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ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO ACCORDS Dr. Iffat Malik * The Middle East peace process appears for the moment to have ground to a complete halt. Since September 2000 a second intifada has been underway in the Occupied Territories; clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces take place on a daily basis, and the death toll continues to rise. Talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, if they take place at all, are about how to get the two sides back to the negotiating table to discuss a settlement. The recent Egyptian-Jordanian proposal, for example, aims just to stop the violence and get the two sides talking: it does not even mention a final settlement. The reasons for the current failure of the peace process are both long-standing and complex. An analysis of the entire process – which could be said to date back to the 1979 Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt – would be very lengthy. This paper proposes to focus on the main agreement forming the foundation of the peace process, the 1993 Oslo Accords. These were hammered out secretly in Oslo between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators before a formal agreement was signed in Washington by the parties involved. The paper will begin by looking at the main terms of the agreement. It will then assess whether, and if so how, it was flawed and why the parties involved still signed it. Finally, it will analyse the performance of the Accords: did they achieve what they set out to do? This assessment of the Oslo Accords is important because – if renewed peace talks get underway in the Middle East – knowing where mistakes were made in these in the past could ensure they are not repeated. Main Points of the Oslo Accords On September 9, 1993, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which he recognised the state of Israel. The letter is highly significant, and worth quoting:
In his reply to the letter, Yitzhak Rabin wrote that the Israeli Government had decided to recognise the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to start negotiations with them, within the Middle East peace process. This mutual recognition paved the way for the formal signing of the Oslo Accords. On September 13, 1993, Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of the PLO and Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres signed the ‘Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule’ (DOP) in Washington. That agreement formalised what negotiators from the two sides had agreed to in secret talks in Oslo. Hence, the DOP’s more common name, the Oslo Accords. These set out arrangements for limited self-rule for the Palestinians, as a prelude to a final status agreement on their future. The main terms of the Oslo Accords were as follows:
Assessment of Main Points of the Oslo Accords Whenever an agreement fails to achieve what it set out to do, there are two main possible reasons for that failure. One, flaws in the deal itself and two, flaws in implementation of the deal. Consider the first with respect to the Oslo Accords: were there inherent flaws in the DOP? The answer has to be yes, many. Note that in assessing the Oslo Accords, the mutual recognition statements that formed its prelude have to be considered as well. Starting with those, it will be obvious that the PLO was making far greater compromises on its principles than the Israeli government. The latter merely accepted the PLO as the spokesmen of the Palestinian people and agreed to talk to them. The PLO, by contrast, gave up its historic refusal to recognise the existence of Israel and the right to wage an armed struggle to liberate Palestinian land. Furthermore, by committing not to use ‘terrorism’, it implicitly accepted the long-held Israeli accusation that it was a terrorist organisation, rather than a group engaged in a legitimate freedom struggle. The commitment to ensure compliance by all PLO and other personnel will be considered below. Turning to the Oslo Accords themselves, the biggest flaw in these was that they left so many points of contention to the permanent status negotiations that were to follow. Indeed, they left all the important issues unresolved. These included the status of Jerusalem, the future of Palestinian refugees, of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and, very importantly, the future borders of a Palestinian state. The differences between the Palestinians and Israelis on these issues were almost poles apart. Taking the question of Jerusalem, for example, the Palestinians were quite clear that (East) Jerusalem would be the capital of a Palestinian state. But, around the very time when the DOP was being signed, Prime Minister Rabin made it clear that Jerusalem would remain united and under Israeli control; it would never be ceded to the Palestinians. The gulf between Israeli and Palestinian positions on the other issues was equally great. The assumption implicit in the Oslo Accords was that once Israel and the Palestinians stopped fighting and started cooperating, an atmosphere would evolve that would be conducive to resolution of the major outstanding issues between them. In other words, that once a harmonious working relationship developed, it would become that much easier to settle disputes over Jerusalem, borders, etc. This assumption was too optimistic. It underestimated both the depth of hostility between Israelis and Palestinians, and the extent of difference between them on various issues. As such, the assumption that a permanent status agreement could be concluded within five years, was far too ambitious. Several clauses in the DOP mentioned UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These call (among other things) for the complete vacation of Israel from all the land it occupied after 1967 (including East Jerusalem), and for the right of return of Palestinian refugees. However, no guarantee was made by Israel in the Accords that it would implement these resolutions. The DOP refers to a permanent settlement ‘based on UN Resolutions’ – but this could be interpreted as partial implementation, not total. The logical conclusion from this is that there was no guarantee at all for the Palestinians about the size of state they would eventually get, and whether their refugees would be allowed to return to their homes. By failing to specify that UN Resolutions on Palestine must be implemented in their entirety, the Oslo Accords effectively rendered them void. The second big flaw in the Oslo Accords was that they were very one-sided. Self-rule and autonomous government for the Palestinians sounds like a considerable achievement. But if one analyses what they actually got, it becomes clear their gains were far more modest. Under the terms of the DOP, the Palestinians got very limited self-rule. It was limited both in geographical scope – not even covering all of Gaza and the West Bank – and in nature. The main indicator of autonomy is control of one’s borders and security. But the Oslo Accords only allowed for parts of the West Bank and Gaza to be patrolled by Palestinian police. Israeli troops would remain deployed in the self-rule areas, albeit outside population centres. Furthermore, the Palestinians would have no authority over the Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza: Israeli forces would control those areas. The clause in the DOP calling for the establishment of a Palestinian police force has to be assessed in conjunction with the PLO commitment to renounce terrorism and violence and ‘ensure their compliance’. As will be seen, militant Islamist groups (notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad) had gained a following among ordinary Palestinians during the first intifada. They presented a real security threat to Israel. Under the Oslo Accords, responsibility for dealing with the Hamas and Islamic Jihad ‘menace’ was placed on the Palestinian police. The PLO, in other words, (assuming it won the Council elections) would eradicate the militant Islamic threat instead of and for Israel. It would be carrying out the same role as the South Lebanese Army (SLA) in Israel’s self-styled ‘security zone’ in South Lebanon. Performing this role would undoubtedly exacerbate differences among the Palestinians and weaken their ability to counter Israel. From the Israeli perspective, the Oslo Accords were, therefore, a very good deal. They were getting the promise of peace, and the problem of having to deal with militant Islam taken off their hands, in return for handing minimal powers over to the Palestinians. From the Palestinian perspective, it was a correspondingly bad deal. They sacrificed long-held principles with regard to not recognising Israel, they gave up the right to armed struggle, and they signed an agreement that would lead to greater differences and in-fighting between them. In return, as borne out by subsequent events, they got very limited self-rule and no guarantees about greater power or territory in any permanent settlement. Reasons for Signing If the Oslo Accords were so flawed – especially from the Palestinian perspective - why did the PLO sign? There were a number of reasons. One, the option of military struggle was fast running out for the PLO. The Israelis had managed to drive the PLO out of their bases in South Lebanon, and later from Tunis too. The PLO itself was riven by factional in-fighting, which further eroded its ability to fight against Israel. Yasser Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War had angered other Arab countries, and caused them to cut off aid to the organisation. There was also diminished interest in the Palestinian problem in the Arab world. Following the Camp David Accord of 1979, when Egypt became the only Arab country to recognise and sign a peace deal with Israel, the option of united Arab military action against Israel disappeared. By the late 1980s financial and other aid for the Palestinians from external sources like Arab countries, had also eroded. Thus the PLO knew it was essentially alone in its struggle against Israel. The third, and most important reason, was that the long-held dominance of the PLO among the Palestinian people was being challenged by a new Palestinian force – militant Islamists. These rose to prominence during the intifada. Frustrated with years of Israeli occupation and oppression, and failing to see any achievements from the PLO, more and more young Palestinians especially were switching support to radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. As their name suggests, these groups called for armed struggle in the name of Islam – jihad – against Israel. These were the challenges and problems besetting Yasser Arafat and the PLO in the early 1990s. A peace deal would have resolved many of these, and given positive dividends to the Palestinian leader. It would – indeed did – give him international credibility, putting him on a par with leading world statesmen. After almost thirty years of leading the PLO, it represented perhaps his last chance to ‘rule’ a Palestinian state. If, through a peace deal, Arafat was able to deliver real benefits to the people – especially in terms of economic prosperity – that would cause them to switch support from the Islamists back to the PLO. [The Oslo Accords were accompanied by promises of financial assistance for development of the West Bank and Gaza from many international donors, e.g. Japan, the US.] These were some of the incentives that drove Yasser Arafat to agree to the Oslo Accords. On the Israeli side, the main reason was the intifada. The Israeli government could see that this could escalate out of its control. They realised that compared to the aggressive and daring cadres of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the PLO was actually quite moderate. Hence their willingness to make a deal. Their gamble paid off. As a result of the Oslo Accords, the intifada died down and the problem of capturing and imprisoning militant Islamists was shifted onto the PLO. Flaws in Implementation The points agreed to in the Oslo Accords were to be elaborated in further agreements between Israel and the Palestinians; these would outline in detail how they were to be implemented. A number of agreements were signed subsequent to the DOP, giving dates for further Israeli transfer of territory to the Palestinians, for example. With regard to implementation of the Oslo Accords (and consequent agreements), a number of problems are easily identifiable. One, the inability – mostly on the Israeli side – to stick to the timetables laid down in the various agreements. Obviously, delays in implementing the various stages of the Accord, resulted in lengthening the whole five-year interim government period stipulated in the DOP. Secondly, following the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a right-wing Likud government was elected to power headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. He refused to accept the legitimacy of the Oslo Accord, or that it was binding on his government, and effectively stopped what implementation had been started by the previous Labour government. Permanent status negotiations failed to reach agreement on any of the points of difference between the Israelis and Palestinians. Former President Bill Clinton of the United States made strenuous efforts to mediate between the two sides, hosting a summit at Camp David in the final months of his Presidency. But these failed to reach a settlement. The gulf that had divided the two sides on issues like the sovereignty of East Jerusalem, remained as wide eight years after the Oslo Accords were signed. There had been two co-signatories to the Oslo Accords: the United States and Russia. But in subsequent talks, mediation was almost solely conducted by the United States. The Clinton administration did not prove a true honest broker, siding sometimes quite openly, with the Israelis. The US in particular failed to endorse Palestinian demands for full implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine. Finally, the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by Yasser Arafat and dominated by his Fatah faction, did not prove an able administrator in the territories where control was handed over to the PA. Problems of corruption, nepotism and cronyism were endemic, and political opposition was suppressed. This added to popular Palestinian anger and frustration, already present because of the failure to reach a permanent settlement that satisfied their demands with regard to statehood, Jerusalem, etc. Outcome of the Oslo Accords The Oslo Accords were designed to pave the way for a permanent settlement of the Israel-Palestine problem. According to the timetable laid down, by May 4, 1999, the Palestinians should have had their independent state. This has not happened. Nothing has been agreed, let alone implemented, with regard to a final status agreement: disputes over Jerusalem, the return of Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements, borders, etc., remain as intractable as ever. Furthermore, what concrete achievements the Oslo Accords did have, now also look like being undone. At the time of writing (May 2001) the Palestinian Authority in charge of the self-rule areas of the West Bank and Gaza, was seeing its ability to rule considerable restricted. Since the start of the second intifada, and particularly since the election of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the Palestinian territories have been blockaded, causing great economic and physical hardship. Tax revenues have been withheld from the PA. In April 2001, supposedly to stop Hamas mortar attacks on Israelis, Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip – the first time they had done so since handing over control of those regions to the PA in 1994. They withdrew within 24 hours, but made further brief incursions. All this indicates that the Israeli government is keen to take back some of the powers and authority handed over to the Palestinians. In summary, not only have the Oslo Accords failed to lead to a permanent settlement and peace in the Middle East, but the limited self-rule that was granted to the Palestinians in them also looks like being eroded. Conclusion At the time of signing the Oslo Accords, there was a lot of optimism that after decades of conflict, genuine peace in the Middle East might be within reach. Sadly, that has not proven to be the case. The reasons are two-fold: a flawed deal and flawed implementation. Both of these came about because of the great imbalance between the two parties involved. Israel is a strong state, and has had the backing of the United States. The Palestinians, by contrast, are a diaspora suffering from internal divisions. They had little more than verbal support from the Arab world and other countries. The Palestinians were never able to overcome this initial disadvantage – they could not force better terms for themselves in the written agreement, and they could not force Israeli compliance with that agreement. The peace process in the Middle East will now have to begin anew, once the violence stops. The mistakes made in the last one are clear but, in view of the continuing imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, and the election of a so far either ‘hands off’ or ‘pro-Israel’ George W. Bush to the US Presidency, it is difficult to see how they will not be repeated next time round. References
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