in the world proclaim their commitment to human rights. Perhaps the most vivid expression of this was the 1993 World Human Rights Conference in Vienna, which resulted in a wide-ranging Declaration and Program of Action endorsed by 171 states. With the continuing awareness and public demands for participatory governance through political liberalisation and democratisation, governments are being pressured at home and from abroad to live up to these commitments. Although, international bodies play a secondary role in implementing the human rights norms, states are increasingly accountable to the international community for their human rights practices. Persistent human rights violations in some countries are receiving international publicity mobilised by transnational public and private groups. Global, regional, national, and transnational actors have created a web of pressures that make it almost impossible today for states to avoid a public accounting of their human rights practices. In the post-9/11 global scenario the Central Asian region witnessed a flurry of activity in the form of the increased interest of many countries and institutions in the region. The US interest in Central Asia emanates from the geo-strategic importance of the region in terms of its geographical location and proximity to Afghanistan as well as its abundant oil and gas resources. The US required the assistance of the Central Asian states for several purposes including the use of bases and over flight facilities during the US-led campaign against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the US was concerned that the Central Asian countries may become breeding grounds for more terrorism. It was critical to the national interests of the US to enhance its relations with the five Central Asian countries, a fact which could be used to alter the course of human rights in these countries. Between 1990 and 2001, Turkmenistan received $1.25 million in Foreign Military Sales, $625,000 in Direct Commercial Sales, $1.8 million in International Military Education and training (IMET) and about $2.9 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Turkmenistan’s decision to provide a land corridor and over-flight rights for humanitarian assistance shipments to Afghanistan raised Turkmenistan’s profile vis-à-vis the US government. In the 2002 fiscal year (FY 02) budget, Turkmenistan was granted approximately $7.4 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funding and $388,000 in IMET. Turkmenistan was allocated an additional $4 million in FSA through the FY 02 Supplemental Appropriations request. For FY 03, Turkmenistan was given $450,000 in IMET, $700,000 in FMF, and $7 million in FSA. For FY 04, $450,000 in IMET, $700,000 in FMF and $8 million in FSA has been pledged for Turkmenistan.51 In addition to praising Turkmen cooperation, the US supported President Niyazov’s proposal to revive plans to construct a Trans-Afghanistan pipeline to bring Turkmen gas to Pakistan and other South Asian countries. Plans to build the gas pipeline stretching from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan were shelved after US oil company Unocal’s withdrawal from the project four years ago following a shift in Washington’s policy towards the Taliban. Following the July 2003 agreement giving US aircraft landing rights at Almaty airport the US has simultaneously pursued closer military ties, and exerting pressure on the Kazakh government with reference to human rights issues. In September 2003, the US government officials took the lead in an international effort to convince the Kazakh authorities not to extradite Gulgeldi Annaniazov, a Turkmen dissident in Kazakh custody, to Turkmenistan. Annaniazov was granted refugee status by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was able to travel to Norway for medical treatment in early October 2003.52 An important US ally, Kyrgyzstan, reportedly received U.S.$49.9 million in assistance in 2002, including $12 million for security programmes, none of it tied to progress on human rights.53 After September 11, 2001, Kyrgyzstan promptly offered support to the US-led war on terrorism by allowing the US military to base its forces at Manas International Airport, located near the capital city of Bishkek. The US continuously provides Kyrgyzstan with equipment and military training. During President Akaev’s Washington visit, US officials told him privately that his cooperation against terrorism did not give him a green light to undermine democracy. The joint statement issued at the close of Akaev’s visit stated that the two countries reaffirmed their ‘mutual commitment’ to promote human rights. Prior to the visit the US, however, failed to insist that Kyrgyzstan show tangible progress on its human rights, such as the release of Feliks Kulov. During meetings between President Akaev and President George W. Bush, there was insistence by the US government regarding specific human rights improvements in the country. In the case of Tajikistan numerous high-level US governmental officials paid visits to the country, but avoided references to human rights violations in their public comments. The US appeared to minimise attention to human rights in Tajikistan, in contrast to other Central Asian countries. The US attitude is based on the Tajik support for the US-led war on terrorism. Conclusion The 9-11 attacks on mainland USA and the events following it have raised the profile of Central Asian countries vis-à-vis the international community because of their proximity and adjacency to Afghanistan. They are now subject to increased scrutiny of the world since it is a region that remains prone to political unrest, human rights violations inclusive of the drugs trade, which originates in the poppy fields of Afghanistan. In the Central Asian countries themselves their participation in the war on terrorism has led to an intensified scrutiny by the governments of these countries of religion based movements within them. If the US chooses to support the regimes in Central Asia unconditionally without prioritising the issue of human rights it would result in a domestic upheaval within the societies and promote a culture of Islamic conservatism. In order to address the issue, the bilateral and multilateral institutions must begin to demand real change in Central Asian countries for continued aid disbursements. Future aid must be conditional on the return for already demonstrated political and economic liberalisation. A greater role of the UN would also serve to enhance the importance that the world attaches to the issue of human rights. Lastly, it is in the interest of Central Asian regimes that they address the issue of human rights and ensure a popular mandate for their continued rule. References
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