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INDIA’S GROWING INFLUENCE
IN CENTRAL ASIA: Amina Afzal * Owing to its geographic location, Central Asia has assumed an important strategic role in global politics. It is significantly positioned in the heart of the Eurasian continent. The region serves not only as a historical buffer zone between Asia and Europe but also as a convenient transit route connecting other major regions. Central Asia and the Caspian Basin are collectively known to contain vast reserves of natural gas and oil. Estimates of proven and possible reserves in the area run to approximately 200 billion barrels of oil out of which 30 billion barrels are known reserves, an estimate which equals the reserves of the North Sea.1 Though the Caspian oil reserves do not match those of the Middle East, which accounts for 65% (684 billion barrels) of the proven oil reserves in the world, in the coming days the region will undoubtedly play an important role in the world energy supply security.2 Iran, Turkey, Russia, China and the US are all vying for influence in the Central Asian region. India has long aspired to establish itself as a global player and the post-9/11 global scenario has provided it with an opportunity to further these aims. India is now the third country together with Russia and the US with a military base in Central Asia, a fact that shows the amount of influence India wields in the region, to be able to acquire such a facility. India also exerts a considerable amount of influence in the economic development of the Central Asian region. This appraisal looks at how the Indian foreign policy is currently focusing on Central Asia and on its possible fall out on Pakistan. While New Delhi has developed relations with each of the five Central Asian Republics (CARs), some of them are clearly more important for it than others. India’s Central Asia policy and its repercussions for Pakistan must be viewed within the broader framework of New Delhi’s relations with Iran, China, Russia and the US, all of which can be considered as current key stake holders in Central Asian region. These developments provide the context in which India is developing its relations with this region, important for the energy reserves it holds. India in Central Asia The disintegration of the USSR was largely interpreted by Indian policy makers in an alarmist manner. Delhi was worried about the fact that Pakistan would no longer be shut out of the region like it had previously been on account of the virtual lack of relations with the former USSR. India was faced with the prospect of the emergence of an Islamic bloc created on the basis of religion and an opposition for India. In its perceptions, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics together could provide Pakistan with a strategic depth on its western border to be able to counter the eastern threat. The Central Asian Republics gained independence in 1991 and since then India’s relations with the newly emerged states have come a long way. India’s favoured position in Central Asia can be attributed to the 1971 Friendship Treaty with Moscow by virtue of which it enjoyed close political links with the USSR and its satellites, and retained that prestige even after the Central Asian republics gained independence. This is evident from the fact that in August 1991, Tashkent celebrated India’s Independence Day. A week of festivities marked the twentieth anniversary of Soviet-Indian treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.3 Unlike most other countries, India already had a consulate functioning in Tashkent which was immediately upgraded to an embassy after the Central Asian states gained independence. Delhi attached so much importance to the newly independent region that it immediately opened embassies in the other four capitals of the Central Asian Republics by early 1992. A number of factors underlie the impetus for the pursuit of Indian interests in the region. These interests include geostrategic and economic factors as well as those related to energy. Budget constraints on the expansion of its foreign services were solved by retrenchment elsewhere in the world. It was India’s fear of the creation of a Muslim bloc in Central Asia coupled with the concern regarding Pakistan’s possible growing presence in Central Asia that compelled New Delhi to undertake such drastic steps. For example in 1992, India claimed that Pakistan had obtained uranium from Tajikistan for its nuclear programme.4 Since the 1990s, Central Asia has come to represent India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’. On account of its strategic and economic interests in Central Asia, officials in New Delhi have made conscious efforts to strengthen and diversify these relations. The post-9/11 events saw the emergence of renewed Indo-Central Asian relations based on the Islamic threat common to India and these Central Asian states. The regimes in Central Asia are engaged in a violent struggle for power vis-à-vis Islamic radical groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir. All five states identify these groups as their main security threats. Following the disintegration of USSR, the poverty and dissatisfaction of the people increased considerably and made them easy targets for the political agendas of certain religious organisations, who used the simple faith of their co-religionists to rouse them against the ‘secular’ nature of the regimes in power. The latter with their authoritarian mode of functioning already stood discredited and were unpopular with the masses for practices such as, absolutism, corruption, and disrespect for law and human rights. The secular and modern forms of governments in each republic fear this popular network in Central Asia. There is a mutual recognition that both India and the Central Asian Republics together need to interact closely in order to contain cross border terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. Central Asia’s shared border with Afghanistan has made its secular regimes susceptible to the impact of religious extremism and ethnic unrest. The IMU is considered to be financed by Osama Bin Laden and influenced by Saudi-supported wahabi elements in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to Indian policy makers, any advance by Islamic militants in Central Asia could invigorate similar elements active in Kashmir.5 Central Asia is cushioned between Russia on its north, China on the east and Iran in the south. India’s diplomatic thrust into Central Asia through bilateral visits and trade as well as by discreet military agreements with some of the Republics is also triggered by the security realignments in the region following the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The ensuing conflict of interest in the area between Russia, the US and China is also a stimulant for New Delhi’s forward Central Asian policy. Similarly, China is engaged with the Central Asian Republics in their common pursuit of rooting out terrorism, which has become a menace for all the countries in the region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) forum was created to counter this threat emanating from terrorism. India is now trying to obtain a membership of this forum. The level of strategic cooperation between India and Central Asian Republics is evident from the fact that India was able to muster the support of not only Tajikistan but also Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which played integral roles to help India establish its military base at Farkhor.6 New Delhi’s increased presence in Central Asia serves a number of purposes for India. Not only does it reinforce India’s position as a key player in the global war against terrorism, but also aids its goal of becoming the dominant regional power in the Indian Ocean region. Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, paid a two-day visit to the Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in January 2003. Sinha’s meetings with his Tajik and Kyrgyz counterparts have been termed sensitive in nature and being viewed as part of India’s increased presence in the region.7 In addition, India has also been trying to develop its bilateral economic, political and social ties based on the historical links that it has with these states. Since the events of 9/11, Indian activities in the Central Asian states have intensified. Trade and economic relations between India and Central Asia are growing at a steady pace. Certain Indian commodities including tea and pharmaceuticals have established a foothold in the Central Asian markets.8 Indian businessmen are exploring the possibilities that lie in Central Asia by virtue of increased interaction with each of the five republics. India has set up a joint business council to boost its bilateral trade with Tajikistan, which presently stands at $3 million per annum. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has over the years been organising ‘Enterprise India’ shows in order to serve as a platform for Indian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Central Asia. The shows were organised in the capitals of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.9 India-Kazakhstan In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the principal producer of energy. India remains an energy deficient country. In the first half of the twenty first century, it is estimated that India will become one of the top five consumers of energy.10 In order to fulfil the growing demands of its burgeoning population and expanding economy, India needs to look for alternative sources of energy, to augment those which it is presently acquiring from the Persian Gulf region. Kazakhstan being the largest Central Asian country has a large market, which is waiting to be exploited. India’s growing need for energy coupled with its aspirations of becoming a regional power, and ultimately a global one, underlies New Delhi’s increased interest in the region. According to a joint declaration between Kazakhstan and India signed on February 12, 2002, by the President of Kazakhstan and the Prime Minister of India the two countries have also agreed on the need to give impetus to regional economic cooperation for the common benefit of the people of the two countries and the region.11 In April 2002, an exhibition was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, during which Indian SMEs were able to sign eleven MOUs and generated business worth $28 million.12 The President of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Kazakhstan visited India in May 2003 where he spoke of Kazakhstan’s keenness to sell crude oil to India and enhance the bilateral trade between the two countries.13 In June 2003, India and Kazakhstan set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) against terrorism. While speaking on the occasion Indian Premier, Atal Behari Vajpayee, asserted that terrorism and religious extremism must not be allowed to develop in Asia, a remark that was interpreted as being directed against Pakistan.14 India-Kyrgyzstan During the Indian Foreign Minister’s visit to Kyrgyzstan, a consular convention was signed between the two countries to facilitate the process of obtaining visas. Kyrgyz Air, previously operating once a week, now operates thrice weekly from Kyrgyzstan to India.15 In its bid to strengthen its position in Central Asia even further, India is lobbying for inclusion in the SCO. In this regard India is engaging Kyrgyzstan, which has voiced its support for India’s inclusion into the forum.16 The SCO organisation is not only about security and anti-terrorism; in fact closer economic cooperation amongst member states is also high on its agenda. India is, therefore, trying to obtain membership in this organisation, which has the potential of becoming the most important multilateral organisation in Eurasia. India-Tajikistan The establishment of an Indian military base at Farkhor in Tajikistan is the latest in the series of developments taking place in the context of the growing Indian presence in Central Asia. Strategic cooperation between India and the Central Asian Republics has assumed a new outlook with India now training military personnel from Tajikistan in Indian military establishments. According to the May 2003 issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review, quoting an anonymous official in Delhi, ‘these manoeuvres would be a roadmap for further military exercises with other Central Asian Republics.’17 Farkhor is the first step that India has taken in trying to establish its military foothold in the Central Asian region. Tajikistan has assumed a very important position in New Delhi’s foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks on mainland USA and the consequent war against terrorism. The war against terrorism has resulted in an increased US presence in the region with New Delhi complementing the US military presence in its fight against terrorism. Interestingly, till last year New Delhi did not even have an embassy in Tajikistan.18 India-Turkmenistan India has also laid great emphasis on its relations with Turkmenistan and there is close understanding between the two countries on issues pertaining to international and regional politics. India-Uzbekistan In April 2003, the first meeting of the joint India-Uzbekistan working group against terrorism was held in Tashkent where the two countries agreed that they share a common perspective on terrorism and agreed that a joint effort was required to combat the threat emanating from terrorists. For Uzbekistan this was the first bilateral dialogue of its kind, with any country.19 India has capitalised on the danger presented by the growth of orthodox Islam in its vicinity. New Delhi is acutely aware of its inability to stabilise its local Muslim population. Given the Kashmir angle, and the Islamic community's opposition in general to the Indian viewpoint on Kashmir, India does not want such orthodox Islam to spread its roots in Central Asia. Accordingly, Delhi has become an active part of the anti-terrorism coalition of the US and has been successful in obtaining the support of each of the Central Asian countries towards this end. Following Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha’s visit to Central Asia in January 2003, the Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, visited New Delhi in February 2003.20 These high level visits signify the amount of goodwill that India enjoys in Central Asia and the fact that Central Asia occupies an important position in India’s foreign policy. Professor Stephen Blank of the US Military War College views the situation thus, ‘Since most of these bases are air bases, ground forces to defend them will also eventually appear. Moreover, given that India has to fly over the Arabian Sea and Iran to reach Central Asia by air, Uzbekistan must be involved in this project and at least approve of it so that Indian planes can traverse its airspace to and from India. There is hence reason to suspect a quid pro quo. India’s security relationship with Uzbekistan based on a common antipathy to Islamic radicalism and terrorism not differentiated by either, is rapidly growing and has clearly deepened since 2001. India is even buying an Ilysuhin-76 from Uzbekistan upon which it apparently intends to mount an Israeli PHALCON, an AWACS-like system to provide reconnaissance activities over Central Asia and Pakistan.’21 Implications for Pakistan Central Asia is a security imperative for Pakistan and in the geostrategic perspective, cordial relations with Central Asia would serve to enhance Pakistan’s sense of security. Indian maneouvers in both Central Asia and Afghanistan have far- reaching implications for Pakistan whereby Pakistan could be confronted with a situation in which India would succeed in its bid to outflank it in both Central Asia and Afghanistan. New Delhi’s current deep involvement in the Afghan crisis has been termed part of India’s long-standing ambition of gaining power in the region. Accordingly, New Delhi has been pursuing a policy of positively engaging both Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics.22 General V.P. Malik, the Indian Chief of Army staff during the Kargil war, has pointed out the sustained policies that have served to safeguard Indian national interests in the Central Asian region and Afghanistan. These include multi-ethnic people-to-people contacts, opposition to jehadi terrorism and political as well as diplomatic support to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the erstwhile Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.23 India has clinched an important role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Cordial relations with the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan would serve to counter Pakistan. Establishing a military base in Farkhor has been a major step forward for India. It will go a long way in providing New Delhi with the means to encircle Pakistan in the region that could otherwise serve as its strategic hinterland in terms of its security. New Delhi’s initiatives in Central Asia also take into account the importance that Central Asia currently holds for many major powers such as Russia, US, China and Iran. For the present, Indian initiatives however are all based on its basic objective of bypassing Pakistan. India refuses to be part of any deal with Iran, Afghanistan, or Central Asia, which enables routes through Pakistan. The route through Pakistan is the shortest and economically the most viable one not only for Delhi but also the other countries in the region. Instead Delhi is focusing on a sea-land route via Iran and Russia and another one via Iran and Afghanistan into the Central Asian Republics. The Memoranda of understanding signed between Afghanistan, Iran and India on January 5, 2003 will serve Delhi’s strategic goal of attaining greater access and stronger ties with nations such as Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics that surround Pakistan.24 Conclusion Central Asia serves to enhance New Delhi’s position as an important player in the global war against terrorism as well as aiding its long-term strategic goal of increasing its economic, military and political influence in the region. It is not only a potential source of energy for India but its strategic location vis-à-vis China, Russia and Iran makes it all the more important for New Delhi, as it both competes and cooperates with these nations. On account of its geographic location and its relations with the Central Asian countries within and outside the framework of the ECO, Pakistan has an advantage, which the country can use to its greater benefit. Infrastructure, trade, economy, culture and religion are some of the avenues, which, if explored properly, would certainly give it a leading position in trade with the Central Asian Republics. In the geo-strategic perspective, cordial relations with Central Asia would enhance Pakistan’s sense of security. Previously, Pakistan’s basic limitation was the lack of adequate financial resources and proper infrastructure to serve as a link to these land-locked states. The instability in Afghanistan aggravated the problem even further. However, the under-construction Gwadar port has presented Pakistan with an opportunity that it can utilise to its advantage. The port will be beneficial for Pakistan in terms of enhancing its trade links with many countries including Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. The port when completed may ultimately help the CARs to actively participate as ECO members and help open channels through Pakistan and will also go a long way in strengthening Pakistan’s position in the region vis-à-vis India. References
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