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Book Review |
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THE
LESSONS OF AFGHANISTAN: WAR FIGHTING, INTELLIGENCE AND FORCE
TRANSFORMATION The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence and Force Transformation, is a co-publication of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, and the Vanguards Books (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore, respectively. The book focusses on lessons so far learnt from the US military anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Author, Anthony Cordesman, maintains that the Pentagon and the British Ministry of Defence have released very few meaningful statistics and other war-related details in Afghanistan, providing some information, limited to the number of forces involved, sorties made, and tactics and weapons used. According to the author, the information provided by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were a ‘systematic misinformation’, exaggerating their forces and weapons strength. Overall, the figures available on the Afghan casualties, collateral damage, weapon accuracy and damage assessment are equally vague and the author asserts that there is a need to make extensive studies in this regard to ascertain the real lessons of the Afghan war. Study teams, like the Defence Science Board of the US Department of Defence, and a 35-member joint task force are currently making systematic efforts to gather detailed data regarding this conflict. However, Cordesman agrees with the perception that it was a conventional war in all aspects. It was an asymmetric war, fought by radically different methods by the different sides with different goals under different perceptions. As the author observes, the problem of drawing lessons from the Afghan conflict is further complicated by the fact that the war is not fully over. Although driven out from power, a large number of the Taliban have melted into the society and at a future date may reorganise and resurface in any form. The ongoing nation-building and reconstruction process faces great challenges, such as warlordism, and ongoing ethnic, tribal and factional frictions. Al-Qaeda may have been defeated in the battle in Afghanistan, but hardly half of its leaders have either been killed or arrested. The notable ones like Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar are still missing. Al-Qaeda remnants continue to be engaged in clashes with the coalition forces inside Afghanistan and a significant number of its fighters off and on slip into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan to escape arrest. Another important factor is that reportedly Al-Qaeda has ‘cells’ operating in around sixty-eight countries and thus still remains a global threat. So, there are good reasons for the US to claim that months, and possibly years, of fighting still remain. The author has, however, drawn some useful data with regard to the precision, and technical and technological reliability of various weapons used in this war by the coalition. The US and British air power played a critical role in destroying the Taliban regime, destroying the enemy infrastructure, and allowing the US to use a relatively small ground force for later military operations, thus reducing the chances of risks to its troops to the minimum. Regarding the cost of the war, the author quotes the US Department of Defence sources. The figures are staggering - $3b in December 2000, and $3.8b in January 2002. The total cost of the war for the US alone - including mobilising resources, deploying troops to the theatre and flying air defence missions inside the US – was $6.4b. Of this, $1.9b was the direct cost of war, $1.57b paid to the reserves and national guards mobilised during the war period, $969m spent on agency support, $373m on munitions, $383m on replacing the equipment lost, $103m on humanitarian relief missions, $45m on flights carrying and equipment and combat supplies and so on. About the unique conditions of war, Cordesman writes of the challenges faced by the Coalition forces, such as a lack of forward bases, fighting in an unfamiliar distant region with major political sensitivities, and dealing with a dispersed enemy. However, local native factors that assisted the coalition forces were, for example, that a significant number of the Afghan population hated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; an organised and armed resistance already existed in the country; the Taliban air-defence was extremely limited while their air force was almost non-existent; their real and trained fighting force was not more than 25,000 as against their claims of 125,000; they lacked internal sources of financial and military supplies; had limited roads, poor coordination in reinforcement and supplies, and so on. All these factors combined to make the impact of the US attacks and bomber sorties uniquely effective at the very start of the war. The US was thus not forced to build-up a massive combat support base. Instead, the average of 60-70 sorties per day generated by three aircraft carriers, and an average of 6-8 bomber sorties daily operated in a permissive environment. It was easy to hit targets accurately, minimise collateral damage, achieve considerable lethality, and psychological impact against the opponents. According to the author, amongst the challenges, factional and regional competition and warlordism created a number of problems for the coalition in terms of false information and hitting of the real targets. Many times, because of giving incorrect information, local and regional groups played a vital role in misguiding the coalition troops thus creating opportunities for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders to escape. The Taliban, themselves, could not rely upon these groups. The main objectives of these groups were to split the Taliban ranks and seize power and weapons in the respective regions. The outcome was an immediate resurgence of warlordism in almost all parts of the country. The fall of Kabul became possible due to extensive air strikes that gave cover to the Northern Alliance’s march towards Kabul, but this march was mainly characterised by bargaining, defections, and concessions, instead of real confrontational battles. In broader terms, it was one of the few wars won without any significant battle. Cordesman is of the view that a large number of civilian deaths occurred in Afghanistan not as result of errant bombs but as a result of accurately hitting the target or suspected enemy positions located in civilian areas, thus resulting in collateral damage as well. Misinformation by local informers, for many reasons of their own, was another major cause of collateral losses. However, as a lesson, this experience has led the US forces towards a steady improvement in their weapons and targeting accuracy, the use of sensors, and the use of new screening methods for accurate target selection. On the post-war scenario, the author says that a complete victory is rarely possible. It has already become clear that it would be much harder to win the peace than the actual war, particularly in terms of nation-building and reconstruction to ensure that the Taliban-like movement does not arise in future. Elaborating on the geo-political environment in and around Afghanistan, he paints a less promising picture. He notes that political instability, factional fighting and warlordism still continue in the country; traditional interference from the neighbour countries has restarted; the US is still reluctant to extend massive support to the peace-keeping forces; the process of establishing a national army and police is moving at a snail’s pace; full-scale reconstruction is yet to start, and so on. For the sake of an effective victory, all these questions need to be tackled. Since detailed data is not available about the actual nature and strength of forces engaged in this war, the author warns that it would be dangerous to draw conclusions or generalisations regarding power projection and force transformation. It is also important to remember the unique character of the Afghan conflict. For example, it has demonstrated the need to be able to project land and air power rapidly over long distances. It also demonstrated the value of strategic airlift and long-range strikes capability, as well as the value of limited forward basing. At the same time, it also confirmed the value of light forces in asymmetric warfare, like Special Operation Forces. During the war in Afghanistan, the US extensively relied on strategic airlift capabilities to transport forces and equipment to forward bases and battlefield areas. At the same time, it also revealed tactical and technical shortcomings in the US airlift capabilities that are now being studied. The author notes that the Afghan war also demonstrated the positive outcome of the coalition warfare in every aspect of the operations, from power projection to actual combat. Trained allied forces like the British Special Air Service (SAS) proved that with standardisation and interoperability they could highly effectively use their expensive high-tech equipment. Significant problems arose in the initial deployment of the allied forces. The basing, transportation and support system, available at the start of the Afghan campaign, limited the US ability to induct the allied forces at an earlier stage. The language training, command and control aspects, and cross training in the use of the US equipment and battle management techniques also posed their own problems. Similarly, the US troops were also not trained in the use of the equipment and techniques of other coalition partners. The situation, however, changed with the progress of the war, and by June 2002 twenty nations had contributed more than 16,000 troops to the CENTCOM’s region of responsibility. Of this 7,000 were dedicated to operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is another example in this regard. Regarding intelligence, the author points out how the Afghan conflict showed the need to maintain a large cadre with language and area skills to deal with the needs for area expertise to support ground and air operations, and to handle the complexities of targeting and battle damage assessment. Human Intelligence is another important aspect of building suitable capabilities. On an average, it takes two years to recruit, train and validate a foreign source. In the Afghan war it was demonstrated that most Human Intelligence sources were either unreliable or had very limited access to targets. In short, Human Intelligence can help in some areas but cannot be a solution to other major problems in technical intelligence collection. The Defence Planning Guide (DPG) for 2004-9, issued by the US Department of Defence in March 2002, reflects the lessons learnt from the campaign in Afghanistan. With reference to the Bush Administration’s shift towards a doctrine of military preemption, it calls for accelerating force transformation and fielding of a new generation of high-tech weapons to enhance effectiveness. It argues that by developing such weapon systems, the US will create a new form of forward deterrence that will make the enemy think twice before striking the US. All branches of the military have been ordered to develop capabilities necessary to execute rapid preemptive strikes against the enemy. Under the guidelines established by the DPG, military spending will focus on specific needs. Such as; countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; enhancing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; developing new methods of protecting against and waging cyber warfare; enhancing space-based military capabilities; and further developing precision air-strike capabilities. Specifically, the DPG calls for developing a squadron of unmanned fighter jets by 2012, as well as the development of hypersonic missile by 2009, that could travel 600 nautical miles in 15 minutes and destroy mobile batteries before the enemy can position them. Overall the book presents the shaping up of US perceptions of war through it action in Afghanistan. It can serve as a useful base study for military analysts to conduct further studies on the Afghan war. Detailed studies, analyses and reports, encompassing social, economic, political and strategic impact would certainly take time to come. Dr. Babar Shah |