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Dr. Rifaat Hussain * Despite shared geography, ethnicity and faith, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have never been smooth. With the sole exception of the four years of the Taliban rule over Afghanistan, successive governments in Kabul have displayed varying degrees of disaffection towards Islamabad. While the principal historical cause of this disaffection has been the unresolved issue of the Durand Line, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have also emanated from their divergent strategic outlooks and dissimilar national ethos. Because of its buffer status thrust upon it by the nineteenth-century colonial rivalry between the British and the Czarist empires, known as the ‘great game’, Kabul assiduously avoided the temptation to rely on foreign influences to ensure its survival. Pakistan, on the other hand, has consistently sought refuge in external alignments and alliances to preserve and promote its security. The dependent nature of Pakistan’s foreign policy thus stands in marked contrast to Afghanistan’s image as a ‘fiercely’ independent people and country. Each country has also had a very different approach towards their shared faith Islam. As noted by Marvin Weinbaum: ‘The ideal and rationale of the Pakistani state is an Islamic consensus that is expected to transcend geographic and ethnic divisions. [In contrast], the Afghan state has found its legitimacy in satisfying and balancing the interests of competitive ethnic and tribal communities [As a result] the relationship between ethnicity and politics has been virtually reversed from one state to the other.’1 Differences in their levels of socio-economic development, social and political structures and their proclivity to meddle in each other’s internal affairs have also strained their bilateral ties. This paper analyses the dynamics of continuity and change in Pakistan’s interactions with Afghanistan and argues that the character of these ties has been decisively shaped by Islamabad’s quest for a friendly regime in Kabul, which would allow Pakistan to escape the nightmare of being sandwiched between a hostile India in the East and an irredentist Afghanistan in the West. Afghanistan’s territorial claims on the Pushtu-speaking areas of Pakistan coupled with the pro-Indian posture of its ruling elites only reinforced Islamabad’s strategic belief that a hostile Afghanistan ill-served Pakistan’s security needs. The logical corollary of this threat perception was that, regardless of its costs and difficulties, Pakistan had to pursue a sub-imperial engagement in Afghanistan to secure a client regime, which would not only give it a ‘strategic depth’ against India but would also help stabilise its volatile Western border. Islamabad came close to achieving this objective in 1996 when the pro-Pakistan Taliban seized control of Kabul and extended their power over two thirds of the country. The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, while providing a temporary relief to Pakistan from its two-front bind, turned out to be a strategic disaster for Islamabad. Because of their obscurantist ideological outlook, religious narrow-mindedness, visceral disdain for modern values and intense anti-Western hubris, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan evoked a harsh regional and global reaction. As the Taliban imposed a harsh Islamic regime in the country and forged organic links with Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist network enabling him to perform a string of acts of international terrorism against American interests using Afghanistan as a sanctuary, their actions caused anxiety and concern in Islamabad. Following the August 1998 American missile attacks on Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, Washington increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to persuade the Taliban regime in Kabul, to hand Osama bin Laden over to a third country to stand trial for his alleged involvement in the terrorist bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Islamabad’s efforts to induce the Taliban to withdraw their support from Osama bin Laden fell on deaf years. Faced with Taliban’s intransigence on the Osama bin Laden issue, Islamabad had already begun to distance itself from them. The rupture came in the wake of the September 11, 2001 horrific attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. The Bush Government gave the ultimatum to Islamabad to decide whether it was ‘with the United States or against it.’ On October 7, 2002, Pakistan withdrew its strategic and diplomatic support from the Taliban regime in Kabul, after the launching of the American military action against them and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had an inauspicious beginning. Primarily because of Kabul’s refusal to recognise the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary between itself and the new state of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan not only cast its solitary vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations but also called for the establishment of ‘Pakhtoonistan’ at the expense of its Muslim neighbour. Despite the withdrawal of the Afghan negative vote and the exchange of Ambassadors between the two sides in 1948, their relations remained tense. The bitterness caused by the accidental bombing of an Afghan village close to the Pakistan border by Pakistan’s Air Force in 1949, the declaration by the Afghan parliament that ‘it does not recognise the imaginary Durand or any similar line’, and Kabul’s efforts to incite Pakistani tribesmen to stage an armed revolt against the central government, led to the closure of Pakistan-Afghanistan border in 1950. The assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan by an Afghan national in 1951, the rise to power in Kabul of Mohammed Daoud, cousin of the Afghan monarch and an ardent advocate of the cause of ‘Pakhtunistan’ two years later and the perception of the Afghan ruling elite that Pakistan, which joined the American-backed regional military alliances, SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955, was blocking the flow of American military assistance to their country, caused the breakdown of their diplomatic ties in 1957. The possibility of a general war emerging from ‘the military incursions, propaganda campaigns and economic retaliations,’2 was narrowly averted due to Iranian mediation.3 Daoud’s resignation as Prime Minister in March 1963 and Afghanistan’s preoccupation with constitutional politics further helped the normalisation process as these developments diluted Kabul’s focus on the Pakhtunistan issue and made the Afghan rulers take a ‘more relaxed view of Pakistan.’4 During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, Afghanistan sided with Pakistan which enabled Islamabad to fully concentrate on its war with India and worry less about the security of its Western border. In 1968 King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan to a very warm welcome, symbolising ‘brotherly and developing relations between the two countries.’5 Islamabad’s decision to disband One Unit and restore the former provinces of West Pakistan further reinforced this growing amity between the two countries.6 Afghanistan maintained strict neutrality during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan and refrained from taking advantage of an Islamabad government preoccupied by conflict.7 This trend towards Pakistan-Afghanistan rapprochement was reversed following the successful military coup by Mohammed Daoud against his cousin – King Zahir Shah in July 1973. The resumption of power by Mohammed Daoud in which pro-Soviet, leftist officers of the Afghan armed forces played an important role, was perceived in Islamabad as a negative development. Daoud was an avowed champion of the cause of Pakhtunistan, and Islamabad feared that his return to power would provide impetus to the separatist sentiment in the Pushtu and Baluchi speaking areas of Pakistan. Daoud’s public allusion to Afghan-Pakistani differences over the Pakhtunistan issue in his first address to the nation was interpreted by Islamabad as a threatening move that was ‘intended to achieve the complete disintegration of Pakistan.’8 Daoud’s decision to mobilise the Afghan military for war games in Nangarhar province close to Pakistan’s border in the winter of 1974-75, further alarmed Islamabad as this move coincided with the outbreak of armed insurgencies in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Although triggered by Islamabad’s inept handling of the Baluchi and Pushtun sentiments for regional autonomy, these secessionist tendencies were portrayed by the Bhutto government as a deliberate attempt by Kabul to destabilize Pakistan. Angered by the sanctuary and financial assistance given to Baluch separatists in Daoud’s Afghanistan, Bhutto decided to turn the tables on Kabul by ‘giving protection and military training to Afghan Islamists’ who wanted to bring down Daoud’s regime. Between 1973 and 1977, Pakistan trained an estimated 5,000 Afghans in secret military camps, most of them young Muslim dissidents and sympathisers.9 The training culminated in a series of Pakistani-backed incursions into eastern Afghanistan in mid-1975. The best known uprising against the Daoud government occurred in the Panjshir area north of Kabul on July 21, 1975 and was violently put down by Kabul. Stung by Islamabad’s retaliation against his government and having come under economic pressure from Tehran not to stoke the fires of Baluchi nationalism, lest they engulf Iran’s restive Baluch population, Daoud decided to seek reconciliation with Islamabad. At Daoud’s invitation Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto visited Kabul in June 1976 and Daoud paid a high-profile return visit to Pakistan two months later. These visits not only helped defuse mounting tensions between the two countries, but also brought them closer to finding an amicable settlement of the thorny issue of ‘Pakhtunistan’. However, Bhutto’s removal from power by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977 and Daoud’s overthrow by Soviet-backed communist forces in April 1978, once again derailed the emerging rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The emergence of a Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul with strong Indian links was perceived in Islamabad as an alarming development since it raised the spectre of Pakistan being confronted by a formidable Kabul-Delhi-Moscow axis.10 Feeling exposed from the north, Islamabad lost little time in supporting the insurgents fighting against the communist regime of President Mohammed Taraki.11 Islamabad also became actively involved in the Afghan civil war through its liberal policy of admitting over 150,000 Afghan refugees into Pakistan. The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the country’s president, created a nightmarish situation for Pakistan as it brought the Red Army perilously close to the Khyber Pass, the traditional gateway of invasions of South Asia from the north. Besides posing a direct strategic threat to the security of Pakistan, the Soviet military move into Afghanistan also ‘deeply offended Pakistani President Zia ul Haq’s sense of Islamic brotherhood.’12 The Soviet military action in Afghanistan was also perceived in Washington as a geostrategic threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Persian Gulf area. The downfall of the Shah of Iran and his replacement by an anti-American, fundamentalist Islamic regime further heightened the American sense of regional insecurity in the area. As part of its efforts to contain the threat of Soviet expansionism, symbolized by the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration deemed it essential to bolster its regional security framework. In a May 4, 1980, speech regarding Afghanistan, President Carter stated, ‘We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.’13 Pakistan, largely because of its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, emerged as the linchpin of this new ‘trend towards increased American military presence in the region and toward greater utilization of available facilities.’14 For the sake of regional stability, the Carter Administration began to woo Islamabad. Washington offered to ‘shove aside’ the divisive issue of the Pakistani nuclear program; it reaffirmed its 1959 defense commitment to Pakistan; and in early 1980, Carter offered Islamabad $400 million in military and economic assistance to be spread over the next two years. However, ‘years of difficulty over arms sales, a deep sense of betrayal at the imposition of arms embargoes [and] perceived hypocrisy in U.S. nonproliferation’15 made Islamabad wary of instantly embracing the Carter offer of a strategic zone of Southwest Asia. Islamabad seemed to reject American entreaties until a new Republican Administration led by Ronald Reagan gained control of the White House. In early 1981, after complex and protracted negotiations, the Zia regime accepted the Reagan offer of $3.2 billion in economic and military assistance. The renewal of Pakistan’s security links with Washington was accompanied by a ‘broader cover action programme’ under which ‘the Central Intelligence Agency would serve as the quartermaster, to supply arms, equipment and munitions for the mujahideen, funneling through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The Americans would train Pakistanis in the use of weapons and equipment, and the ISI, in turn would instruct the Afghan resistance fighters’ headquartered in Peshawar.16 Beginning at $60 million annually in 1981, the aid in covert programmes ballooned to $400 million by 1984.17 The bulk of this aid went to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami, the best-organised and most disciplined of the Afghan resistance parties, who had developed ‘relations of trust and confidence’ with the Pakistan military.18 Thus, in cooperation with Zia ul-Haq’s military and intelligence services, ‘the CIA, with Saudi finances as well as Pakistani logistical support, managed the raising, training, equipping, paying and sending into battle against the Red Army in Afghanistan of a mercenary army of Islamist volunteers,’19 which forced Moscow to consider retreating from Afghanistan. At the 27th Party Congress held in February 1986, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev described the Afghan conflict as a ‘bleeding wound’. Following his landmark ‘window to the East’ speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, he announced the withdrawal of six regiments of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. During his November 1986 visit to India, Gorbachev emphasised the fact that Moscow had no ‘expansionist designs’ and that it was interested in a political solution ‘that would ensure the existence of a nonaligned, neutral, and independent Afghanistan.’20 Realising that a transition in Soviet thinking on Afghanistan was underway and that Moscow’s peace overtures needed to be reciprocated, Islamabad initiated high-level consultations with Moscow on the critical question of the time-frame for withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At the seventh round of Geneva proximity talks held in March 1987, Islamabad and Kabul agreed to a time frame of less than a year as opposed to the initial gap of some two and a half years. But this positive development, which had raised hopes of an early solution of the Afghan conflict through the Geneva parleys, was soon overshadowed by mounting tensions in Pak-Afghan relations triggered by the massive Afghan bombing of the border villages of Pakistan in which several hundred people, mostly Afghan refugees, were killed.21 In retaliation for this Afghan bombing, the Pakistan Air Force jets shot down an Afghan transport plane with forty passengers on board.22 These events were accompanied by massive bomb explosions in the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi that caused heavy loss of human life, including the death of a prominent Pakistani religious leader, Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. In the wake of these bomb explosions and increasing Afghan violations of Pakistani air space, President Zia-ul-Haq blamed Kabul and Moscow for an ‘increase in terrorist activities in Pakistan.’23 In mid-April 1987, the Pakistan Air Force lost one of its highly prized F-16 warplanes to Afghan jets during a dogfight. This event prompted Islamabad to request the leasing of Advanced Warning Airborne Command System (AWACS) from Washington on an emergency basis. Kabul characterised the proposed supply of AWACS as a ‘serious threat to regional security.’24 On April 10, 1988, the ISI munition-storage depot, located at Ojiri Camp near the Islamabad airport, blew up, raining rockets, artillery shells, and mortar rounds down on the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. More than one hundred people died and eleven hundred were injured. President Zia-ul-Haq described the horrifying incident as a ‘very effective act of sabotage.’25 The Peace Accord on Afghanistan was finally signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, between Islamabad and Kabul with the two superpowers as its co-guarantors. In essence, the Geneva Accords called on the Soviets to remove their forces from Afghanistan within nine months, with fifty per cent of their troops to be removed in the first three months. Although it did not provide for a formal ceasefire, the agreement called for a ban on ‘encouraging or supporting rebellious activities’ across internationally recognised borders. It also allowed the two superpowers to reserve the right to arm their respective ‘allies’ should there be a violation of the one-year moratorium on arms deliveries. On August 17, 1988, President Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash. His death, however, did not mark the end of an activist phase in Islamabad’s Afghan policy. In the years following the February 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Islamabad continued with its interventionist approach toward its war-torn neigbhour. With a view to acquiring a controlling influence in post-Soviet Afghanistan, the new civilian government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sanctioned the launch of a military campaign to capture Jalalabad, Afghanistan’s fourth largest urban area, located forty miles from the Khyber Pass. The battle for Jalalabad, launched by the Mujahideen forces in spring 1989, however, turned out to be a military disaster. Grossly underestimating the staying power of the Moscow-backed regime of President Mohammed Najibullah, the squabbling Mujahideen forces were unable to interdict the vital road between Jalalabad and Kabul. Displaying greater resolve, better skills and military acumen, the well-supplied Afghan army fought off the military assault on Jalalabad. The Jalalabad fiasco led to the sacking of General Hamid Gul, head of the ISI who had masterminded the whole plan. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, nonetheless, proved fatal for Najibullah. Deprived of Soviet arms, money and diplomatic support, he decided to resign, ‘placing his hopes on the endeavours of the UN mission to arrange a peaceful transfer of power.’26 This gambit ‘foundered as the US and the Pakistan-backed mujahideen, scenting total victory, pressed for a military solution.’27 The desertion of his powerful Interior Minister Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum to the anti-communist cause in April 1992 triggered the collapse of Najibullah’s regime. A broad-based Interim Government headed by Sibghatullah Mojadedi that was set up under Pakistan’s tutelage in 1989 assumed control of Kabul and proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s new leaders proved incapable of bringing peace to the war-torn country. The power-sharing arrangement that was brokered by Pakistan under the Peshawar Accord,28 totally broke down after Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was offered the position of prime minister, refused to share power with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani who became President in June 1992, and Ahmad Shah Masood, who became the defense minister. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s decision to launch rocket attacks on Kabul ushered in a debilitating civil war in which the rival factions, divided mainly along ethnic lines – Pushtuns in the south, Uzbeks and Tajiks in the north, and the Shi’a Hazaras in the center – battled each other. The internecine Afghan civil war not only dashed Pakistani hopes of gaining access to the six Central Asian Muslim republics through a friendly Afghanistan, but also caused estrangement between President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Pakistani leaders. Following Rabbani’s re-election as President in June 1994, Islamabad accused the Afghan leader of perpetuating his power illegally. The blunt statement made by Sardar Assef Ahmad Ali, Pakistan’s foreign minister, that ‘any thing that happens in Afghanistan after 28 June 1994 will have no legitimacy’ provoked anti-Pakistan protests in Kabul including rocket attacks on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul.29 The incident of the hijacking of a school bus by Afghan nationals, who were later shot dead by Pakistani commandos, further soured relations between Kabul and Islamabad.30 The Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was closed down and began functioning from Jalalabad. To ‘spite’ Pakistan, President Rabbani began flirting with New Delhi, a move which evoked bitter hostility from Islamabad. The growing friction between Islamabad and the Rabbani regime in Kabul coincided with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Steeped in a puritanical interpretation of Islam, the Taliban were the product of the network of private, rural-based madrassas (religious schools) in Afghanistan and the neighbouring areas of Pakistan. Affiliated with the Deobandi movement in both countries, the Taliban leadership hailed mainly from the Pushtu – speaking area of Kandahar. Impressed by their ‘success in suppressing unruly Mujahideen commanders and imposing peace in and around Kandahar’, Islamabad decided to encourage the Taliban as an alternative to the troublesome Rabbani regime which had ‘established close links with the Indians.’31 To coordinate assistance to the Taliban, an Afghan cell was established in the Interior Ministry headed by General Naseerullah Babar, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s favorite ‘grand uncle.’ Under General Babar’s guidance, the ISI provided ‘transportation, fuel, communications equipment and advice’ to the Taliban movement.32 Pakistan’s pro-Taliban approach was underpinned by several considerations. First, by supporting the Taliban as a controlling force in Afghanistan, Islamabad hoped to achieve its goal of securing trade routes to Central Asia. Second, because of their rigid Islamic beliefs and harsh outlook, Taliban were perceived as an anti-secular and, by extension, an anti-Indian force which would help Pakistan secure its western borders. Third, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would give Pakistan ‘strategic depth’33 against a hostile India in the East. Fourth, a Taliban-controlled friendly Afghanistan could provide a ‘base where Kashmiri militants could be trained.’34 Impelled by this mixture of geo-economic and geo-political considerations, Islamabad threw its strategic weight behind the Taliban as its proxy in the Afghan conflict. The Taliban’s first large military operation took place in October 1994 when it seized the Pasha munitions depot and the town of Spin Boldak on the Pakistani border, held at the time by Hizb-i-Islami commanders. The capture of the arms dump provided them with an enormous quantity of military material, including rockets, ammunition, artillery, and small arms.35 Shortly thereafter the Taliban took control of Kandahar. By December 1994, the Taliban fighters had spread north and east to the outskirts of Kabul and west toward the strategic town of Herat. In September 1995 they overran Herat and a year later seized Jalalabad and Kabul, the capital city, itself. The fall of Kabul was described by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as a ‘welcome development’ while Naseerullah Babar gleefully stated that the ‘rise of Taliban is of great advantage to Pakistan’ since ‘this is the first time there is a government which has no links with India, or anybody else.’36 The new government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which assumed power after the 1997 elections, further cemented Pakistan’s alliance with the Taliban by according them diplomatic recognition on May 25, 1997. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates followed suit two days later. The Taliban takeover of Kabul in September 1996 and their brutal enforcement of medieval Islamic practices sent ideological shockwaves through the region. Iran, Russia and Central Asian Republics not only expressed concern and alarm over the extreme religious views of the Taliban but also scorned them as another foreign-backed adventure into Afghan territory. Iran, which had been backing the deposed Rabbani government since 1992 portrayed Taliban as a ‘great disaster’ which the U.S. was attempting to use ‘to confront the Islamic republic of Iran.’ Similar views were expressed by Russia. Describing the situation evolving in Afghanistan as ‘alarming’ a Russian foreign ministry spokesperson warned of its ‘destabilizing consequences for the region.’ To express their collective concern over the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation was held in Almaty in October 1996. While noting that the ‘flames of war are approaching the border of the C.I.S. member states posing an immediate threat to national interests, security of those states and the commonwealth as a whole and destabilizing regional and international situation,’ it called for taking ‘adequate measures aimed at strengthening security of the outer boundaries of the commonwealth.’37 To prevent the spread of ‘fundamentalism and instability’ from South to Central Asia, the Almaty summit agreed to pursue a three-pronged containment approach. This containment strategy involved the strengthening of border troops by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan along the Afghan border, increased CIS activity in the international fora to diplomatically isolate the Taliban, and greater cooperation among forces opposed to the Taliban.’38 To help allay the Iranian and Central Asian fears regarding the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a potential source of regional instability, Pakistan put forth a four-fold peace formula which stressed the following:
Simultaneously, Islamabad initiated efforts to persuade the Taliban to accept a broad-based government in Kabul in which all major ethnic tribes would share power. Confident of their popular support and secure in the knowledge that possession was nine tenth of the law, Taliban refused to share power with the Northern Alliance, which controlled less than 10 percent of the Afghan territory. To guard against any Pakistani arm-twisting on the question of the broad-based government on account of their economic dependence on Islamabad, and also to gain a measure of autonomy for themselves, the Taliban leadership began cultivating close ties with the Saudi millionaire-turned rebel, Osama bin Laden, who had set up a ‘private base’ near Jalalabad in 1990, and had reportedly given ‘the Taliban $3 million to buy the defections which opened the road to Kabul in September 1996.’40 Aware of bin Laden’s need for a sanctuary after his expulsion from Sudan in 1993, the Taliban allowed him to live comfortably in Afghanistan as their ‘honoured guest’. In exchange, he not only bankrolled their stay in power but ‘endeared himself further to the leadership by sending several hundred Arab-Afghans to participate’ in the Taliban military campaigns in the north.41 To underpin his closeness with the Taliban, bin Laden also married one of his daughters to Mullah Mohammed Omar’s son.42 The Taliban’s symbiotic ties with bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist network marked Afghanistan’s transition from an ‘accidental to a mature terrorist state.’43 Taking advantage of the presence of some 25,000 battle-hardened Arab volunteers who came to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet Jihad, and drawing upon his personal wealth and family fortunes and intimate knowledge of the mountainous Afghan terrain acquired during that period, bin Laden gradually and skillfully transformed the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan into a truly rogue entity, whose only mission was to serve the cause of anti-American ‘Islamic Jihad.’ In February 1998, bin Laden issued a manifesto for what he called ‘The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,’ in which he denounced the United States for ‘occupying the land of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, and terrorizing its neighbours.’ He also condemned the US bombing and economic blockade of Iraq and accused the US of turning Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and Sudan into ‘paper statelets’ in order to ‘guarantee Israel’s survival.’ The manifesto went on to declare that: to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military- is an Individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.44 On August 7, 1998, a few months after bin Laden’s fiery fatwa, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing 226 people. The Taliban’s strategic support for bin Laden became a major source of discord between Islamabad and Kabul after it became known that bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network had carried out these terrorist attacks. Two weeks later, President Bill Clinton, at a time when he was mired in the Monica Lewinski mess, ordered American cruise missile attacks on bin Laden’s hideouts near Khost in Eastern Afghanistan, in which bin Laden narrowly escaped. The failed U.S. missile strikes, while frustrating Washington, drew sharp criticism from pro-Islamic groups in Pakistan. Due to Washington’s failure to take Islamabad into confidence the air strikes were seen as an infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Further, by killing a dozen Pakistanis, belonging to Herkat al-Ansar, a militant group that was active in the Kashmiri freedom struggle in the Indian-held Kashmir, and had been on the American hit-list of terrorist organisations, the missile attacks caused considerable public anger and official embarrassment in Islamabad. On 4 November 1998, the Manhattan Federal Court issued an indictment in absentia against bin Laden, containing 238 charges of terrorism against him. The American court held him responsible, among many other crimes, for the 1993 bombing of World Trade Center, an assassination plot against President Clinton in 1994, and funding Islamist groups in New Jersey. It also identified bin Laden as a prime suspect in the bomb attack on American soldiers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, in 1996.45 Four days after the indictment, on November 8, the CIA announced a $5 million bounty for information leading to the arrest of bin Laden. Faced with Washington’s insistent demand that it should press the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, the Sharif government joined hands with Riyadh to seek his expulsion from Afghanistan. Accompanied by the head of the Pakistan’s intelligence services, ISI, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal secretly visited Kandahar in September 1998 to take possession of bin Laden from his Taliban hosts, as per a prior understanding. Much to his dismay, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar not only ‘refused to discuss’ bin Laden with Prince Turki but also accused the Saudi royal family as ‘American lackeys.’46 Shortly afterwards, bin Laden pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar and recognised him formally as Amirul Momineen, leader of the faithful. To discourage further intercessions from Islamabad or Riyadh, the Taliban declared that bin Laden had ‘disappeared’. Caught between the conflicting pulls of the American pressure on the one hand and the Taliban’s absolute refusal to yield on bin Laden’s expulsion on the other, Islamabad took refuge in the argument that ‘fiercely held Afghan customs regarding hospitality would render its efforts fruitless.’47 The American air strikes against Al-Qaeda training camps coincided with the Taliban’s successful assault on Mazar-i-Sharif, in which they ‘massacred at least 2,000 people, most of them Hazara civilians.’48 and also killed nine Iranian diplomats, whom they had captured from the Iranian consulate after taking the city. Tehran reacted angrily to this violent incident by stating that the ‘responsibility’ for the ‘abhorrent killing of these Iranian citizens rests on the Taliban militia and the government of Pakistan which had assured us of their safety.’49 In a message broadcast on the state radio and television on September 12, 1998, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused the Pakistan Army of being involved in the ‘Taliban mischief’ and called upon Islamabad to ‘cease’ its backing of the Taliban and urged them both ‘to abandon actions which could lead to a catastrophe.’50 Islamabad dismissed these allegations as ‘disinformation’ and claimed that ‘no Pakistani aircraft or armed forces personnel were involved in fighting in Afghanistan.’ In his statement before the Pakistan Senate on September 17, foreign minister Sartaj Aziz stated that ‘Pakistan was not a party to the Afghan strife,’ and that ‘the Pakistan army had not played any role in the internal fighting in Afghanistan.’ Despite these Pakistani disclaimers, Iran continued to assert that Islamabad was not only actively involved on the side of the Taliban in the Afghan conflict but was also seeking to establish its tutelage over Afghanistan to the detriment of Iranian interests. In order to force the Taliban to comply with the Iranian demand, that those responsible for the killing of Iranian diplomats should be arrested and extradited to Iran for a trial, Tehran staged a formidable military build-up on its border with Afghanistan under the guise of a two-phase military exercise code-named ‘Zolifqar’. Reacting strongly to this coercive Iranian pressure, the Taliban publicly warned Tehran that they would attack Iranian cities with Scud missiles if ‘Tehran initiated any military action against them.’51 To counter the Iranian military build-up, the Taliban also reinforced their military position along the Iran-Afghan border. Alarmed by these threatening moves, Pakistan sent foreign minister Sartaj Aziz on a peace mission to Tehran. After being told that Islamabad had to clearly choose between Kabul and Tehran, Pakistan declared its ‘neutrality’. The threat of war between Iran and Afghanistan dissipated significantly after Iran’s moderate President Mohammed Khatami unilaterally declared that his country ‘did not war with Afghanistan’ and was willing to ‘explore all political and peaceful solutions in line with Iran’s interests.’52 Partly to stem the erosion of its friendly ties with Tehran and mainly to address the mounting American criticism of its strategic support for the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Islamabad began to distance itself from the Taliban. On 8 December 1998, the UN Security Council passed a motion of censure on the Taliban for its failure to conclude a ceasefire with the Northern Alliance; for killing the Iranian diplomats; the slaughter in Mazar-i-Sharif; profiting from the narcotics trade and harbouring terrorists.53 In early December, UNOCAL, ‘the Taliban’s only corporate friend’ formally announced the scrapping of its plans to build an energy pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan. During his February 1999 visit to Islamabad, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott called Taliban-controlled Afghanistan ‘the focus of one of the first, most severe and ominous battles of the post-Cold War period – the battle against the forces of terrorism, extremism and intolerance.’54 Following Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s December 1998 official visit to Washington, Islamabad reportedly agreed to participate in a clandestine US-led commando operation to assassinate bin Laden.55 This CIA-hatched plan never materialised due to the dismissal of the Nawaz government by the military in October 1999. In the same month, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1267, imposing aviation and financial sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Their purpose was to convince the Taliban regime to end its support for international terrorists and to turn bin Laden over to ‘appropriate’ authorities. In the days before the sanctions went into effect in November 1999, Taliban activists organised public rallies against the United States and the United Nations in Kabul and other cities. Defying the coercive international pressure, Mullah Mohammed Omer, the top Taliban leader, vowed that the regime would never force bin Laden to leave Afghanistan, or turn him over to international authorities.56 In mid-2000, the Taliban mounted their big military offensive against the Northern Alliance forces in the Takhar province. On September 5, they captured Taloqan, the capital of Takhar province. Reacting to media reports that Pakistani aircraft were used to rotate Taliban troops on Taloqan frontlines, the US government felt obliged to issue ‘a demarche to the Pakistani government asking for assurances that Pakistan had not been involved in engineering the fall of Taloqan.’57 Taliban’s military advances against the Northern Alliance forces coupled with their refusal to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1267, led to an expansion of the sanctions regime with the passing of Resolution 1333 on December 19, 2000, by which the Security Council further imposed an arms embargo on the Taliban, banned travel outside Afghanistan by Taliban officials of deputy ministerial rank and higher, and ordered the closing of Taliban offices abroad. Security Council Resolution 1333 also called for the appointment of a committee of experts to make recommendations as to how the arms embargo and the closure of alleged terrorist training camps could be monitored. The committee’s report was presented to the Security Council on May 21, 2001. Its primary recommendation was that the Security Council set up a special UN office for sanctions-monitoring and coordination for Afghanistan that would include ‘sanctions enforcement support teams’, to be based in each of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. The team’s task would be ‘to improve the effectiveness of these countries border controls and counter-terrorism services.’ The committee also recommended that ‘urgent considerations’ be given to including ‘aircraft turbine fuel, and special fluids and lubricants needed for use in armoured vehicles’ in the embargo.58 The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States presented Pakistan with a stark choice: either make common cause with Washington in its war against bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network based in Taliban-controlled neighbouring Afghanistan, or persist with its pro-Taliban Afghan policy and as a consequence suffer international condemnation of guilt by association. Within twenty-four hours after being asked, by Washington whether he was going to be on America’s side or not, on September 13 President General Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan would lend its ‘unstinted cooperation’ to the international coalition against terror. Two days earlier, in his public statement President Pervez Musharraf had expressed his deep shock and outrage at the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and offered his country’s ‘deepest condolences and sympathy’ to President George Bush, the bereaved families and the American people. Describing the terrorist attacks as ‘barbaric which will live in memory as a most heinous crime against humanity,’ he assured President George Bush of his ‘unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.’59 After a marathon meeting with top military leaders including the powerful nine corps commanders, General Pervez Musharraf informed Washington that his army-led regime would open Pakistani airspace for American air and missile strikes against the landlocked Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, share ‘information and intelligence,’ and offer ‘logistical support’ to American military forces including the use of two Pakistani airfields in Jacobabad and Pasni for ‘emergency and rescue operations.’ These decisions marked a paradigm shift in Islamabad’s thinking towards the Taliban. That the letter then had become a strategic liability rather than an asset was clearly acknowledged by General Pervez Musharraf in his televised address to the nation on September 19. He said: ‘We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation. Perhaps as critical as the events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be harmed … Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and fourth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam. It is not a question of bravery or cowardice. But bravery without thinking is stupidity … We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary … Let me say that I am concerned about Afghanistan and the Taliban. I have tried my best, but sadly without much success … I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the world is against them. I have met twenty to twenty-five world leaders and talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban…I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of our friends accepted this. In the present situation we have been trying to convince the Taliban to be wise. We have also asked the US for evidence about Osama bin Laden. Also how do we best serve Afghanistan’s interests? By going against the world community or by working with the international community. I am sure you will agree with me that we can only do the latter.’60 Referring to the ‘critical situation’ that had arisen as a result of the September 11 acts of terrorism, which had raised a ‘wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States, General Musharraf categorically stated that ‘at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only’ and that ‘I give top priority to the defence of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later.’ A few days later, General Pervez Musharraf told the BBC that the days of the Taliban regime in Kabul ‘appeared to be numbered’. To mitigate growing Western apprehensions after it became evident that he was facing some ‘internal resistance’ from the military to effectively pursue his new Afghan policy, General Pervez Musharraf conducted a massive shake-up in the top military hierarchy, on the eve of the American military action against the Taliban launched on October 7, 2001. Using the occasion to extend his tenure as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Pervez Musharraf promoted Lt. General Mohammed Aziz and Lt. General Muhammed Yousuf to full generals and forced Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Lt. General Muzaffer Usmani, Deputy COAS to seek premature retirements. Following their promotion to full generals, Aziz and Yousuf were appointed as Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) and Vice COAS respectively. Known for his puritanical Islamic beliefs and undisguised sympathy for the ill-fated Taliban regime, General Aziz’s elevation to the ceremonial position of Chairman JCSC essentially meant that he would have very little influence over the conduct of Pakistan’s new Afghan policy. The critical decision-making forum shaping this policy were the meetings of the corps commanders presided over by General Pervez Musharraf. Chairman JCSC was not required to attend such meetings. As Chairman JCSC, General Aziz had to work closely with Vice COAS, General Mohammed Yousuf who was widely known in the army as a moderate officer with excellent professional credentials. Lt. General Mahmood’s removal as head of ISI and his replacement by Lt. General Ehsanul Haq, former head of the powerful Military Intelligence and a close associate of General Pervez Musharraf, was the most significant aspect of his efforts to ‘de-Talibanize’ Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Ever since his appointment as head of ISI, following the ouster of the Nawaz Sharif government in the October 12, 1999, military coup, in which he played a key role as corps commander Rawalpindi, Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad consistently failed to leverage Taliban’s structural dependence on Islamabad to the latter’s advantage. Besides failing to elicit the Taliban’s cooperation on the issue of the return of convicted Pakistani criminals hiding in Afghanistan, General Mahmood tried his best to ‘save’ the Taliban regime by leading two ‘dubious’ peace missions to Kandahar, following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The failure of these attempts coupled with his unfolding ‘bonapartist’ ambitions for power caused his abrupt removal from power. Three key incidents were reportedly linked to the termination Mahmood’s career: firstly, he prevented Musharraf from visiting Kandahar for a one-to-one meeting with Mullah Omer; secondly, he misbehaved with almost all the key civil and military aides to the President and with the air chief during an important meeting held after his return from the US in mid-October; finally, he refused to accept Musharraf’s offer to become Chairman JCSC and tried to influence the President through common friends to change his mind. By distancing itself from the Taliban regime and also agreeing to provide help to Washington in such key areas as ‘intelligence and information exchange’, use of Pakistan ‘air space’ and ‘logistic support’ in its impending military action against bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the Musharraf government courted significant domestic risks. These risks related to the very survival of his regime in the face of pro-Taliban societal sentiments within Pakistan, deep societal split along the liberal/radical right ideological divide, and possible polarisation within the Pakistani security establishment especially along pro-American and anti-American feelings. These risks did not seem unmanageable for the Musharraf government then, as they do not currently. Despite being an unelected leader, General Musharraf is regarded by the vast majority of Pakistanis as a capable, sincere and a well-meaning person. His grip on power remains firm and because of his consultative decision-making style, there is little room for anyone to harbour an unspoken grudge against him. His well-honed communication skills and his predilection for transparent and ‘loud thinking’ even on the most vital issues is appreciated by his peers in the military and the common man alike. His regime’s relationship with the vocal Pakistani media, especially the influential vernacular press, has been smooth and devoid of any friction or tension, and the Pakistani press remains free. None of these positive personal elements, however, promise General Musharraf easy success if he is faced with a situation of mass agitation mounted by gun-touting mullahs willing to take on the government in the name of ‘Jihad’. The likelihood of this happening is remote, if not impossible, for three reasons. First, in order for this kind of mass upsurge to happen and succeed, one needs a charismatic religious leader á la Imam Khomeini. The religious right in Pakistan does not possess such an overarching figure. It is badly divided along sectarian and denominational lines, and is politically too inept to be able to throw up such a leader even in a situation of deep crisis. Second, bearded mullahs have never been the role-models for Pakistani masses and this is not likely to change regardless of what happens in Afghanistan. The limited popular appeal of the religious parties in Pakistan is underscored by the fact that they have never been able to capture more than 3% of the popular vote during the last three elections. (Editor’s Note: This assessment by the author was made prior to the October 2002 election results). The third mitigating factor preventing a mass-agitation sparked by Pakistan – supported American military action against the Taliban is the general acceptance by the Pakistani people of the necessity of being on the right side of history on the issue of terrorism, for national security reasons. General Musharraf’s argument, that if Pakistan would not have supported the U.S.-led international community, which includes Islamabad’s arch-ally, China, and many leading Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, then Pakistan’s ‘strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir’ would have been endangered, has resonated with informed sections of opinion. In his meeting with representatives of leading think tanks on September 18, 2001, General Musharraf categorically stated that given Pakistan’s precarious economic situation and New Delhi’s desire to get Pakistan branded as a sponsor of terrorism, his government felt compelled to side with the world as any thought to the contrary would have meant running the risk of taking the country back to the ‘stone-age.’ Still, by severing its close links with the Taliban regime and reviving his country’s strategic cooperation with the United States, General Musharraf has moved into an uncharted territory. All his expected gains from a rejuvenated Pak-US entente have yet to become a reality, and these can easily get vitiated if President George Bush overreaches himself by targeting other Muslim countries especially, Iraq and Iran in his ‘crusade’ against terrorism. Such a multi-targeted attack will generate a global backlash of Muslim anger, which can fuel the fires of anti-Americanism at the popular level within Pakistan. In that scenario, the small streams of pro-Taliban public sympathy that may still exist, might turn into an uncontrollable tidal wave of public resentment for the Musharraf government. The Musharraf regime has taken a calculated risk of incurring the wrath of the ‘Jihadi’ elements within Pakistan, to help reposition the country internationally by forging strategic ties with Washington. Its decision to come out on the right side of history has yielded some gains. Also to note is the fact that public perceptions of ‘Jihad’ have encouraged a public debate on the concept, reflecting significant shifts. In terms of gains, except for the Missile Technology Control Regime curbs, all other American sanctions against Pakistan have been lifted and other key countries such as Japan, Britain and European Union have provided substantial economic and financial relief to Pakistan’s cash – strapped economy. Having dumped the Taliban, the Musharraf government intensified its diplomatic campaign to protect its security interests in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Besides demanding the formation of a broad-based successor government in Kabul, in which all ethnic groups including the dominant Pushtuns are represented, Islamabad has made it clear that it would not want a regime in Kabul which might be hostile to Pakistani interests. Islamabad has welcomed the installation of an Afghan interim administration in Kabul as part of the Bonn agreement signed on December 5, 2001 between four major Afghan groups, namely, the Northern Alliance, the Rome Group, the Cyprus Group and the Peshawar Group.61 The Chairman of the Afghan interim administration, Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pushtun, well-known to the top Pakistani leadership, visited Pakistan on February 8, 2002, at the personal invitation of President Musharraf. To underscore its goodwill toward the new regime in Kabul, President Musharraf announced the release of an additional amount of $10 million to Afghanistan to help Kabul meet its immediate cash flow needs.62 Both sides also pledged to respect each other’s freedom, territorial integrity and emphasised that their future relations would be based on the policy of non-interference. Notwithstanding these sentiments of good will, Pakistan’s relations with the post-Taliban Afghanistan would remain hostage to the vagaries of India-Pakistan ties, which have experienced a marked deterioration since 9/11. Tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi, triggered by the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan, reached their all time high in May 2002 when both countries openly talked of war. Fearing that war with India was imminent, Pakistan withdrew more than 50,000 troops it had deployed along its border with Afghanistan to prevent the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces from entering into its territory. Islamabad also informed Washington that in the event of an India-Pakistan war, it would have to reclaim some of its airfields, which had been loaned to the United States for its military operations in Afghanistan. To prevent the looming India-Pakistan war playing havoc with its military campaign against Al-Qaeda forces, Washington launched a frantic diplomatic campaign to defuse the India-Pakistan crisis. Following the visit of Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage to New Delhi and Islamabad in early June 2002, both countries agreed to pull themselves back from the brink of a catastrophic war. In response to President Pervez Musharraf’s pledge that he would ‘permanently’ end his country’s support for armed militancy in Indian-held Kashmir, New Delhi lifted some of the diplomatic and economic curbs imposed on Islamabad in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attacks on Indian parliament. President Musharraf’s decision to limit Islamabad’s strategic support for the militancy in Kashmir has been greeted with howls of a ‘sell out’ by the Islamic hard-liners in the country. To underscore their opposition to his policies, they have joined hands with surviving elements of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces, and have carried out a string of terrorist attacks in the country including the killing of Pakistani soldiers and policemen. The threat of home-grown terrorism has become the biggest security challenge for Islamabad today. President Musharraf’s crackdown on the pro-Taliban religious forces in Pakistan and their violent response is the direct outcome of Islamabad’s strategic decision to discard militant jihad as a vehicle to pursue its interests in neighbouring Afghanistan. References
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