Articles

PAKISTAN’S MISSILE DEVELOPMENT:
PRIORITIES, CHALLENGES, MYTHS AND REALITY

Naeem Ahmad Salik *

Background

The issue of the proliferation of missiles – especially the ballistic missiles – has become the focus of a worldwide debate, as a consequence of the domestic debate raging in the US for the past few years with regard to the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield. With a Republican Administration in the saddle, the deployment of some form of a BMD was a foregone conclusion, and the only thing left to be seen was how far the campaign rhetoric would be translated into an operational policy. The appointment of Mr. Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defence left no doubt whatsoever about the direction, or the priorities of the Bush Administration. The appointment of the former head of the Space Command, General Myers, as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff has further reinforced the perception that the momentum for a BMD deployment would now be irreversible.

However, the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the most volatile regions of the world, and especially in the countries of concern, has stolen all the limelight from the hidden dangers lurking behind the ever-growing menace of increasingly more sophisticated cruise missiles. This unifocal obsession with the threat emanating from the emerging ballistic missile capabilities of the ‘rogue states’ may well have contributed towards turning a blind eye to the possibilities of a variety of low-tech means of destruction, which could be employed by forces inimical to the interests of the US and the rest of the world community resulting in the tragic events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington.

Current Status and Likely Future Directions

Pakistan’s missile development programme like its nuclear programme, has been driven entirely by its security concerns vis-à-vis an increasingly militaristic and bellicose India, which seeks, without any pretence, a regional and a global power status. Geographically Pakistan is located in a politically volatile region, where it shares a 2500 kilometres long, rugged and a porous border with Afghanistan, which has been in a perpetual state of turmoil since the Soviet invasion of that country in December 1979. Pakistan has hosted nearly 3 million Afghan refugees for more than two decades now, and suffering from the spill over of serious socio-political and internal security consequences of narco- trafficking, gun running, ethnic and sectarian violence.

Pakistan has been a reluctant entrant into the missile club, which is evident from the fact that in the early 1990s, Pakistan proposed a ‘Zero Missile Regime’ for South Asia, but unfortunately the proposal did not evoke a positive response from India.¹ Pakistan has, however, reiterated on a number of occasions that it has no intention of matching India missile for missile and has deliberately eschewed a nuclear/missile arms race with India, by embracing a policy based on ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrence’. This policy is evident in the fact that Pakistan has frozen its defence budget for the past two years, despite a 41% rise in India’s defence budget in the corresponding period. In 2001, India in fact became the second highest importer of arms in the world, only behind UAE, with a total import of arms and equipment worth $ 4.8 billion. After a modest beginning in late 1980s, with first test-firing of the short-range Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles, Pakistan slowly moved to consolidate and develop its indigenous technological base, since it has been unduly and repeatedly subjected to various kinds of sanctions and export control restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).²

Pakistan has come a long way in its missile development efforts and has acquired the capability to produce short and medium-range ballistic missiles of both liquid and solid-fuelled varieties. The first test firing of the liquid-fuelled ‘Ghauri’, with a range of 1500 kilometres, contributed significantly towards enhancing Pakistan’s deterrence and providing it with a capability to match India’s ‘Agni’ missile which the latter it had tested many years earlier in 1989. This was followed by the firing of an improved version of ‘Ghauri’ and the first test firing of the solid fuelled ‘Shaheen-1’ missile in April 1999, in response to India’s testing of its advanced version of ‘AGNI’ missile, designated as the Agni-II with a range of 2500 kilometres.³ Since then, as a result of a conscious decision and acting in a responsible and restrained manner, Pakistan has broken out of the ‘Action-Reaction Syndrome,’ which earlier characterised the relations between the two South Asian neighbours. Resultantly, Pakistan has refused to be provoked into responding in kind to frequent Indian tests conducted over the past two years.

Pakistan’s missile programme is aimed at achieving a credible, reliable and sustainable deterrence capability, which is not aimed at achieving a power projection capability beyond its immediate security arena. As a result, the goals and objectives of the programme are well defined and the testing programme is confined only to the requirements of technical validation of systems, rather than a blatant display of missile muscle. At the moment, Pakistan is simultaneously pursuing both liquid propellant and solid propellant systems and this is going to be the likely pattern in the near to mid-term. It is obvious that a variety of delivery systems always have its advantages. Moreover, it will be imprudent for any country, and more so for a country with limited resources, to abandon a programme, which has yielded successful results and thereby waste the funds already expended towards its Research and Development.

Pakistan’s policy was aptly summed up by Foreign Secretary Inam-ul-Haq during his address in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva on January 25, 2001, when he said that, ‘Instead of a triad of nuclear forces Pakistan seeks a triad of peace, security, and progress.’ He went on to state that Pakistan is prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements with India for nuclear and missile restraint. He elaborated this proposal as:

• One, not to deploy ballistic missiles;

• Two, not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems;

• Three, formalize the understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight-tests of missiles; and

• Four, to declare a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems, since these can destabilise ‘minimum credible deterrence.’⁴

Growing Diversity of Indian Missile Threat

While Pakistan is endeavouring to meet its bare minimum requirements consistent with its threat perception, India is moving full steam ahead to enter the big league, both by expanding as well as diversifying its capabilities. From Pakistan’s point of view the most serious development is that, despite the pervasive myth and tall claims about India’s homegrown missile capability, the ever-increasing technological participation by Russia in India’s missile development is now an open secret. Additionally, India is also seeking advanced technology from Israel, especially in the realm of Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology and Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs).

India has introduced ‘Cruise Missiles’ to the South Asian missile landscape in a big way. To begin with, it has acquired and is in the process of installing ‘Klub’ Cruise Missile System on its Russian supplied Kilo-Class submarines, as well as some of its surface vessels. This missile, with a range of 250-300 kilometres, a payload of 450 kilograms, and a solid-solid propulsion moves at supersonic speed for the last 20 kilometres of its flight and can be launched from the existing 533 mm launch tubes of the kilo-class submarines. This missile also has a land attack variant. Besides the Russian Navy, Indian Navy is the only other Navy to be equipped with Klub missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.⁵ Through the induction of these missiles, India has already attained a degree of assured second strike capability, at least for the interim period. It also affords India an extended reach and power projection capability in the Indian Ocean Region. However, an even more serious development has been the test firing from Chandipur Range at the coast of the Indian State of Orissa of the jointly developed ‘Brahmos’ missile, also code-named PJ-10, on June 12, 2001.⁶ As per reports appearing in the Indian print and electronic media, the propulsion system of the missile was provided by the Russians, while the Indians provided the ‘indigenously developed’ guidance system.⁷ This missile is also known to be supersonic. Whether it moves with the supersonic speed for whole or part of its flight is not known.⁸ The advertised range of this missile is 280 kilometres and its payload capability is reportedly in the range of half a ton. This is nothing but a ploy to make a mockery of the MTCR guidelines pertaining to range-payload combination and thus avoiding the MTCR related sanctions of which Pakistan has been the privileged ‘beneficiary’, while India’s indiscretions have always gone unnoticed.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the veracity of the claims with regard to the designed range of the ‘Brahmos’. However, since this missile is capable of being launched from ground launchers, naval vessels as well as aircraft, it has a stand off capability to deliver a nuclear payload at long ranges, thereby making the issue of its range irrelevant.⁹ Unfortunately, what to talk of imposing sanctions against either of the two countries for openly flouting MTCR guidelines, even a critical statement has not been issued by those who are committed to promote the cause of ridding the world of the scourge of missiles. Such selective application of principles can only work to the detriment of the international efforts towards halting the further proliferation of missiles.

According to Major General (Retired) Ashok Mehta, Brahmos is an improved version of Russia’s Yakhont Missile. According to him, ‘ the fire and forget Mach-2 missile gives India a stand-off capability and strategic reach¹⁰ which can be extended beyond the present range of 280 kilometres.’ He goes on to claim that, ‘ the Brahmos exposes Pakistan’s coastline and soft underbelly.’ The General also pointed out that, ‘…India is gradually moving away from a mere buyer-seller relationship to one of joint production, technology transfer and exchange with Russian defence industry.’¹¹ In addition to introducing a qualitatively new element in the South Asian security calculus, the missile also has overtones of a ‘secondary proliferation’ potential. Describing the successful test firing of the PJ-10 as a manifestation of the growing strategic partnership between India and Russia, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister in charge of defence industry, Mr Ilya Klebanov remarked that, ‘Russian Government was thrusting joint development, exploitation and marketing of new weapons in line with the Indo-Russian Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed last year.’¹² India’s Minister of External Affairs and Defence, Jaswant Singh, has described the development of the PJ-10 ‘as a landmark in technology partnership.’¹³

In the past two and a half years, India has conducted a total of 21 missile tests of various types as follows:-

• Agni-II: 2 Tests

• Prithvi-II & III: 4 Tests

• Nag (Anti Tank): 3 Tests

• Brahmos (PJ-10): 1 Test

• Akash (ATBM): 7 Tests

• Trishul (SAM): 6 Tests

However, other than the verbal confirmation, on a query by Pakistani High Commissioner to New Delhi, of the test firing of Agni-II in April 1999, no other test has been pre-notified, in violation of the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which India keeps referring back to every now and then. The President of India’s ruling BJP party, Jana Krishnamurthy claimed that India was in the process of developing Agni-III, with a striking range of 5000 kilometres, which will obviously herald India’s entry into the ICBM field.¹⁴ News appearing in the Indian press, quoting Defense News, a Washington-based publication, indicate that India is preparing to test fire its first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Surya-I or Agni-IV. The missile, with a range of 5000 kilometres, is expected to be launched in January 2002, while a follow-on version Surya-II, with a range of 12,000 kilometres will be tested in 2003. ¹⁵ It may also be pertinent to note here that after an earlier hiccup, India successfully tested its Geo-synchronous launch vehicle (GSLV) in April 2001. It is widely accepted that a GSLV is readily convertible into an ICBM with requisite modifications. After a failed attempt in April 2000, India has successfully test-fired ‘Dhanush’, the naval version of the Prithvi missile. This missile, with a range of 350 kilometres, is nuclear capable and is likely to be operationalised soon.¹⁶

The second area of concern for Pakistan is the expanding cooperation between India and Israel in the military-technological field. India has already inducted Israeli made Searcher-I UAV and is in the process of acquiring its advanced version Searcher-II. It is worth mentioning here that UAVs are also included in the MTCR restricted technologies. India is also keen to acquire the Arrow ABM technology from Israel. A trilateral agreement has already been signed between India, Russia and Israel, wherein advanced Israeli ‘Green Pine’ Radars, which form part of the Arrow system, would be mounted on Russian supplied IL-76 aircraft to put together an AWAC system for the IAF.¹⁷ Indians are also reportedly interested in purchasing the ‘Popeye’ air-to-surface stand off missiles from Israel.¹⁸ Reports suggest that Israel tested a long range Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) from its Dolphin submarines in the Indian Ocean, in June 2000. India and Israel are now planning to conduct joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean.¹⁹ Indians are keen that the Dolphin submarines should also participate so that they can gain valuable insight into the successful Israeli testing of strategic SLCMs.

Pakistan views the programmes for the development and deployment of Threatre Missile Defence (TMD) and National Missile Defence (NMD) systems as a sovereign decision of the US in response to the perceived threats to its security. Many analysts around the world and even within the US itself believe that this may not be the right solution to the problem at hand. However, Pakistan is mainly concerned about the adverse cascading effect of the deployment of TMD and NMD on the South Asian region. Pakistan feels that in case of a failure by the US to reach an agreement with China on the BMD issue, China is likely to respond to these deployments by expanding its missile capability, both qualitatively and quantitatively. This will provide India with a raison detre to expand its missile inventory in turn, thereby generating undesirable pressures for Pakistan to respond, much against its desire to avoid getting embroiled into a debilitating missile race, putting a further strain on Pakistan’s limited resources.

The second cause of concern for Pakistan is the possibility that, in view of the lingering differences between US-Russia on the one hand and US and China on the other, there is a real danger of unhinging the whole structure of the international non-proliferation regime with obvious negative impact on the international security and stability. Already these differences have brought to a virtual halt the progress on the ongoing treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva. In this regard we see the adoption of a ‘consultative’ approach to narrow down the differences with the critics of the scheme, as is evident from President Bush’s pronouncement of May 1, 2001, as a positive development. Pakistan can only hope that China’s legitimate security concerns would be addressed before a final decision on deployment is taken by the US.

Despite repeated denials by both China and Pakistan, the myth of technological collaboration between them in the field of ballistic missile development is a pervasive one. On numerous occasions both countries have declared that they have not engaged in any technology exchange/transfer in violation of the MTCR guidelines, but newspaper reports based on alleged intelligence leaks keep appearing with a monotonous regularity in the US. As a result, Pakistan has repeatedly been at the receiving end of MTCR-related sanctions. In November 2000, in its parting gift to the Indian government, the Clinton Administration decided to clamp MTCR Category One sanctions against Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence and Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). In a typical ‘wolf and lamb story’, Pakistan was punished for alleged ‘sins’ committed in the past while in the same breath, the alleged supplier China was exonerated. One of the sentences in the press statement announcing the sanctions told it all, saying that the Indians should be pleased that China has assured that it would not indulge in any more missile-related transactions with Pakistan. Another ironic aspect of these sanctions was the imposition of sanctions against the Ministry of Defence, which is not an entity involved in the production of missiles or any other strategic systems. A press release issued in Islamabad on November 22, 2000, stated that:

Again, at the beginning of September 2001, MTCR Category-2 sanctions were imposed against the National Development Complex. The allegations of selling missile technology to Pakistan was once again denied by China.²¹ Unfortunately, while Pakistan was being singled out for the clamping of MTCR sanctions against it, activities in clear contravention of MTCR guidelines happening next doors were totally ignored. Similarly, some of the other programmes, such as the ARROW programme were moving ahead unhindered and in fact getting active technological and financial assistance from the US. Realising the inherent injustice meted out to Pakistan, despite its policies of responsibility and restraint, these sanctions have been waived off by the US President.

From time to time concerns have been expressed regarding the possibility of Pakistani missile being transferred to some of the Muslim countries in the Middle East. Pakistan’s record in this regard has been impeccable and its leaders have reiterated on a number of occasions that Pakistan has no intention to export its missile and nuclear technology to any other country whatsoever. Some of these speculations may have been caused by the visits to some of the entities by some visiting dignitaries. But what many people either don’t know or tend to ignore is the fact that these entities also produce many conventional weapon systems like Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, SAMs and optical equipment, such as Laser Range Finders etc whose export is perfectly legitimate.

Pakistan has put in place a very elaborate Command and Control Mechanism for its strategic assets.²² The system is functioning efficiently for the last two years now and its various components have taken firm roots, as has been acknowledged by some respected analysts. As a result, various procedures have been institutionalised and positive controls over the strategic systems have been put in place. There is, therefore, no reason for any doubts or misperceptions in this regard, as the following chart shows:

In a keynote address at the Carnegie Endowment at Washington on June 18, 2001, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Mr. Abdul Sattar explained that:

Export Control Policy and Implementation Mechanisms

Pakistan has a very well-defined and clear-cut policy to control the export of sensitive materials and technologies and has a virtually leak-proof export control mechanism in place. In the aftermath of May 1998 nuclear tests, the existing legislation was augmented by the issuance of fresh Statutory Regulatory Orders. In addition to these SROs, internal procedures have been revamped and fresh regulations have been implemented to control the export-related activities of various strategic entities, even in the realm of export of conventional munitions. Another key factor which is generally ignored is the fact that entities involved in the production of weapons and equipment, both conventional and strategic, are all public enterprises and thus their activities are much easier to control. As this study goes to print, to further augment the export control mechanisms, a comprehensive ordinance is in the advanced stages of deliberation in the concerned government departments for its promulgation.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s missile programme, like its nuclear programme, has been surrounded with controversies, has faced all kinds of technology denials, been repeatedly subjected to sanctions and has weathered various kinds of politico-diplomatic pressures. However, it is a tribute to the resilience and technological prowess of Pakistani scientists and engineers that they have managed to develop an indigenous missile capability, thereby contributing to the enhancement of the credibility of the nation’s minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Pakistan’s missile programme is aimed at achieving modest objectives consistent with its policy of restraint and responsibility and is purely driven by its security concerns, without any pretensions for a great power status.

1. Address by Shahbaz Hussain, Director General Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported in The News, (Islamabad), February 24, 2001.

2. Rodney W. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence-A Conjecture’, Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January 2000, p.9.

3. Nasim Zehra, ‘Pakistan has no choice but to bolster its security’, Gulf News, April 16, 1999; The News, (Islamabad), April 16, 1999. Also see Jones, op.cit., pp.13-14.

4. Foreign Secretary, Inam-ul-Haq, Address at CD, Geneva, January 25, 2001.

5. Ashok K. Mehta, ‘India’s Defence on Cruise Mode’, The Pioneer, (New Delhi), July 4, 2001.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. N.K.Pant, ‘Isn’t it time to try new defence partners?’, The Tribune, (Chandigarh), June 19, 2001.

8. Douglas Barrie, ‘India, Russia Vow to Keep Missile Legal Under MTCR’, Defense News, Washington, D.C., August 27 to September 2, 2001.

9. Mehta, op. cit.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘India, Russia to market missile,’ The Hindu, (New Delhi), June 16, 2001.

13. ‘The Missile Message’, The Hindu, (New Delhi), June 14, 2001.

14. ‘India Developing Agni III : Jana’, The Sentinel, (Guwahati), June 2, 2001.

15. ‘India set for ICBM test-launch, says report’, The Hindu, (New Delhi), May 5, 2001.

16. ‘Dhanush missile test fired’, The Times of India, (New Delhi), September 22, 2001.

17. ‘ India-Israel military prove extensive’, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), June 16, 2001.

18. Amir Ghauri, ‘India seeking Israeli help to handle Pakistan’ The News, (Islamabad), August 5, 2001; Times of India, (New Delhi), April 19, 2001; The Hindu, (New Delhi), August 16, 2001.

19. Amir Mateen, ‘India may purchase $ 500 million Phalcon radar from Israel’, The News, (Islamabad), May 9, 2001.

20. Press Release No. 170/2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

21. Afzal Khan, ‘China exporting missiles to Pakistan, says US – Beijing denies selling weapons’, The Nation, (Islamabad), July 28, 2001.

22. ‘Pakistan announces establishment of Strategic Command Organisation’, (The Dawn), February 3, 2000; also see The News, (Islamabad), February 3, 2000.

23. Keynote Address by Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar at the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, June 18, 2001, Washington, D.C.

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