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THE GENESIS OF THE CHECHEN CONFLICT Syed Adnan Ali Shah *
The study is an attempt to understand the genesis of the Chechen conflict as a political dispute within a historical context, and to examine the various solutions to the dispute floated by people from all walks of life. It also discusses the prevailing situation in Chechnya to establish the case that the dispute needs to be peacefully resolved for any durable solution instead of application of military might that would only nurture further hatred and suspicions, leading to further conflicts. An Historical Overview Chechnya is situated in the Eastern part of the Northern Caucasus. Its area is 6,000 square miles. Chechnya borders Georgia in the South, Daghestan in the East (Russian Federation), Ingushetia (Russian Federation) and Northern Ossetia in the West (Russian Federation), and Stavropol Territory in the North (Russian Federation). The Chechens are the indigenous people of the North Caucasus, belonging to the Shemite race – the descendants of Shem. They speak a distinct Caucasic language similar to the language of the neighbouring Ingushetia. The Chechens and their ancestors have lived in their North Caucasus homeland for several thousand years. Over the centuries, part or all of their territory has been overrun for long periods by the Iranian Alans (ancestors of the Ossetians) between the 9th-12th centuries, by the Golden Hordes in the 13th century, and then by the Russian Empire in the 16th century. Geographically, Chechnya falls into two natural subdivisions: the mountainous areas, and the plains. The mountainous part comprises only 20% of the area of the Chechen Republic, and the majority of the Chechen population is of mountain dwellers. The region of the plains comprising the rest of the territory is mainly inhabited by Russians and Cossacks, where the main economic activity ranges from agriculture to heavy industry, including the location of oil wells and refineries. Since the Chechens and Ingush people presented a special problem to the expanding Czarist Russia during the 18th century, the government felt compelled to employ Cossack communities to expel them from the valleys and lowlands towards the bare mountain regions. The resisting Chechens and Ingush people lived in abject poverty, faced by Cossack settlements on one side, and the wild mountain peaks on the other, imprisoned by their geography, and putting up resistance struggles whenever opportunities came their way. The present Chechen Republic is greater in area compared to the one that existed in the 19th century. After the communist revolution that established the former Soviet Union, the Chechen Autonomous District was formed as an administrative unit in January 1921 inside the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). This Republic comprised ethnic groups such as; Kabardins, Balkars, Karachais, Northern Ossetes, Ingushs, Chechen, Cossacks, and Russians. In November 1922, the Autonomous District was further reorganised to include lands of four Cossack communities belonging to the Sunzha Cossack District, member of the Mountainous ASSR. In 1928, the Sunzha Cossack District, which was part of the Mountainous ASSR, was shared among the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Chechen Autonomous Region acquired the mainly Russian-dominated Autonomous city of Grozny, that became the administrative capital of the Chechen Autonomous Region. In 1934, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions were united to become the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. And thus it remained until 1991 as a constituting unit of the Soviet Union. In 1989, Chechnya-Ingushetia’s total population was 1.2 million. The Chechens were the majority group – constituting 57.8% of the total population. The Russians were concentrated mostly in and around the administrative capital of Chechnya-Ingushetia, Grozny, and in the North of the Republic. They constituted 23.1% of the population. The Ingushs were 12.9% of the population, and occupied the Western part of the Republic. In 1992, both Republics split creating separate Chechen and Ingush Republics. If Chechen clans were united by the same language, the same history, the same traditions and the same way of life, other inhabitants of the Chechen administrative unit shared with the Chechens only a part of the territory of this Republic, such as the Russians, Kumyks, Armenians, Nogais, Jews etc. An important aspect of Chechen history is that it portrays the Russians and Cossacks of Chechnya-Ingushetia as eternal enemies of the Chechen people and those who organised Stalin’s deportations of the Chechens in 1957. Hence, ethnic hatred has present in the hearts of the Chechen communities residing in Chechnya, long before the current Chechen drive for independence of the 1990s. The genesis of the present day Chechen conflict shows that this region has had a history of continuous armed conflicts faced by the Chechens, struggling to preserve their distinct identity and freedom from foreign invaders. Their last subjugation and resistance was to the Russian Empire, which began in the middle of the 16th century, and ended in the middle of the 19th century when the Russian Empire amalgamated them into its fold. Briefly, the Russo-Chechen struggle can be divided into six stages of history described below. The Period of Peaceful Colonisation – 16th-17th Century The first stage, which started in the middle of the 16th century, and lasted until the end of the 17th century, was marked by a peaceful colonisation of the region. This period was characterised by vassal-allies form of relations between the Moscow Tsars and the elders of the Chechen communities. Moscow was trying to expand its influence in the region mainly by political and economic means. The policy was a success, and Chechen communities, by signing agreements, voluntarily announced their recognition of the supreme power of the Tsarist state. The Rise of Militaristic Movements by the Chechens – 18th Century The second stage, which lasted throughout the 18th century, marks the beginning of powerful militaristic movements by the Chechens. The resistance movements were the result of Russia’s overt military expansion in the regions of North Caucasus. Under Peter the Great, and then Catherine II, the doctrine of colonising the mountain areas remained prevalent. The Russian military expeditions in the North Caucasus began in 1783, after the signing of the Gueorguievsk’s Treaty, according to which Georgia was placed under the Russian protectorate. This led to an armed struggle launched by the Chechen people for freedom and independence under the leadership of a Chechen religious figure, Sheikh Mansur in 1785. Mansur succeeded in resisting the Czarist incursions into the Northern Caucasus from 1785 to 1791, and the rebellion spread through all of Chechnya, Daghestan and Cherkessia. Mansur attempted, however unsuccessfully, to unite the people of the North Caucasus into a single Islamic state. Mansur was captured during the Russian-Turkish war in 1791, and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Schlisselbourg fortress, where he died on April 1794. Chechen Resistance Against Russian Military Advances – 19th Century The third stage of the Russian-Chechen relations falls in the first half of the 19th century. The name that stands out in this period is that of a Russian General A. P. Yermolov, Commander of the Russian Army in the Caucasus (1816-1827), under whose command military pressure intensified as Russian troops continued to advance deep into Chechnya. Chechens responded by stepping up their resistance movement. In 1822, a Chechen, Kadyr Abdul, organised another rebellion against the Czarist Russia, on the basis of rumours that within four months, the Ottomans would intervene in the Caucasus. However, his movement could not survive for more than half a year. In 1825, a new Chechen insurrection, conducted by Beybulat Tamazov took place. For the first time, Tamazov was successful in uniting most of the Chechen communities, by concluding an alliance between free Chechnya and the feudal principalities of the North Caucasus. Tamazov also called for a peaceful solution to the conflict, and wanted to avoid a big war with Russia. However, he was treacherously murdered. The year 1828 became a turning point in the Caucasian war. The ‘muridism’ movement that started in Daghestan spread to the eastern parts of Chechnya. Kazi Magomed proclaimed himself imam. He advocated ‘gazawat’ (Jehad or ‘holy war’ in Islam) against the Russians, finally laying down his life in one such struggle in 1832. One of his followers, Gamzat-Bek, proclaimed himself the second imam, and continued the jihad. He was killed because of his inner circle intrigues. In 1834, Shamil was proclaimed the third imam. He conducted ‘gazawat’ against the Russian army for the next twenty five years, and was successful in accomplishing what Sheikh Mansur had initiated: to unite part of the North Caucasian highlanders in their struggle against Czarist Russia, and set up a theocratic sharia state, known under the name of the ‘Shamil imamate’. However, in August 1859, Shamil suffered defeat in the village of Gunib, and to avoid slaughter of inhabitants of the said village surrendered to the Russian troops. He was received warmly by the Russian Emperor, Alexander II at Saint Petersburg, and became his honorary captive, and was sent to Kaluga to spend the rest of his life there, and where he died in 1871. The consolidation of Chechen resistance against the Tsarist Russian Army was mainly due to the Russian General Grabbe’s punitive operations and brutal reprisals against the Chechen civilians, which resulted in the swelling of the ranks of Imam Shamil. Violence and flagrant interference in their traditional way of life pushed the Chechen mountain people into war with Russia.1 It was also during the Caucasian War that the ideology of Chechen militant nationalism was born, and which continues as the ideological basis for the present-day separatists in Chechnya who reject Chechnya’s union with Russia.2 The defeat of Shamil led to Chechnya’s control coming under the Czarist military administration. Czarist Russia, instead of granting autonomy in internal affairs to the Chechens as it had promised earlier, imposed a colonial regime instead. Russia’s victory over Shamil was followed by their policy of deportation of the Chechens to the Ottomon Empire (nearly 15 percent of the total number of Chechens were thus displaced), in order reduce the considerable concentration of Chechens in their regions. The dispossessed Chechens were forced to leave their arable lands of the Sunzha valley of the Northern Chechnya, which were take over by the Cossacks of the Northern Caucasus as yet another policy of the Russian authorities Chechnya’s Assimilation into the Russian Empire – Second Half of 19th Century The period when Chechnya became part of Russia (the second half of the 19th century) can be designated as the fourth stage in Russian-Chechen relations. Apart from threats and bribery, there were progressively-minded representatives of the Tsarist administration who realised that violence would not resolve the problem vis-à-vis the rebellious mountainous Chechens, and what was the need of the hour was cultural work and modernisation. Through such efforts in the late 19th century, a pro-Russian elite was created among the Chechen populace, and the region was gradually drawn into the economic system of Russia. Grozny became the centre of economic activity centering on oil extraction, refineries, and a railway line was laid down connecting it to Moscow and Saint Petersberg. Chechens also actively participated in almost all of the Russian wars on the Russian side, namely in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), Russo-Japanese wars, and Russo-German wars.3 Chechens Under The Soviet Rule The fifth stage starts with the early 20th century, when the Chechens, influenced by the Russian revolutions during the period 1917-1925 saw a revival of the Chechen ethnic identity reassertion under three trends, namely:
During that period, Chechens and Ingushes survived the revolutions and counter-revolutions, a genocidal ethnic war with the Cossacks, the White and the Red Armies, and their unsuccessful attempts to create an independent state for the Chechens. Finally, the less affluent social groups among the Chechens and Ingushes turned their allegiance towards the Soviet Union, which had promised them freedom, equality, land and statehood. However, the collectivisation of agricultural lands, and the massive resettlement of the Kulaks in Chechnya added to yet another layer of resentment to the existent legacy of bitterness. Chechens, therefore, put up a stiff resistance to the Stalin regime. Riots and uprisings grew into guerrilla wars. The first rebellion of the 20th century took place in Chechnya and Daghestan in September 1920. It was put down in May 1921. Thenceforth, rebellion became a common feature of the Chechen-Russia relations. However, on charges of collaborating with the Nazi Germany against the Red Army, it was the deportation of the vast numbers of the Chechen population to Central Asia by Stalin in February 1944, which resulted in deaths of a nearly 40% of the Chechen population.5 After Stalin’s death, the Chechens were rehabilitated in their native lands, and the disbanded Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored in 1957 by the Khruschev. However, their return was a painful process. Their political and territorial rehabilitation never materialised according to their expectations, and political distrust of the Russians in Chechens as people remained intact. The traditional culture and religion of the Chechens and Ingushes was banned, and the Soviet State pursued the goal of Russifying the indigenous people, thereby hampering the development of the Chechen culture. So great is the hatred based on such memories of what the Russians have done to them that the Chechens joyfully declared their independence, when the Soviet Union demised and disintegrated in 1991. Chechen Resistance in the Post-Soviet Russia During the era of President Gorbachev, the initiation of Glasnost and Prestroika led to a period of renewed unrest among the Chechens. In 1988, a proposal to build a biochemical plant in the Chechen town of Gudermes aroused widespread popular opposition over environmental issues. As a result, in the summer of 1988, a Chechen-Ingush Popular Front was formed, which rapidly progressed from ecological to political slogans. Also, in June 1989, a Chechen, Doku Zavgaev, was elected for the first time as first secretary of the Communist Party in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The unrest culminated in November 1990 with the convening of a Chechen National Congress (CNC) by various civic groups, with the consent and participation of Zavgaev. The Congress passed a resolution calling for the ‘sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic’, and elected Jokhar Dudaev as chairman of its Executive Committee. The same month, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) adopted a ‘Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic’. Since, ‘sovereignty’ was proclaimed at this time by other Soviet Republics, the Chechen-Ingush declaration did not cause particular concern. Although Russia refused to accept that attempted secession, but initially it acted with a benign indifference towards these developments within Chechnya. In June 1991, the CNC again convened and concluded its gathering by calling for early parliamentary elections, for adoption of a new constitution and a law on citizenship, and a referendum on the Republic’s future status. The CNC also set as prerequisite for signing a treaty with the USSR, later Russia, the unconditional recognition of the Chechen nation’s right to independence, compensation for crimes committed against the Chechen nation, trials of the guilty, and establishment of a government, based on democratic principles. In August 1991, the power struggle between Boris Yelstin and Gorbachev intensified, leading to the August 19-21 failed coup attempt by the reactionary forces in Moscow. While Zavgaev did not condemn the plotters, but instead opted to remain silent, Dudaev and the CNC Executive Committee issued a decree denouncing the plotters, and called for ‘a campaign of civil disobedience.’ This led to large demonstrations in favour of Dudaev, resulting in the loss of control by the pro-Russian establishment led by Zavgaev. On August 22, Dudaev’s followers seized the Grozny television station, and organised the formation of a national guard under Dudaev’s command. In early September 1991, the third session of the CNC passed a resolution transferring power in Chechnya to its Executive Committee headed by Dudaev. On September 6, the National Guard stormed a meeting of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, and forced Zavgaev to sign an ‘act of abdication’. Following these events, the Russian government began to assert its authority over the seceding Chechen-Ingush Republic by sending a Chechen General, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, to Chechnya, who urged Zavgaev, still recognised by Moscow to refrain from the use of force in dealing with the civil obedience under way. The visit of Aslanbek was followed by the visits of other high-ranking dignitaries in September 1991. Among them was Ruslan Khasbulatov, a Chechen elected to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet from Grozny in 1990, and who called for a special session of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet on September 15, where he persuaded the deputies to remove Zavgaev and to disband the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, in anticipation of the new parliamentary elections, set for November 17, 1991. A 32-member Provisional Council, drawn from various political factions, was appointed to exercise executive power in the interim period. Meanwhile the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted a ‘Resolution on the Political situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republics’, which expressed ‘serious concern regarding the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic’, and declared the Provisional Council to be the legitimate state power in the Republic. Also, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, ordered all in Chechnya to submit to the terms of the Resolution of October 8 within three days. In response, Dudaev announced mobilisation and expansion of the Chechen National Guard. 50,000 persons demonstrated in his support in Grozny. Presidential elections were held on October 27 with a turnout of 72% of the eligible voters casting their vote, leading to Dudaev’s victory, winning 90% of the votes cast. The Russian authorities refused to recognise the election as valid, claiming that only 15% of eligible voters participated in the process, and that existing legislation had not been respected. As a follow up, the newly-elected mayor of the Nadterechny Raion, Omar Avturkhanov, refused allegiance to Dudaev, and announced that he would not obey Grozny’s commands following rising tensions. On November 7, President Yelstin declared a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The newly-elected Chechen parliament responded by voting emergency powers for Dudaev, who imposed martial law in the republic and mobilised the National Guard. In further retaliation, the Russian troops landed at the Grozny airport to take action against Dudaev. However, on November 10, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation voted to withhold the confirmation required by Russian law for any prolongation of Yelstin’s state of emergency. This was followed by the evacuation of Russian troops from Grozny airport, since Dudaev’s National Guard refused to allow them to deploy, thereby giving rise to a fierce encounter between the two. After Russia’s failure to reassert effective control over Chechnya in November 1991, an extended stalemate developed. While Russia continued to regard Chechnya as its subject (Article 63 of the 1993 Constitution declared Chechnya as one of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation), Chechnya, ton the contrary, continued to assert its independent sovereign status. That stalemate situation continued to prevail with the Russian Federation acting with benign indifference to the Chechen independence for the next two years. However, when Dudaev clashed with the Chechen Parliament in June 1992, he announced the introduction of direct presidential rule. The intra-Chechen conflict further exacerbated, when the speaker of the Chechen Parliament, Husein Akhmadov met with the Russian officials in January 1993, and signed a letter of intent to negotiate a treaty with Russia. As a consequence, Dudaev dissolved the Parliament, resulting in a violent battle in the streets of Grozny in June 1993, between the Dudaev-led National Guard and the supporters of the Parliament, resulting in the loss of hundreds of civilian lives caught in the crossfire. In the meantime, an opposition led by the mayor of the Nadterechny Raion, Umar Avturkhanov, was able to bring some Chechen districts under his control, and in December 1993, he organized a Provisional Council as a potential alternative government for Chechnya and appealed to Moscow for assistance. Moscow seized the opportunity and started providing substantial military equipment and personnel to the Council. The ensuing stalemate was broken when an armoured attack on Grozny was launched on November 26, 1994, by the anti-Dudayev forces. The attack was, however, defeated and Moscow felt humiliated when, in the face of Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev’s denial of any knowledge of or involvement in the operation, the Chechen government paraded captured Russian military personnel live on television. On November 29, 1994, a special meeting of the Russian Security Council ratified the decisions already taken by President Yeltsin to shift from covert to overt military action, and to use Russian military forces to subdue Chechnya. Thus, on December 11, 1994, a full-fledged attack was launched on Chechnya, by the Russian armed forces from the North, East and the West. The protracted war carried on for nearly two years with no signs of any gain by either side. In April 1996, Dudaev was killed in a rocket attack, and was replaced by vice-President, Zalimkhan Yanderbiev. Pressed hard by the mounting public opinion at home as well as internationally, Moscow agreed for peace talks which resulted in the signing of the Khasavyurt cease fire agreement on August 31, 1996. The Khasavyurt agreement provided for the holding of a referendum in Chechnya by December 2001 to ascertain the wishes of the Chechen people with regard to independence, or staying within the fold of the Russian Federation. The withdrawal of the forces, as a result of the agreement was followed by the presidential election in January 1997, following which Aslan Mashkadov became the President of the Chechen Republic. In May 1997, the signing of the agreement ‘On Peace and the Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’ was a major breakthrough in bilateral relations. From 1996 to 1999, the relations between Chechnya and Russia remained strained. The debilitated Chechens could not get the required finances for rebuilding their country, and the overall economy remained in ruins. Also, the Chechen President, Aslan Maskahdov, could not exercise much control over the military formations formed as a result of the first Russo-Chechen battle (1994-96), and who acted independently of the Chechen government. According to the Russian federal and Chechen estimates, there were 157 such armed groups active in the Republic before the start of the anti-terrorist operations.6 Chechnya had thus become a base for criminals, drug smugglers and for arms trafficking. However, another direct armed conflict with the Russian Federation took place in August 1999, when the situation along Daghestan’s mountainous border with Chechnya worsened sharply, with Chechen militants spearheading an armed foray by Daghestani and Chechen militants of the wahabi sect of Sunni Islam, in a bid to drive ‘infidels’ out of Chechnya’s neighbourhood. The conflict quickly degenerated into an all-out war, with a massive federal military crackdown against the militants, resulting in their ouster from Daghestan. This was followed by an on-going low-intensity conflict between the Federal forces and the Muslim militants. However, it was the October 1999 bombing of the Moscow residential apartments that led to the Russian military action inside Chechnya for the second time in a decade. Nor are there any sings that the confrontations are over. As this study goes to print, Moscow has experienced another Chechen onslaught in the shape of a hostage crisis. On October 23, armed Chechen militants captured a theatre in Moscow, taking more than 1000 persons as hostage. The militants demanded that they want peace, and that Russian military forces should withdraw from the war ravaged republic. However, Russia instead of negotiating the release of hostages launched an operation on October 26, resulting in the killing of than 100 hostages, and all the hostage-takers. All this leads to the need to analyse why Russia remains so adamant to keep Chechnya under its control. Russia’s Objectives vis-à-vis Chechnya A number of factors stand out as the rationale behind Russian objectives to control Chechnya at any cost. 1. The Struggle for Oil and Property Redistribution Chechnya accounts for only 0.7 percent of Russia’s total territory, but the area is strategic, since Russia depends on a 95-mile stretch of oil pipeline that runs through the region. Disputes over oil were at the heart of Russia’s earlier war against Chechnya in December 1994, as well as in Russia’s incursions into Chechnya in November 1999. Till the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechen-Ingush Republic produced an annual 4.2 million tons of oil, and refined another 18 million tons. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Chechnya boasted a hefty 6% of the Soviet Union’s GDP, and later 10% of Russia’s GDP. Up to 1994, oil from other Russian oilfields came to the Grozny oil refineries for processing.7 In the post-Cold War era, the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea Basin has aroused much interest in the major world powers, especially the US and the European countries in pipelines routes. While, the US attempts have been focused on persuading the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia to build oil pipelines that would bypass the existent pipelines across Russian territory, Russia desires to maintain them for exports across its territory of crude oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to western markets. Russia has presented its own overland pipeline routes starting from Baku, passing through the Russian territory, and culminating in the Black Sea port of Novorossisk. This northern Baku-Novorossisk route passes through over 153 km of Chechen territory, which makes it an unreliable stretch given the current conflict, and unless Russia acquires firm control over Chechnya. In September 1997, Russia and Chechnya concluded an agreement to allow large quantities of Azerbaijani oil to pass through the Chechen territory. Under this agreement, Moscow agreed to pay a 43-cent fee per ton of oil as transit fee. Russia also agreed to the maintenance of the pipeline. However, the flow was halted after armed gangs began stealing large amounts of oil in 1998. Moscow has also planned to develop an alternative pipeline via Daghestan, bypassing the Chechen section. But armed incursions by Chechen guerillas into Daghestan in August 1999 rendered this alternate route equally unsafe.8 The Chechen rebellion has held up the construction of a proposed 1,600 km link between the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan and the Black Sea port near Novorossisk. Known as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the project is estimated to generate $23.3 billion for Moscow and about $8 billion for Kazakhstan as future revenues. These mega petro-dollars cannot accrue to Moscow unless Chechnya is totally under control.9 2. Chechnya’s secession poses a threat to the Russian Federation Moscow’s reluctance to allow Chechnya’s secession has another aspect, that of a precedent that it would set for Russia’s other republics populated by ethnic minorities making similar demands. The present Russian leadership is clearly attempting to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence throughout most of the areas of the former Soviet Union. Also, the breakup of the Soviet Union is a sore point for many nationalist Russians who do not want any further loss of territory.10 3. Aversion to the establishment of an Islamic state in Northern Caucasus Another factor of importance is that Russia does not want to see a strong Islamic state in the northern Caucasus, to serve as a precedent for other independence-minded republics. Since, most of the states in contiguity or proximity of Chechnya are Muslim majority states, any major concessions to Chechnya may stir unrest in these areas, which could led to the reassertion of ethnic-based religious nationalism. Various Peace Proposals The Chechen dispute has aroused much public criticism within Russia regarding the mishandling of the issue by the Russian government. Russia has also been censured, especially by the US and the EU, for human rights abuses committed by its military against the Chechens. Numerous individuals and organisations seeking peace in the war-torn republic and an end to this impasse have proposed a number of peace proposals. It has been observed that majority of those peace proposals speak of a future autonomous status of Chechnya but within the fold of the Russian Federation, and not of total independence. One of the notable proponents of peace, the former Prime Minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov, called for a revision of policies vis-a-vis Chechnya, and supported talks with Chechen freedom fighters in order to solve the impasse. He suggested that Russia adopt the Tsarist ‘Finnish model’11 in an attempt to bring about a settlement of the conflict in Chechnya. According to him, the ‘Finnish Model’ would offer Chechnya special rights within Russia.12 Meanwhile, leaders of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Max Kampelman, and Alexander Haig,13 have supported calls for holding of negotiations between the Russian government and the Chechen resistance movement, urging upon the Chechen side to ‘acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.’ The initiative also recommended the holding of a referendum that gave Chechens ‘the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for a comprehensive self-government, modeled on what Tatarstan currently enjoys within the Russian Federation.’ The proposal supported the stationing of Russian troops on Chechnya’s southern frontier ‘to protect from there the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.’14 Still, another peace proposal floated by members of the ‘Russian National Committee for Ending the War and Securing Peace in the Chechen Republic’, comprising some Deputies of the Russian State Duma, and Russian PEN-centre, suggested a four-stage approach to resolve the conflict amicably. The proposal spoke of the need for a mutual recognition of the parties to the dispute, followed by a ceasefire agreement, and recommended the creation of a trilateral body, to be called the Peace Commission (PC), comprising a representative of the Russian delegation, a Chechen delegation, and international mediators/observers. According to the plan, the PC would be the highest interim administrative body, assigned with the task of creating provisional administrative structures, granting permission for deployment of troops, and sanctioning force where needed to forestall excesses by both parties. In the third stage, the proposal recommended the creation of a ‘Round Table’ to give broad representation to a large segment of the people. In the final stage, the status of the Chechen Republic was to be defined. According to it, the possible scenario would be the Round Table announcing a referendum to determine the status of Chechnya and the fundamental principles of its state system, followed by elections to Constituent Assembly, or a Chechen Republic Parliament.15 Still, another draft proposal, made by the Caucasian Peace Initiative representing the Congress of Chechen Refugees, suggested a peaceful settlement of the Russian-Chechen conflict, and strongly advocated that the UN should take on the commitment of settling the Russian-Chechen conflict on the basis of the Khasavyurt Agreement of August 1996, and the 1997 Treaty of Peace. It stated that Chechnya be recognized as a ‘territory under UN protection’, and that a contingent of international peace-keepers be introduced in the UN-supervised territory, following the subsequent ‘withdrawal of all armed forces, police and security service structures’. The initiative suggested that the territory remain under UN jurisdiction ‘until the complete restoration of national economy, social, cultural infrastructure, creation of democratic bodies of power, conditions for peaceful and secure life, return of refugees and those who left Chechnya prior to the war due to political or other reasons. It further suggested that the UN institute an administration for ‘the territory under UN protection’ with complete transfer of power to it. Finally, the draft suggested the holding of the referendum by the UN to determine the future status of the territory: ‘whether it wants to remain within the fold of the Russian Federation, or it opts for independence.’16 Since the earlier Caucasian Wars and later as a result of the mass deportations conducted by Stalin in 144-1957, the Chechens carry an undying hatred of Russians, which makes it next to impossible for them to live side by side with the Russians in a unified political system. The recent Russo-Chechen war of 1994-96 has strengthened the Chechen resolve of seeking independence from the Russian Federation. Moreover, both the recent Russo-Chechen wars of 1994-1996, and of 1999 have left the entire Chechen infrastructure, industries, cities, towns etc in rubbles. Between 100,00 and 130,000 persons perished during the first Russo-Chechen war of 1994-96. The fate of more than 1,500 persons who disappeared during purges of the local population and from detention camps remains unknown to date. Current Situation and Future Directions In the recent battle for Chechnya, Russia has held all the cards in its hands. Any solution to the Chechen dispute rests on the policies of the Russian Federation: whether it continues with a military campaign to arrive at a solution, or opts for political negotiations. At present, Russia is in control of the Chechen territory, with the capital Grozny and other cities and towns under the Russian rule. Also, Russia has installed a pro-Moscow Chechen administration headed by Akhmed Kadyrov. Apart from running the Republic’s affairs, the Chechen administration is also working on the formation of a draft constitution, seeking Chechnya’s autonomous status but as part of the Russian Federation. The Chechen administration is faced with the responsibility of rehabilitating the Chechen refugees, left homeless as a result of the Russian armed assaults in 1999. The freedom fighters, on the other hand, have abandoned the plain areas, and retreated into the mountains located in the south of the Republic. There, they organise guerrilla operations against the Russian troops. Previously the freedom fighters were divided into three distinct groups, each pursuing varied objectives. These three groups were led by Shamil Basayev, ex-President Aslan Maskhadov, and Ruslan Gualyev respectively. However, recently the first two groups have agreed to coordinate their military operations under leadership of Maskhadov. Presently, the war is being waged with no end in sight. While the Chechens demand freedom from the Russian Federation, Russia is adamant in maintaining it in its fold, while granting autonomy to the Republic. If Russia persists with its decision to overcome the Chechen resistance through military means, the war will drag on indefinitely until one side is exhausted, and abandons its maximalist position, accepting a solution within the frontiers of the Russian Federation. However, it seems that presently there is no sign that Chechen freedom fighters and their Islamist comrades-in-arms belonging to various Muslim countries are battle weary. Chechen freedom fighters have taken their battle into the Russian heartland. Numerous incidents have taken place since 1994, when Chechen militants have taken hundreds of Russians as hostages, to extract political concessions in return. The hostage taking by the Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamil Basayev, of nearly 1000 hostages at the Budyonovsk village in Russia in June 1995, and the recent hostage taking by some Chechen freedom fighters of the Moscow theatre in October 2002 are forceful reminders of their resolve. Not only were significant number of hostages killed in the ensuing stand-off in both the cases, but the event had a great de-motivating psychological impact upon the Russian people as well. Regarding the Russian armed forces, reports state that they are experiencing a low morale and that they suffer from ‘lack of initiative, lower wages, shortage in weaponry as well as ammunition’.17 The Russian armed forces are deeply demoralised. The level of Russian forces’ competence can be gauged from the fact that during the Soviet operations in Afghanistan during the 1979-88 invasion, several hundred helicopters were constantly deployed in a region which was distant in every way– in Chechnya, which is near the Russian heartland itself, only 40 helicopters have been in operation during the 1999 war and to date.18 The Chechen Wars of the end 1990s has caused heavy losses of men and material for Russia. Official sources have admitted the number of Russian casualties in Chechnya as 3,220 men killed, and 8,972 wounded since 1999.19 However, the Organization of Mothers of Russian Soldiers’ have claimed the killing of more than 10,000 troops since 1999.20 Russia has lost nearly 26 helicopters since 1999 in Chechnya, because the freedom fighters managed to shoot down planes using shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. It has been reported that the militant factions of Chechen President, Aslan Mashkadov, and warlord, Shamil Basayev, have recently unified their forces, under the former as the overall commander-in-chief of the united freedom fighting force, while Basayev is the chief of military operations.21 However, there have been positive hints from the Chechen freedom fighters, especially the former Chechen President, Aslan Mashkadov, and Ruslan Gulayev, that they are seeking to restart negotiations on the Chechen conflict. In an interview released on June 13, 2002, Aslan Maskhadov affirmed that his side was ‘ready to discuss any question with the Russian side, including the question of independence … if goodwill can be found, no obstacles are insuperable.’22 Also, Russia’s attempt at establishing al-Qaeda-Chechen nexus is worrisome for the Chechen leaders, as it could lead to further punitive reprisals under the guise of anti-terrorism campaigns. Furthermore, Russian public opinion has been changing since the second war started in 1999. The Moscow Times published a Russian public opinion poll that concluded that 62 percent of Russians support entering into negotiations with the Chechen resistance - a dramatic turnaround from just two years ago, when only 22 percent favoured talks and 72 percent supported the continuation of the war.23 The recent episode of hostage-taking of nearly 1000 persons at the Moscow theatre on the evening of October 23, 2002, was a signal to the Russian government that the Russian heartland could be attacked by the disgruntled Chechen groups, if freedom is not granted to them. If one looks at the demands of the hostage takers, they seemed rational ones, since they asked for an end to the war in Chechnya, opening of peace talks, and withdrawal of the Russian military forces. However, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, rejected negotiations, insisting he would not be ‘blackmailed’ by ‘terrorists’. It appears to be the right time for Russia to negotiate peace with the former Chechen President, Maskhadov, since the Chechen resistance has consolidated under his leadership, and thus attempts to reach any solution would have the approval of all the Chechen groups currently fighting the Russian military operations. However, both sides need to keep in mind the fact that for any durable settlement, both the Kremlin and the Chechen resistance will have to make big concessions. Russia must accept a political process to leading the way out of the present impasse. It must recall its troops and punish those guilty of atrocities. The Chechen groups as much as their leader Maskhadov will have to admit his own adverse role, and promise to rein in those renegade elements that have been acting independently. They need to give strong assurances to the Russian government that they will abide by any agreement in principle whenever they embark upon one. Moreover, Chechnya needs to rebuild the economy and rein in corruption, bring the refugees home, and provide them with housing, jobs and a safe place to live in. These issues are no less important than the issue of the republic’s future legal status within Russia. The decision to send Russian troops into Chechnya was made by politicians who must bear the responsibility for what happened there. They are the one who should come out with a viable solution Chechen problem. If a solution is not found immediately, Chechnya may become a bleeding wound like Afghanistan devouring the national exchequer, and becoming a burden on the already economically weakened Russia.
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