Article

Nazir Hussain*

The strategic dynamics within the region makes the Middle East a highly volatile place in the world. The area is rich in hydrocarbon and mineral resources, and has been instrumental in initiating some great wars and major crises involving the world. Though being a cradle of great civilizations and birthplace of three divine religions, the history of the region is replete with wars and conflicts over many traditional and non-traditional issues. Its geo-political position and huge oil reserves have invited great powers’ influence and involvement in the area.

Within this strategic importance of the largely desert and arid region, the scarcity of water has been a historic problem. The two great civilizations on the banks of the Nile and the Euphrates flourished just because of the abundance and availability of the water resources. In the early periods, the scarcity of water resources were met through rain and digging of wells. In the modern period, due to increased water usage for multiple reasons, the scarcity of water has reached alarming proportions to the extent that many experts claim that the future wars and conflicts in the area would be on water resources.

It is strange that while water covers two-third of the total area of the earth, usable water is becoming scarcer day by day.¹ The phenomenon of water scarcity is not confined to the Middle East alone, but it is now recognised as a global security problem and many UN-led studies have highlighted the gravity of the situation.

The issue of water scarcity adds to the peculiar strategic and political dynamics of the Middle East, making it an interesting and important study to explore. In this paper an attempt is made to see the available water resources of the region, its impact on the regional states, the disputes over sharing of waters of major rivers and how unresolved water issues could become a source of future conflicts in the exiting Arab-Israel and intra-Arab rivalries.

In the Middle East, the three main rivers systems which provide fresh water resources to the regional states are the Nile, the Euphrates-Tigris and the Jordan rivers. All these rivers have biblical fame and also have religious importance. These rivers cover many riparian states within their water basins and the waters of these rivers contribute substantially to the socio-economic development of the respective states, through which they flow.

Of these rivers, the Jordan River, also described as the Nahr al-Urdan, stretches from Lebanon to the Dead Sea covering an area of 320 kilometers. All its tributaries drain an area of about 18,000 square kilometers. The total average flow of the Jordan River is between 1200 and 1850 million cubic meters (mcm) per year. This flow varies from season to season: during winters the river carries about 40 percent of its total annual flow; and in summer and autumn, when more water is needed, the discharge reduces to 3-4 percent², creating problems for the areas dependent on this river. The major tributaries of the Jordan River are: Dan and Hullah, flowing through Israel (with a 450 mcm annual discharge), Banias and Yarmuk, flow through Syria (625 mcm annual discharge) and Hasbani, flows through Lebanon (138 mcm annual discharge).³

Five countries of the region meet their partial requirements of water from this river, which are Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and parts of the Palestinian area notably the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Among these countries, Syria and Lebanon have more water than they actually require for their respective current uses. But Israel, Jordan and Palestinian areas suffer from an acute water deficit and are the most dependent riparian states of the Jordan River system. Syria’s total water needs are about 36 billion cubic meters (bcm), sufficient for its immediate and future needs. The Euphrates and Orontes rivers cover the bulk of Syria’s water demand, while only 7 percent of Syria’s water demands are met through the Yarmuk.⁴ Therefore, Syria is less dependent on the Jordan River basin. Lebanon, a mountainous country also has many internal rivers, which are adequate for its water needs.

Jordan is regarded as one of the driest countries in the world and for its water needs depends on the annual rainfall, groundwater sources and the river Yarmuk. Israel did not allow Jordan to increase its water storage capacity on the Yarmuk, therefore, the latter tends to over-utilise its underground water resources, as it has been doing for many years. In 1985, the Jordanian domestic water demand was 950 mcm, or about 110 mcm less than the availability of supply. Even as a presumption, if Jordan increases its water supply for the year 2002 to more than 1.1 billion cubic meters, it would still be short of 100-300 mcm.⁵

Israel not only suffers from scarcity of water, but also from its maldistribution. Its annual supply of fresh water resources is about 1.6-1.9 bcm, of which the Jordan River constitutes a major supply source. Israel also utilises the water resources from the Litani River, which flows from Lebanese areas, and from the occupied territories of Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights. In Gaza, the water resource availability is 60 mcm, whereas the demand is for 100-120 mcm annually. This demand is increasing to the tune of 200-250 mcm annually, so is the water deficit to the tune of 140-190 mcm, which means either over-pumping of the ground water sources, or import from outside the region.⁶ In Gaza, only 20 percent of the water resources are available to the Palestinians, while Israel consumes the rest. This situation also reveals the actual reason for the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories and needs to be addressed as a root cause.

The Euphrates-Tigris basin drains about 900,000 square kilometers. The Euphrates covers a distance of 2700 kilometers and stretches over an area of 444,000 square kilometers. Whereas the Tigris, has a total length of 1900 kilometers and covers an area of 470,000 square kilometers.⁷ Three countries of the region depend on this twin-river basin, which includes Turkey, Syria and Iraq. There are inter-state controversies over the twin-river basin sources, that flow through these three countries. However, researchers agree that the major portion of the Euphrates i.e about 80-90 percent originates from Turkey and 10-12 percent from Syria. The major area of the Tigris basin is in Iraq i.e about 54 percent, while Turkey accounts for 12 percent and the rest is located in Syria, and partly in Iran. The average annual flow of these two rivers varies from 70-80 bcm, of which 30-35 bcm is from the Euphrates and 40-45 bcm from the Tigris. According to 1995 estimates, the two rivers provide Turkey with 100 bcm of water, Syria 23 bcm and Iraq 91.2 bcm annually.⁸

Turkey, because of its snowy mountains and abundant precipitation, is the most well endowed country in the Middle East in terms of both its ground and surface water resources. In addition to the vast catchment area of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Turkey also has access to water sources of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The total water potential of Turkey is estimated around 107 bcm but only 30 bcm of available resources are utilised. In contrast, half of Syria and two-third of Iraq is desert and the rainfall is very scarce, therefore these countries need more water resources than are available to them. Though Syria has other sources of water, but it is heavily dependent on the Euphrates, to the tune of around 86 percent of its total water needs.⁹ Under these circumstances, Iraq’s dependence on the Euphrates-Tigris becomes acute and the water in these rivers from Turkey and Syria is detrimental to the Iraqi needs. These countries, through bilateral agreements, have decided that Turkey is obliged to release 16 bcm of water annually downstream. Syria and Iraq have agreed that the Euphrates waters would be allocated between them, with 42 percent water available to Syria and 58 percent to Iraq.¹⁰

The Nile is the world’s longest river and serves ten states: Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. It is 6825 kilometers long, discharges around 84 bcm of water annually and covers about 3 million square kilometer drainage area. Though 86 percent of the discharge of the Nile River originates in Ethiopia, but the largest consumers of its water are Sudan and Egypt. Two main tributaries from the Nile; the White Nile and the Blue Nile converge at Khartoum, the capital of Sudan and then flow as a single river through Egypt, into the Mediterranean.¹¹

The following table shows a comparative hydrological profile of these rivers.

The following chart gives an idea of the water availability vis-à-vis the demand/supply needs of the countries of the region:¹²

Source: Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, London: Macmillan, 2000.

With the rapid rise in population, as the demands for water are increasing, water sharing and allocation problems have assumed a global importance to the extent that it has become a security issue. The demands for water have increased proportionate to the growth in population, agricultural and industrial development. According to the UN estimates, the world population jumped from 2.3 billion to 5.3 billion between 1940 to 1990. At the same time, per capita water consumption doubled from 400 to 800 cubic meters per person per year. It is estimated that by year 2050 the world population would be over 10 billion and the water requirements would double again.¹³

The water use in agriculture sector is estimated to the tune of around 62 percent of the total water requirements. It has decreased from an earlier 90 percent usage to the present level, largely because of the massive use of fertilizers and pesticides, which in turn has led to other problems, such as the contamination and pollution of renewable water sources. The massive industrialisation during the last century also led to an increased consumption of water. In 1900, the industrial sector consumed only six percent of the total water requirements, while in 1990 it accounted for more than 24 percent of water usage, mainly by the industrialised and developed states. According to estimates, 2 billion people live in areas which experience continuous shortages of water. In 88 developing countries, accounting for nearly 40 percent of the world’s population, water shortage is already a serious impediment to their economic development.¹⁴

The increased importance of the water issues had led the UN to initiate some action plans for the effective management and utilisation of the water resources. The first such UN Water Conference was held in Argentina in 1977. The primary purpose of the conference was to promote a level of preparedness that would enable the world to avoid a global water crisis. This was followed by the 1992 International Conference on Water and Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, which presented a draft action plan to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. The action plan envisioned ‘the adequate supplies of water for the entire population and preserving the hydrological, biological and chemical functions of the ecosystems’.¹⁵ Two other UN Conventions, the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1983, and the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNCLNUIW) of 1997, address the concerns of the international community on the need to regulate water issues, so to avoid any possible conflict of global proportions over water.

The case of the Middle East region is more acute because of its peculiar climatic conditions and less rainfall.¹⁶ The region faces severe water shortage problems. Only Iran, Lebanon and Turkey have adequate water resources to meet their present and future demands. The rest of the co-riparian countries face the problem of greater water demands and lesser available supplies. This results in the over-utilisation of water resources leading to disputes over the sharing of available resources. The catchment areas lie with the disputed lands where transborder problems exist, e.g Israel obtains more than half of its water needs from its occupied territories. This means that territorial and hydro-politics are deeply interwoven, and are a crucial element in the inter-state military-security paradigm of the region, other than the more direct Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

The subsequent Arab-Israel conflicts, arising out of the annexation of the fertile Arab territories by Israel, added a new dimension to the water politics in the area. Israel’s continuous possession of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon have been part and parcel of the Israeli policy of ‘possession of land and water’. In fact some experts believe that the 1982 invasion of Beirut by Israel, besides other security reasons, was determined by its need to control the Litani River for its water needs.¹⁷

Therefore, it is not surprising that water and environment issues were put high on the agenda by the Israeli side during the Madrid Peace Process in October 1991. Even the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty includes two annexes addressing water and environmental issues. While withdrawing from Southern Lebanon in 200I, Israel did not withdraw from the fertile region of the Shaba farmland area, over which three countries, Syria, Lebanon and Israel have staked their sovereign claims. Besides the Arab-Israel equation on water problems, no worthwhile dispute has occurred amongst other riparian countries of the Jordan River. That does not preclude the possibility of any future disputes among them.

The three riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin have bilateral agreements to share the available water of the twin-rivers. However, in the past, due to the increased water demands, Turkey and Syria were compelled to create storage and build additional dams on the Euphrates, which led to disputes among these states. As Iraq is the lower riparian of these two rivers, any future plan for building dams to increase storage capacity, either by Turkey or Syria could lead to conflict among these three states.¹⁸

Although ten African countries share the Nile, but the major dispute is between Egypt and Sudan over the sharing of the river waters. Various agreements concluded by these two countries since 1929 depict the serious nature of water-sharing disputes within the Nile River basin. During the 1954-58 period, and again in 1985, water-sharing disputes almost became a full-fledged conflict between Sudan and Egypt. Sudan, due to its increased agricultural activity and population growth, needs to store water and build more dams, therefore, in 1985 it asked for a revision in the 1959 water agreement it had signed with Egypt to increase her share of the Nile water. But Egypt opposed any such move and even threatened military action against Sudan. Ethiopia constitutes another threat to Egypt’s water needs. The Blue Nile tributary that supplies more than 80 percent of Egyptian water needs, flows for the larger stretch through Ethiopia. Ethiopia is not bound by any water agreement with Egypt and Sudan. It has planned to divert 4 billion cubic meters of water for its irrigation purposes by building dams and increasing storage facilities for the Nile water. In 1990, in retaliation, Egypt blocked an African development Bank loan to Ethiopia. In 1991, a bilateral water agreement was signed between Sudan and Ethiopia, which reduced the political dominance of Egypt as the downstream riparian over the Nile. Due to its total dependence on the Nile, water thus constitutes a high priority foreign policy concern for Egypt.¹⁹

Tracing the history of modern warfare, it has been observed that major wars have occurred due to geo-political/ geo-economic reasons, arising out of the need to assert control over natural resources. The Gulf War-I, or commonly known as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was primarily instigated by the need to exert control over the region’s water resources i.e Shattul Arab between Iran and Iraq. The major cause of Gulf War-II (1990-91), under the US-led 28-sate coalition against Iraq, was over the control of the oil resources of the Gulf.

In a region like the Middle East, where oil has been a major source of conflict, water scarcity is becoming an equally volatile issue and gaining primacy in world attention, because of its high potential for leading to war. Experts, writers and statesmen have predicted that future wars in the Middle East will not be over oil but water.²⁰

The creation of Israel, a Jewish State, at the very heart of Muslim Arab world exacerbated the regional dynamics. It is significant to note that the territorial concept of the land of Zion, or the ancient empire of the Solomon, stretches between the Nile and the Euphrates. The very nature and depiction of the Israeli flag symbolises its expansionist desire and for the control of water resources. The Israeli flag has two blue lines and a six-corner star. The six-corner star is a symbol of Solomon’s biblical empire and the two blue lines represent the two rivers i.e the Nile and the Euphrates. It shows that the Jewish State would like to revive the ancient empire of the Solomon, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

In a volatile region like the Middle East, where there are underlying and simmering ideological rivalries, strategic and military tensions among several countries that constitute the region, the issue of water scarcity has all the elements to become a major cause for future conflict and war in the Middle East.²¹ Though every river system of the region carries the potential for conflict, it is the Jordan River, shared by hostile and sworn enemies like Israel versus Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, that may become an immediate source of future conflict. Israel, in occupation of the Arab territories since 1967, has diverted the water resources of Jordan, Yarmok and Litani rivers, which has already caused great anxiety to the Arab states. Michael Klare, who is author of ‘Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflicts’ describes how the water issue is further complicated, because rivers cross political boundaries, and many countries of the region must share the limited available water resources. In the face of a rising demand for water the dangers of competition turning into conflict over these limited shared supplies appears inevitable.²²

The Middle East region has already witnessed several major wars over natural resources during the last century. It is being predicted that in the 21st century the likely war in the region would be over water resources. However, this prediction can be proved wrong if the regional countries cooperate, coordinate and integrate management of this vital human need, on which their very survival depends. However, given the past history of crisis-management that has dominated the inter-state relations of the Middle Eastern states, this proposition seems very unlikely. Therefore, the world should be ready for a major war in the region over some water issue, sooner than later.

References

1. Water covers 2/3rd of the Earth’s surface. The total volume of existing water on the planet is 1.41 billion cubic kilometers, of which nearly 98 percent is unusable because it is found in the saltwater of oceans, inland seas and deep underground basins. The total volume of available fresh water stocks is only 35-36 million cubic kilometers. Of these, fresh water lakes and rivers, which are the main sources of human water consumption, contain about 90,000 cubic kilometers of water, which amounts to just 0.26 percent of total global fresh water reserves. For details see, Peter Wallensteen and Ashok Swain, Comprehensive Assessment of the Fresh Water Resources of the World, Stockholm Environment Institute, 1997.

2. Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or Cooperation? (London: Macmillan, 2000) p. 85.

3. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

4. Ibid., p. 90.

5. Ibid., p 91.

6. Ibid., p. 92.

7. Ibid., p.121.

8. Ibid., pp. 121-122 also see Narottam Gaan, ‘Environment, Scarcity of Water and Violent Conflict: A Study in their Linkages’, BIISS Journal (Dhaka) Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 262-264.

9. Dolatyar and Gray, op. cit., p 140.

10. Ibid.

11. Wallensteen and Swain, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

12. Also see UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001 under profile of environment degradation.

13. Wallensteen and Swain, op. cit., p. 2.

14. Ibid., p. 8.

15. Dolatyar and Gray, op. cit., p.7.

16. See for details www.iwmi.org under respective country profile and Nurit Kliot, Water resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London: Routledge, 1999.

17. Mounir B. Abboud, ‘Israel plans to divert waters of rivers in Lebanon’, Muslim (Islamabad), November 13, 1993.

18. See Gaan, op. cit.

19. Wallensteen and Swain, op cit., pp. 18-20.

20. See Michael T. Klare, ‘The New Geography of Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, May/June 2001, pp. 59-60

21. See Natasha Beschorner, ‘Water and Instability in the Middle East,’ Adelphi Paper 273, London: IISS, 1992.

22. Ibid., also see Tony Allan, ‘Avoiding War over Natural Resources’ at www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/

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