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BIOLOGICAL
TERRORISM: THE THREAT OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Bio-terrorism is by no measure a new threat to humans and international security. The use of disease germs as a weapon of war dates back centuries. Perhaps the first recorded incident occurred in the 14th century when an army besieging Kaffa,1 a seaport in the Crimean region of Russia, catapulted plague-infected cadavers over the city walls. American and British soldiers, for example, gave the native Red Indians, the aboriginal inhabitants of America, blankets infected with small pox and plague germs disguised as gifts.2 During World War II, Japan used plague and other bacteria against China in the 1930s and 1940s, while Britain used anthrax against German cattle to slow down the war economy of German forces.3 Similarly, the Germans attempted sabotage with pathogens against the livestock in the United States destined for Europe.4 The dramatic experiences of the epidemic of Spanish flu at the end of the First World War led to an increased concern regarding the use of biological weapons throughout the duration of the Second World War. However, during the Second World War, the success in creating viable biological weapons splintered and did not lead to the manufacturing of any battle-usable biological weapons, either by the Germans, Japanese or the Allied Forces.5 Some efforts were made even though the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical and biological weapons, and that most nations were party to that protocol. Moreover, much work on refining biological weapons continued in the post-war period, by the Soviet Union, United States of America and Britain, while most of the other countries gradually abandoned their offensive biological programmes.6 The military value of the weapons at that time had been questioned by state parties, which were intensively involved in developing a viable biological weapon. As a result of the fear that biological weapons could unleash epidemics, which would not be effectively contained, or remained confined, in a particular area or to a target population, a major international effort was launched to ban the use of biological and chemical weapons.
The convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or other wise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, weapons equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict … to divert to peaceful purposes all agents toxins, weapons, means of delivery … not to transfer, assist, encourage or induce states, international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or equipment specified in article I of the convention.8 The Biological Toxin Weapons Convention provided the basic guidelines to States, to enable each State to ensure the non-proliferation of biological weapons. However, the brevity of the Convention and the absence of a verification regime for the BTWC, has made it a case of being a Convention without teeth. The absence of verification mechanisms, in addition to various factors, such as advances in biotechnology and reports that various States have remained engaged in active biological weapons program over the years, have led to renewed efforts to strengthen the Convention, by negotiating an additional protocol. Concerns for the non-compliance with the provisions of the BTWC were sharpened by the 1980-88 Iran–Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War and fears that Iraq had an active biological weapons program. There were other developments that added to these fears. The Russian President Boris Yeltsin, also admitted in 1992, that Russia had an active biological weapons program, though suspicions on that score had been aroused a decade earlier, when there was an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979.9 In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult in Japan, released the nerve gas, sarin, in a Tokyo subway. Earlier, in 1990 and 1993, its cult members had tried to release botullin toxin (Bubonic plague) from a car near the Japanese parliament building and then later they tried to spray anthrax spores from the roof of their office building in Tokyo.10 Though the effect of the release of the agent was marginal, it led to renewed fears that biological weapons may be used in future not only by state actors but also by sub–state actors. In the 1980s, the US named the Soviet Union as being involved in the production of bio-weapons. By 1990s, the number of countries, which were thought to be involved in developing biological weapons program increased substantially. According to the US, the countries, which were actively pursuing such programs, were Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Egypt, South Africa, China, Russia, India, and Libya.11 The number of countries on the list of possible proliferates has increased significantly over time. Presently, about 17 countries are thought to be on the US list of countries in possession of biological weapons, including some European countries. Various statements and reports of the US officials have brought to the forefront that the US, which had claimed to have abandoned its bio-weapons program , in 1969, has actually remained involved in conducting biological tests. According to the US officials, these tests have been conducted to come up with possible defense against biological weapons. However, it is argued that these tests border very close to the manufacture of biological weapons and can be termed as a violation of the BTWC.12 In 1987, the US Department of Defense revealed that it still maintained an active chemical biological weapons program, at 127 sites in the US.13 After the 1979 anthrax breakout in Russia, and the 1992 Russian admission of having an active program, the US imported anthrax cultures from Russia. It was claimed that the advanced form of anthrax strains were imported and manufactured in the US for developing a defense against a potential biological weapons attack. However, this led to the concern as to how deeply the US itself was involved in making advanced biological weapons. It is still not clear whether the US itself has created biological weapons, in violation of the BTWC.14 The rejection by the US of the BTWC protocol in recent years, on grounds that it would compromise national interests for its biological weapons programs, as well as intellectual property rights of plasma and bio-tech industries, has enhanced fears over an active biological weapons program, hidden from the public eye.15 However, the US refusal to agree on the protocol text, has led to fears that no substantial breakthrough may be found in the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC, scheduled for November 19 to December 7, 2001, in Geneva. With advances in modern biotechnology, much that has been carried out in the name of developing defensive weapon systems, is of an offensive nature primarily. Potential threats remain inherent to, and are indistinguishable from, the preparations of offensive capabilities, such as creating genetically modified virus, pathogens and the developments in aerosol.16 In short, the end of the Cold War has proven that currently the threat of biological warfare has increased and is likely to further increase in the future. Biological Warfare: Threat Assessment Since the 1972 BTW Convention, the threat of biological weapons has developed in a two-pronged direction. One is based on the civilian application of biotechnology, such as making pathogen cultures, for defensive purposes.17 The second, more offensive one, is based on the active military programs carried out by the State actors. In the 21st century, the threat of weapons of mass destruction has gained a new currency, especially after the cases of anthrax fatalities in the US. In the post-September 11 context, it is necessary to understand what is the nature of the threat of biological warfare? What can be done to eliminate this threat? Biological warfare is the intentional use of microorganisms and toxins, generally of microbial, plant or animal origin, to produce disease and/or death in humans, livestock and crops. The low production cost of manufacturing bio-weapons makes it an attractive weapon of war, not only by state actors but also by sub-national actors like the terrorist organisations. Given the easy access to a wide range of disease-producing biological agents, their non-detection by routine security systems, and their easy transportation between locations, makes bio-weapons to be described as the weapons of the 21st century.18 With their property of invisibility and virtual weightlessness, their detection would be difficult, as verification procedures to oversee clandestine activities could easily be by-passed. Hence the dual use application of biotechnology makes the tasks of putting an end to the use of biotechnology for military purposes a difficult if not an impossible task, especially under the current faulty mechanisms, to check this proliferation. Consequently, national security decision-makers, defence professionals, and security personnel are and will increasingly be confronted by threats of biological warfare as it unfolds in the battlefields of the future in unconventional ways. Current concerns regarding the use of biological weapons spring from the advancements in biotechnology and the increased number of targets available to potential terrorist attacks, as well as over the accompanying lack of measures to combat threats of disease as epidemics, both in terms of detecting an outbreak and then decontaminating the areas and concerned personnel. The wide range of pathogens that are concurrently effective and spread from animals to humans, such as Leishmania infections, or for example the presence of Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron in the intestines of humans and mice, increase the threat manifold.19 Similarly, there also exist, ‘battle strains’ of anthrax, bubonic plague, smallpox, Ebola virus, and a ‘double agent’, microbe-based versions, which are basically modified or the engineered versions of the naturally accruing diseases.20 The biological agents listed for use in weaponization and war are many. This has increased manifold due to the process of globalization, urbanization, easy access to technology and information, dual usage of technology and the currently ineffective measures aimed at biological disarmament. Those commonly identified for prohibition by the monitoring authorities are the causative agents of the bacterial diseases such as anthrax and brucellosis; the rickettsial agent Coxiella botulinum, which causes Q-fever; viral diseases, Venezuela equine encephalitis (VEE), and several toxins such as Staphylococcal enterotoxin, Clostridium botulinum and more advanced versions of botulinum toxin.21 The current breakthroughs in genetic engineering have modified hitherto infective agents into bio-weapons. Biological warfare programs consist of several integrated processes and components. The key components are usually defined as research, development, and production of the agent, delivery system, testing and modifications, storage, managing accidental attacks and stockpiling. While the threat of bio-weapons has increased with time, however, in order to use biological agents as weapons of war, either by terrorists or by state actors, a would-be proliferatator would need to fulfill and require the understanding of certain principles. It would be necessary for the actor to have sufficient knowledge and skills to identify the biochemical agents, which are capable of causing widespread damage, and of being used for a biological warfare program. Generically speaking, the following groups, or classes of microorganisms, are seen as agents which can cause epidemics and are capable of being used as weapons of mass destruction. Bacteria Bacteria are single-cell organisms that cause diseases such as anthrax, plague and tularemia.22 The degree of their lethality, infectivity and resistance to antibiotics determines the precise usage of that bacterium for a warfare program. However, for a bacterium to have an epidemic effect, it is necessary that these not only survive natural climatic conditions but also be heat resistant and of a specific quantity and size.23 Biological weapons are highly vulnerable to atmospheric conditions such as heat, moisture and meteorological conditions. These factors usually determine the cycle of the effectiveness of a weapon. For any agent, to overcome its susceptibility to meteorological conditions, the disseminated agent must have a reliable delivery system. For example, for agents like the inhalation anthrax, that affects the respiratory system, its delivery mechanism must be capable of producing, or dispersing, 1 to 10 microns particles of the agent, for it to serve as an effective biological weapon.24 Anthrax is often cited as the most preferred agent for warfare purposes, the reason being that it can survive longer as spores even in warm environments and can be lethal.25 As a spore-forming bacteria, anthrax germs can hide or remain dormant in the soil for decades. This makes it an ideal substance for freeze–drying as fine powder. Anthrax spores, once ensconced in the lungs, release their toxins over a period of time and destroy the immunological responses of the body, thereby reducing the body’s ability to protect itself.26 A number of systems have been tested to deliver such agents. These include weapon systems such as low-flying projectiles, tanks, ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, bomb sub munitions, aerial spray, artillery shells, cluster bombs, cruise missile warheads, and any such means which can ensure a wide-scale dispersion and exposure of the biological agents. However, for a biological weapon it is not necessary that the delivery agent be a conventional military equipment. It can easily be produced and dispersed from high buildings, or moving vehicles. The particular choice of a delivery mechanism, however, depends upon the quantity, the biological agents, which are being used, and the target area, and whether the agent would be able to catch the upwind or the downwind draft, for wide-scale dispersal. For example, a single aircraft, leaving a trail of 100-kg anthrax in an upwind direction, say over Washington, could result in 1 to 3 million deaths. While, in comparison, if one hydrogen bomb were dropped, it would cause between 0.5 to 1.9 million deaths.27 The simple microbe is thus more devastating than the simple atom of a hydrogen bomb. Virus Virus is the second preferred culture for use as bio weapons. These are 100 times smaller than bacteria and ordinarily occur in large numbers in nature and can infect crops, animals and humans. The disease-producing viruses include most significantly Ebola, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. The virus can be genetically modified, to enhance its effectiveness. The Ebola virus, for example, kills 90 percent of its victims in little more than a week, and for Ebola there is no available cure, or treatment, as the manner in which it spreads is not even clear yet. Recent outbreaks of this virus in Zaire, prompted the concerned authorities to quarantine off sections of the country, till the disease had run its course.28 To date, no government is adequately prepared to handle a widespread biological weapons attack and in most cases the city area would have to be quarantined off, to stop the spread of the epidemic to other parts of the country. Rickettsial agent This agent, similar to bacteria in structure and form, is an another biological agent that can cause serious epidemics, if used as a biological weapon. It causes diseases such as Q-fever, Typhus and Rocky Mountain spotted fever. Fungi Fungi occur naturally in nature, are usually effective against plants and have been used to make defoliants and crop destroyers. If large quantities are sprayed it can be harmful to humans as well. However, these are usually seen as agents which are used to attack and destroy the agricultural base of the target country. Toxins Toxins are non-living products of micro-organisms (e.g Botulinum toxin and Staphylococcal entertoxin B).29 Since toxins can also be produced due to chemical processes, they affect only those who are exposed to them and unlike biological weapons are not contagious, nor act as living warfare elements. They require more time than biological weapons to show their effectiveness. Since they are usually derivatives of microorganisms, they are termed as by-products of biological substances and are covered by the BTWC Convention. Article I of the BTWC prohibits the misuse of microbiological, or toxin agents, ‘whatever their method of production’. At each Review Conference, a Final Declaration is agreed to by State parties, by consensus. This enables State parties to reaffirm and ensure that all such advances are included in the basic prohibition. Thus, in successive Review Conferences, especially at the Fourth Review Conference held in 1996, the Final Declaration included that:
Four Review Conferences have been held in 1980, 1986, 1991, 1996 and the Fifth one is scheduled for 19 November to 7 December, 2001. The Fourth Review Conference, in Article IV stressed that:
Thus re-inforcing what Article I states:
These statements, as well as the revisions made in the Final Declaration, suggest that there are clear departures from the language used in the original convention, which, though it bans the use of biological weapons, does not address the issue in clear and explicit terms. Therefore, the text of the Final Declaration of the last Review Conference suggests that by the start of the nineties, there is a growing understanding by the States that biological weapons pose the greatest threat. As a result of which, measures are now being incorporated by State parties to address the new emergent threats arising out of scientific advances in biotechnology, and their potential for dual use. Biotechnology and genetic engineering has gained immense momentum during the 1980s and 1990s. The possibilities of the misuse of the various advances in genetic engineering remain enormous challenges, as these can be directed towards the manufacture of weapons aimed at genocide on a large scale.33 The fears are based on the fact that advances in knowledge about the human genome, can then be used for the manufacture of weapons, based on genetic engineering, and that a particular pathogen or biological weapon could actually be manufactured that would only be effective against a specific population, which is targeted through its particular genetic coding. Hence a weapon which was thought of as science fiction is now not only possible but also likely to be developed. Studies indicate that the mapping of the human genome and that of several organisms, under the auspices of the Human Genome Organization (HUGO), an international organization, which coordinates and maintains the international database of all developments regarding the human gene, has met with considerable success.34 The project, initiated by the US in early 1980s with an allocation of 3 billion dollars, initially aimed at mapping the human gene in fifteen years. The project conceived in 1985, has been a tremendous source of human endeavor but at the same time, the success achieved by it and the knowledge it has brought to the surface regarding genetic engineering has also led to the possibility that the knowledge, now available to the scientific community, can henceforth lead to the manufacture of ‘genetic’ weapons.35 Such weapons could in theory wipe out a certain race, or class of organisms from the planet. The deeper understanding of the human genome, and of pathogenesis arising out of recent scientific developments, could allow the manufacture of targeted biological weapons of increased lethality. Recent advances in the field of biotechnology, particularly in genetic engineering, have raised public concerns, including among the community of scientists themselves, over the possible misuse of the breakthroughs in various scientific endeavors. The following illustrations provide the reasons. Weapons could be manufactured that, through the process of the synthesis of active protein molecules, can be so codified in their functions as to target specific population groups. There are also techniques by which protein molecules can be so manipulated that they can alter the normal functioning of the human body and introduce self-designed degenerative processes in otherwise healthy human beings. The same result can be obtained through genetically engineered foreign DNA (viruses, bacteria, etc), when introduced in a body, at a regulated pace. There are grave concerns over techniques known as heterogeneous gene expression, that can produce proteins in another organism, other than the one in which they are produced naturally, in order to aid or disrupt natural bodily functions.36 These techniques are already in use to produce organic medicines, as well as pharmaceutical products. Another technique, heterologous gene expression, recreates hormones or genes artificially in other organisms through the use of ‘recombinant’ growth of human proteins. In recent times, developments in this technique have been revolutionary. This technique has shown remarkable results in the improved healing of wounds, bone-resorption, bone marrow formation (resulting from radiation damage) and so forth.37 However, these same techniques could be used for military purposes, with lethal applications. Heterologous gene expression can lead to the manufacture of bio-weapons, through techniques such as, genetic engineering of whole organism (cloning), protein engineering,38 DNA finger printing and human monoclonal antibodies,39 which is the capacity to make more virulent micro organisms for genetically modified bio-weapons.40 For instance, genetically engineered organisms can be made to carry foreign DNA into the target population, at an accelerated pace, by the use of a more infectious virulent strains in other organisms, such as humans, plants and animals. Currently, it is recognised that bio-engineering techniques give immense power to its exploiter. If scientists today can resurrect dormant viruses, or through the use of transgenic expression techniques, create new and more resistant strains against the naturally-occurring diseases, such knowledge in the hands of the unscrupulous could lead to unforeseen catastrophes. From a bio-weapons point of view these techniques can lead to the manufacture of infectious virulent strains, resistant to the available antibiotics and immune systems, leading to the possibility of the spread of drug-resistant diseases.41 Additionally, a biological aggressor can also use its derivative toxins to cripple the immune system within the target population, resulting in a variety of debilities and death.42 Thus, the potential of using genomic sequencing for lethal bio-weapons is immense. The advancements made in functional genomic in terms of cellular functioning and DNA encoding, increase the prospects of manufacturing advanced bio-weapons. Functional genomic alongside strides being made in structural genomic will in future allow the manipulation of human objectives. For example, the greater knowledge today of neuro-science carries also the potential for the manipulation of, for example, the nerve cells of receptor systems by the manipulator, to alter the functions arising out of the chemical transmitter substances released by nerve cells.43 The increased capacity to apply genomic techniques in neurobiology, cloning and gene expression has created new kind of bio-threats. With the aid of these techniques, scientists can manipulate gene expression in vivo.44 Through genetically engineered vectors that modify infectious organisms, combined with an increased understanding of the human immune system functions and disease mechanisms, it is possible to ‘attack’ the human body simultaneously by several diseases. Other techniques can modify the pattern of known diseases in a way that these become capable of adversely affecting multiple functions of the body simultaneously.45 Such advancements have increased the potential to manufacture more advanced bio-weapons. The threat of biological terrorism has not receded but increased with time.46 These are few of the techniques, which are not the only applications of biotechnology but are also equally effective for the development of bio-weapons. The list continues to expand. With each scientific discovery in the field of genetic engineering and biotechnology, it is possible to imagine new biological weapons with particularly the creation of ‘ethnic weapons’, one that would target a certain ethnic group through genetic coding embedded in such weapons.47 To date, the biggest problems of bio-weapons relate to their dispersion and in maintaining the effectiveness of its substance. Theoretically, while some military grade agents can produce large number of fatalities or incapacitating, large numbers. The potential for malfunctioning and disseminating the most lethal and complex biological weapons in sufficient quantities is still complex. Conclusion Any would-be terrorist organisation or individual would require the knowledge of the following aspects of biological weapons.
The most significant, basic factor of concern is the availability of cultures for further developing of the micro-bioorganisms. However, manufacturing a biological weapon is relatively easy because of the dual usage of biotechnology and the easily accessible knowledge regarding the recent developments in bio-technology. However, factors relating to the precise conditions for producing microorganisms; the refinement of the product through its various process, and understanding the factors that cause microorganisms to decay, as well as determining the decay rate are all fairly difficult tasks, as they require an in-depth knowledge of the atmosphere, geographical locations and the various demographic characteristics of the target population. Nevertheless, while factors outlined above may become hindrances for terrorists, it can be relatively easier for states to overcome them. Besides, the cost-effectiveness of manufacturing a biological weapon far outweigh the costs incurred in acquiring nuclear or chemical weapons. According to some estimates,49 where it would require approximately one dollar to manufacture bio–weapons, to affect a target area of per square kilometer of impact, in comparison it would be $ 800 for nuclear weapons and $ 600 for chemical weapons. Similarly, the amounts required for carrying large-scale attacks would require around 100 to 700 kg of toxins, for carrying out attack say on an area equal to that of Washington.50 The difficulty in the use of biological weapons usually rests with maintaining effective stockpiles of particular agents, requiring storage in particular environments, to ensure its effectiveness, as well as in producing sufficient quantities of deliverable bio-chemical weapons. The effectiveness of such weapons further depends on its own particular hazard assessments, such as how well prepared are the preventive measures in respect of the target population, as well preparatory defensive measures prior to an attack? Furthermore, the biological agents can be detected only after the outbreak of the intended disease, hence preventive measures would perforce focus on damage mitigation as well. All these factors, plus other breakthroughs in bio-sciences, make the threat of biological weapons a more imminent one in the future, though at present the race between the defensive and offensive nature of bio-technology is being overshadowed by the breakthroughs in defensive measures, the possibilities of the offensive capabilities of these weapons cannot be underscored enough. Decades of success in biotechnology can enable a committed team of scientists to spread diseases by customized weapons within the target enemy population. With slight modifications, the pathogens could be modified to hit enemy defenses, and at the same time, with engineered antidotes, protect the friendly troops in their vicinity.51 At the core of biotechnology lies data collection, culture creation and bio-technical experimentation skills, in developing and applying new knowledge. Hence, the biggest challenge to the existing BTWC and the ongoing protocol negotiations comes from States involved in such research. Similarly, sometimes the overbearing nature of military necessity can also be a contributing factor for the introduction of biological weapons to target zones, which due to factors such as globalization, interdependence and the lack of relevance of national borders for biological weapons are seen as weapons that could give the user an added edge. However, the use of bio-weapons, under such conditions would result in a much more horizontal damage. Therefore, the worldwide concern to stop the proliferation of the biological weapons is far more acute than that over nuclear weapons. It is now considered necessary that the BTWC, which lacks the verification mechanisms, be supplemented and strengthened by the addition and acceptance of an additional protocol to the Convention. Like earlier arms limitation and disarmament treaties, the BTWC of 1972 requires periodic reviews of its provisions, with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions were being realized. Hence in 1980, the First Review Conference held at Geneva from 3-21 March, agreed on the viability of the 1972 Convention and included in its Final Declaration, a strong support for the Convention, and the commitment of the State parties to implement the provisions of the Convention.52 However, concerns remained regarding the effectiveness of the verification and compliance procedures, which were reflected in the Final Declaration as the right of State parties to use international procedures, to ensure effective and adequate implementation of the Convention. This and the other questions concerning compliance to the Convention continued to be raised in the successive years. Consequently, advances in biotechnology, given the confrontationist international environment, increased further apprehensions about the possible misuse of new technologies and developments. Over the course of the four Review Conferences, held respectively in, 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996, not only were commitments reaffirmed of the earlier Conferences, but State signatories aimed to tackle the emerging problems of the advancements made in the field of biotechnology, and dealt with the problems of definitions, scope, compliance factors and ways to strengthen the Convention. As a result, the Second and Third Review Conferences, held in 1986 and 1991 respectively, instituted procedures, which aimed to build confidence among State parties of the BTWC. At the Third Review Conference in 1991, State parties approved a study of possible verification procedures by scientific experts, resulting in the establishment of the group of governmental experts who have met regularly since then to deliberate on this aspect. This is commonly referred as the VEREX process.53 The Study carried out by the group resulted in the 1994 Special Conference and the formation of the ad hoc group with its mandate to negotiate a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC.54 Hence, since 1995, an ad hoc group, with the specific mandate to negotiate a protocol, in order to strengthen the Convention, was established and its work has moved through three stages.55 First, from 1995-1997, the work of the group reflected the work built on the VEREX negotiations, resulting in a final report to identify the elements of the protocol. The second stage, starting from July to August 1997 witnessed the transition of the elements into a rolling text of the draft Protocol and the initiation of negotiations; the inclusion of detailed provisions in the Protocol and an intensification of the work, as called by the State parties in the Fourth Review Conference. In the period from July 1997 to January 1999, the ad hoc group had held seventeen weeks of negotiations and further developed the preliminary elements of the Draft Protocol in a coherent framework. January 1999 saw the third phase of the negotiations - the move to the final framework of the Protocol and the detailed negotiations on the key elements. The ad hoc group, which met approximately for sixteen weeks in 1999, was to negotiate the final text of the Protocol latest by the Fifth Review Conference, (November 19 to December 7, 2001), in Geneva. However, where the ad hoc group had gained significant success in bringing about a consensus by State parties in its 24th session opened from March 23 till July 19, 2001, on the rolling draft of the Protocol, the US withdrawal from the negotiations gave the efforts of the adhoc group a heavy blow. The US withdrawal blocked the negotiating process by deferring the solution to the Sixth Review Conference. Given the current situation in which anthrax attacks have actually taken place and there is an increased reason to fear threats of bio terrorism in the future, it is necessary that a solution-oriented approach be used in the upcoming Fifth Review Conference. Without an internationally-supported protocol, it is impossible to address international concerns and fears regarding the suspect capabilities of the signatory States parties to the Convention. Similarly, without effective verifications and compliance mechanisms, mandatory declarations, on-site inspections, routine and challenged, the potential of confidence-building measures between States cannot be established on a firm footing. Partial answers to these questions cannot address related issues properly. To ensure that the threat of bio-terrorism is curtailed effectively, the existence of a strengthened BTWC protocol is imperative. Its re-affirmation, of the goals and norms arrived at in earlier conferences, will help consolidate international efforts thus far. The 21st Century can well turn out to be the Century in which bio-sciences could liberate mankind from a host of diseases and enable it to remap its existence for the better. Or be a century that holds the world hostage to the threats of biological terrorism. References
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