FMCT: An Unfinished Mission

Saira Abbasi *

Overview
The dawn of the 21stcentury witnessed the renewal of global efforts at disarmament  and  nuclear  non-proliferation.  Many  arms  control  initiatives  have  been  formulated  to  secure the world from the catastrophic consequences of weapons of mass destruction.

One of the major objectives of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is to  halt the production and use of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The negotiations for  a separate treaty were needed that would primarily deal with the production of fissile  material for weapons.  The notion of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is perceived  as  an  imperative  step  in  the  complex  political  and  technical  process  of  nuclear  disarmament.


The history of FMCT dates back to 1978, when the United Nations General Assembly  approved  the  first  of  it’s  many  resolutions  aiming  at  verifiable  control  of  fissionable  material..  In  December  1993,  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  adopted  by  consensus a resolution (48/75L) recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory,  multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for  nuclear  weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive  devices.1However,  the  resolution,  describing the treaty     as “a significant contribution to nuclear non proliferation”, failed to  address the existing stocks of fissile materials.


In order to pursue UNGA resolution 48/75L, the Conference on Disarmament (CD)  decided  in  1994  on  the  establishment  of  an  ad  hoc  committee  to  negotiate  a  fissile  material treaty. The committee was unable to reach a consensus on the scope of the  treaty; therefore, CD appointed Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada as a special  co-coordinator to seek the views of members on the most appropriate arrangements for  negotiating an FMCT.


After intensive consultations, both bilaterally and with groups, Ambassador Shannon  was  unable  to  find  complete  consensus  on  the  mandate  for  negotiations.  The  report  submitted  by  Ambassador  Shannon  to  the  CD  proposed  an  ad  hoc  committee  to  negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or any other  nuclear devices that could be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable.  The mandate does not prevent any delegation from raising issues for consideration in  the ad hoc committee.


Ambassador Shannon in his report presented to CD said:


“During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about  a  variety  of  issues  relating  to  fissile  material,  including  the  appropriate  scope  of  the  convention.  Some  delegations  expressed  the  view  that  this  mandate  would  permit  consideration in the committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other

 
delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of  future but of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not  only  relate  to  the  production  of  fissile  material  but  also  to  other  issues,  such  as  the  management of such material.


“Mr  President,  it  has  been  agreed  by  delegations  that  the  mandate  for  the  establishment of the ad hoc committee does not preclude any delegation from raising  for consideration in the ad hoc committee any of the above-noted issues.”2


Despite  the  support  given  by  the  1995  NPT review and extension conference, the  Shannon mandate did not lead to actual negotiations in the CD. Nor did the strong FMCT  support of the 2000 review conference of the NPT generate any negotiating momentum.


The CD stalemate


After the end of CTBT negotiations in 1996, the proposal of an ad hoc committee on  the  FMCT  came  under  discussion.  But  the  CD  was  not  able  to  make  progress  in  the  years  after  1996.  The  underlying  reason  was  a  group  of  non-aligned  States,  led  by  India,  which  was  adamant  that  there  should  be  talks  on  the  phased  elimination  of  nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. The group blocked discussions of any  other nuclear issues upon the rejection of their demands. The nuclear weapon States  were  reluctant  to  concur  in  any  meaningful  negotiations  on  comprehensive  nuclear  disarmament, which led to initial deadlock of the CD, where all decisions are taken by  consensus.


From 1999, China insisted that that a treaty on prevention of arms control in outer  space  should  be established  in  parallel  to  any  FMCT  endeavours.  China  saw  the  U.S.  cancellation  of  the  ABM  treaty  and  establishment  of  missile  defense  as  a  system  to  cripple  its  nuclear  deterrence,  resting  currently  on  minimum  strategic  nuclear  force.  Israel  has  neither  confirmed  nor  denied  the  existence  of  its  nuclear  arsenal  and  is  therefore not interested in nuclear transparency. Russia is also not willing to provide the  transparency of its nuclear installations that would be necessary for their verification.


In 1996, the United States submitted a draft text for negotiating a fissile material  cut-off treaty, which did not include any verification provisions, due to America’s lack of  confidence in the possibility of monitoring compliance with an FMCT. According to the  U.S. representative to the CD, Ambassador Jackie Sanders, “The objective of an FMCT is  not its verification, but the creation of an observed norm against the production of fissile  material  intended  for  weapons.”3It  was  thought  that  verification  would  not  only  be  challenging, but would also require extremely intrusive inspections, such as sampling in  and around facilities, which would be unacceptable to the U.S. Department of Defense  and other security agencies, as it might pose a danger of compromising national secrets.  In addition, it was argued that it is very difficult to verify the absence  of clandestine  enrichment  facilities,  and  also  hard  to  discriminate  between  material  previously  produced and produced after the cut-off date.


The CD thus remained in stalemate for almost twelve years after the conclusion of  the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, due to the lack of an agreement  among major nations on issues taken up by the CD.
 
 


Pakistan and FMCT


Over  the  past  decade,  Pakistan  has  played  an  active  diplomatic  role in  the  FMCT  process. In 1998, after the country carried out its nuclear tests, it agreed to negotiate  on  fissile  material  talks  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  Shannon  mandate,  while  making  clear  that  it  intended  to  “raise  its  concern  about  the  problem  of  unequal  stockpiles.”  Pakistan’s Ambassador to CD, Munir Akram, spelled out his country’s concerns in detail,  saying,  “We  believe  that  a  wide  disparity  in  fissile  material  stockpiles  of  India  and  Pakistan  could  erode  the  stability  of  nuclear  deterrence.”  Later,  he  explained  that  Pakistan  assumed  “India  will  transform  its  large  fissile  material  stocks  into  nuclear  weapons and thus Pakistan needed to take into account both India’s nuclear weapons  and fissile material stockpiles. It therefore cannot agree to freeze inequality.”4


Pakistan  has  not  been  supportive  of  the  treaty’s  name  (FMCT)  and  argues  that  it  does not agree to the treaty being called “Fissile Material Cut-off”, implying only a halt in  future  production.  It  should  therefore  be  called  Fissile  Material  Treaty  (FMT).  Many  States and analysts have endorsed Pakistan’s idea of an FMT.


In  2006,  Pakistan  laid  out  an  open  idea  for  an  FMT.  Masood  Khan,  Pakistan’s  ambassador  to  the  CD,  argued  that  a  cut-off  in  the  manufacturing  of  fissile  material  must be accompanied by an obligatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in  the  possession  of  fissile  material  stockpiles  by various  States. A  fissile material  treaty  must provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use  and  placing  these  stockpiles  under  safeguards  so  that  the  unsafeguarded  stocks  are  equalized at the lowest level possible.


The 65-member Conference on Disarmament established a work plan in May 2009,  which included negotiations on an FMCT, nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms  race in outer space (PAROS) and negative security assurance (assurance of security to  non-nuclear  weapon  States  by  nuclear  weapon  States).  Pakistan’s  ambassador  to  the  CD, Munir Akram, said, “At the time, it’s not perfect,” without blocking the plan. The CD,  however,  failed  to  establish  a  framework  to  implement  the  work  plan  by  the  end  of  2009, partly due to Pakistan’s concerns.


Pakistan  has  defied  international  pressure  on  fissile  material  talks  since  2009.  In  February 2010, Ambassador Zamir Akram elucidated that with the hope that Pakistan’s  concern  would  be  addressed  by  the  new  U.S.  administration,  it  agreed  to  the  programme of work in 2009. But, unfortunately, this optimism had been short-lived. He  further communicated his country’s position to the CD by saying that “the deal which  had  been  offered  to  India,  along  with  the  commitments  to  build  up  its  strategic  and  conventional capabilities, had encouraged its hegemonic ambitions, the consequences of  which can be both unintended and uncontrollable.5


“This situation confronted Pakistan with a clear and present danger. In its meeting  on January 12, 2010, the National Command Authority of Pakistan had concluded that  Pakistan  could  not  be  oblivious  of  these  developments  in  its  neighbourhood  and,  accordingly,  it  would  not  compromise  on  its  security  interests  and  the  imperative  of  maintaining a credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan’s position at the CD on an FMCT

 
 

would be based on its national security interests and objective of strategic stability in

South Asia.”


Many other countries; including Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, North Korea, Sri Lanka and  Syria; have joined Pakistan in its position for a more “balanced programme of work”,  particularly the need for talks on nuclear disarmament.


Pakistan’s current position on the FMCT negotiating course is based on the concern  that the treaty could disturb the strategic balance in the region by limiting the country’s  deterrent  capability  at  a  time  when  India  has  been  presented  with  other  means  to  increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and the subsequent  Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver have allowed India to conclude agreements with  countries,  including  Russia  and  France,  to  supply  it  with  nuclear  fuel.  With  NSG  exemption, India is placed in a position to increase its fissile material stocks qualitatively  and quantitatively. It can now divert its indigenous stock to weapons programme which  will increase asymmetry in the region.


Another  serious  concern  for  Pakistan is  India’s  quest  for  Ballistic  Missile  Defense

(BMD) by seeking help from Russia, Israel and the United States. India’s acquisition of

Ballistic Missile Defense is likely to increase strategic imbalance in the region. Pakistan  then  will  need  to  respond  by  developing  its  missile  programme  and  building  more  warheads, for which it will require more fissile material.


Pakistan has long made a case in the CD that unless the FMCT addresses the issue  of the past stock of fissile material, the treaty would freeze inequalities, placing Pakistan  at a strategic disadvantage. The stockpile issue has been debated time and again at the  CD with the nuclear weapon States, as well as India, insisting that the treaty should only  deal with future production. Many non-nuclear States have, however, argued that the  treaty should prevent civilian stocks and other fissile stock declared in excess of military  use from being diverted to use in weapons.


India’s  stance  on  FMCT  has,  however,  changed  over  time.  It  was  one  of  the  co-sponsors of the 1993 United Nations General Assembly resolution, but has been hiding  behind  the  objections  raised  by  other  countries  in  the  CD.  India  supports  multilateral  negotiating process and insists that it will not accept any compulsion detrimental to its  national security interests or which impede its strategic programme. India seems to be a  strong proponent of the treaty which will deal with future production of fissile material  and not with the existing stockpiles.


The principal focus of the treaty after being negotiated would be on Pakistan, as all  the  five  nuclear  weapon  States  have  already  terminated  fissile  material  production.  Israel has neither declared nor denied its nuclear capability. It has, however, adequate  stock of fissile material. India has been provided the opportunity to acquire fuel from  external  sources,  thereby  expanding  its  considerable  stockpiles.  The  pressure  will,  therefore, likely mount on Pakistan over its production of fissile material.


Conclusion


The  conclusion  of  the  FMCT  has  been  a  longstanding  goal  of  the  international  community.  The  indefinite  extension  of  NPT  in  1995  visualized  that  negotiations  on  FMCT  must  take  into  account  both  nuclear  disarmament  and  non-proliferation  objectives.  The  differences  of  the  CD  members  over  the  scope  of  the  treaty,  its  effectiveness as well as verification, have halted progress towards the conclusion of the  treaty. If the deadlock remains resolved, the CD may lose its significance and relevance.  Deep  insight  is  needed  at  the  highest  political  level  by  all  CD  members,  in  particular  those States who continue to have reservations about a verifiable treaty, on whether the  idea of an FMCT continues to be a high priority.


Moreover, the concerns of various countries over the existing stockpiles need to be  addressed in the most suitable manner. Since CD works on the principle of consensus,  any further development towards the conclusion of the treaty would require bringing on  board countries like Pakistan and addressing their concerns and apprehensions.


At the same time, political will and sincerity to the cause of nuclear disarmament and  non-proliferation,  is  the  pre-requisite  to  any  arms  control  measure  including  the  conclusion of the FMCT. If the FMCT is to become a reality, it would have to mediate  both  former  and  current  nuclear  security  threats.  The  FMCT  should  build  upon  the  increased  international  sensitivity  to  fissile  material  security.  The  conclusion  of  a  multilateral,  non-discriminatory  and  effectively  verifiable  FMCT  should  not  become  an  end in itself, but an effective means for nuclear stockpile security.


References
1    Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear proliferation and International Security, Routledge, 2007, p. 236.
2.    Report  of   Ambassador  Gerald  E.  Shannon  on  consultations  on  the  most  appropriate ag reement  to  negotiate  a  treaty  banning  the  production  of  fissile  material  for  nuclear weapons  or  other  nuclear  devices,  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html
3     http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Meyer
4    “Pakistan explains to conference on disarmament the rationale behind its position on a fissile material  cut  off  treaty,  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/2010/press/part1/18February.html
5.    Ibid.